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ABSTRACT
Drawing from complexity theory, this dissertation develops a schema of rhetorical
memory that exhibits extended characteristics. Scholars traditionally conceptualize
memory, the fourth canon in classical rhetoric, as place (loci) or image (phantasm).
However, memory resists the traditional loci-phantasm framework and instead emerges
from enmeshments of interiority, collectivity, and technology. Emergence considers the
dynamics of fundamental parts that generate complex systems and offers a
methodological lens to theorizing memory. The resulting construct informs everyday life,
which includes interfacing with pervasive computing or sensing familiarity. Further,
congruently with a neurological turn that contradicts simplification, this dissertation
resituates rhetorical memory as generative to imagination or perception.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Here obviously is a strategic moment, an alchemic moment, wherein momentous
miracles of transformation can take place. For here the intrinsic and the extrinsic
can change places. This idea of locating, or placing, is implicit in our very word
for definition itself: to define, or determine a thing, is to mark its boundaries
hence to use terms that possess, implicitly at least, contextual reference.
—Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives
Beginning in 1991, the United States Department of Energy (DoE) confronted a
difficult challenge. The toxic radioactive waste disposal sites they were charged with
overseeing would remain harmful beyond the foreseeable lifespans of existing languages.
How then would it be possible to warn people in the future to stay away? For
comparison, the oldest forms of writing represent a fraction of the ten thousand (10,000)
year horizon of toxicity for the waste. How could the environment, now uninhabitable
and highly toxic, be marked in understandable ways to a human that far into the future?

Fig. 1.1: “Landscape of Thorns” by Michael Brill and Safdar Abidi
“Landscape of Thorns” endeavors to answer this question by linking a landscape
of desolation with the presence of being at a particular place. Its designers, Michael Brill
and Safdar Abidi, attempt to use associational logics, namely the affordances of a nearly
universally recognizable negative image—the spike. Ideally, any future humans
wandering in the area will recognize the sign as one of danger, and leave before being
harmed. However, those future uninvited guests may also see a sign indicative of
something valuable nearby. Their curiosity might be peaked. Why else attempt to deter a
visitor, they may think, other than to keep valuables under lock and key? Or perhaps
there is something nearby of such immense political or cultural value that further study is
needed. The simplest message, stay away for your own good, becomes nearly impossible
to communicate without first understanding the memory with which it would interface.
As the situation of “Landscape of Thorns” demonstrates, the rhetorical mechanics
that order and organize human experience remain rely on interanimating parts. They are,
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in part, functions of stimuli (light, sound, touch, smell, etc.) generated by the
environment. And in part, the stores of prior knowledge and experience represented in
memory also contribute to the making of order by aligning stimuli with meaning.
Perception, which orders the world using both memory and the senses, cannot account for
conditions in which memory is absent. Similarly, without sensation of the material world
we occupy, obviously perception is impossible by definition. The persistence of the past
in memory thus directly influences our contemporary experience. However, most
commonly, memory rhetorics are defined simply as repositories of lived experience or
existing bases of knowledge, if not ignored outright. In contrast to these predominantly
inert paradigms of memory housed within the individual, this dissertation charts an
alternative perspective that understands memory as it breaches the subjects /
environments threshold. It positions memory as a rhetoric that conjoins two dynamic
pieces (the subject and the environment) into an emergent whole.

Of Memory’s Subjects
Simply stated, what becomes of the fourth canon as rhetorical agency extends
beyond human subjectivity? Concerning subjectivity and agency, we can begin with a
basic statement of an authorial nature: I, Glen Southergill, am not writing this page. But if
not “I,” who or what is doing the work of developing the argument? Would “a” Glen
Southergill be a more correct articulation given the many facets of generating text? “I”
could be an apparition; a conjured effort to project someone onto the page by way of the
computer interface to place words on pages. The keyboard “feels” real enough, and the
words—either used or using Glen Southergill—await the reader’s gaze. Some form of
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producer (in true Newtonian fashion) exists, as a change requires cause lest things at rest
stay at rest. So, how could Glen Southergill not be writing this? Who or what is?
The assertion “I” am not writing stems from arguments Mark Taylor offers in his
explorations of complexity theory in The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network
Culture. Taylor argues that the “I’s” of the writer exist, but in a perpetually emerging
form that violate fundamentally what “I” conceptually often times is taken to suggest.
Someone is writing on this page. However, the writer may just as easily be the “you” who
reads this writing within a larger rubric of response, or “them” in the sense of those prior
experiences and acquaintances that shaped “I” the writer. It could also be the terms
themselves, employed with their allegorical and metaphorical resonances. Or, it could be
in the images conjured by the places in which this text will be read. Any of these could be
the author, the subject, the artist, or another term for the manifestation of agency. To
Taylor, however, “I” operates as an assemblage of past experiences interacting with and
within a dynamic environment—perpetually shifting and reframing as connections are
forged between parts of a whole greater than “I” can contain. It is in this sense of an
unstable and shifting “I ” that Taylor puts forth his assertion.
Taylor’s dramatic point, when considered for one of its many possible
consequences for rhetoric, reverses the notion of an original compositional source born of
agents; rather, Taylor suggests that agency exists in the “agent” insofar as the agent
represents a point of intersection between the past as recalled and the environment as
experienced through perception. Taylor seemingly asserts that agencies conjure the
agents, rather than the oft-held notion that agency is a characteristic of the agent. When
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read for his implications for rhetoric, Taylor joins a longstanding conversation that
extends from antiquity into recent times. Marilyn M. Cooper revisits Taylor’s work as a
part of her exposition of complexity theory in “Rhetorical Agency as Enacted and
Emergent.” Cooper argues that agency and intentionality are not to be confused. Rather,
as Cooper demonstrates, the agents themselves closely resemble emergent complex
systems. And as is the case with any complex system, the systems of agency organize
themselves.
Cooper’s argument is careful to delineate intentionality from agency: the agent
gains agency not through conscious action, but from perception defined by presence and
affect in any given environment. To rehabilitate agency through an enacted approach,
Cooper also broadly engages Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s The Tree of
Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Working through Maturana
and Varela as a lens, Cooper concludes that “the enactive approach explains the nature of
this kind of agency as the process through which organisms create meanings through
acting into the world and changing their structure in response to the perceived
consequences of their actions” (426). Whether knowingly or not, the agent and the
environment perform looping actions that continually remake each other—with
perception serving as a basis for the rhetorical alchemy found at the interfaces of agents
and environments.
Cooper also extends arguments made by Evan Thompson and Walter Freeman in
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind, ultimately
conceding that an enacted approach to agency depends on a “process of assimilation that
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defines an agent as an individual with her own intentions and goals; individual agents are
determinate, but not determined, in an ongoing becoming driven by the interaction among
the components of their nervous system and by their interaction with the surround” (428).
Assimilation in this context refers to perceptual affects, which Cooper sees as emerging
from interactions of the agent and the environment. At issue is not agency per se, but the
overarching lines of demarcation between the capacity to act as a rhetorical agent and the
ecology in which that action would take place.

Affectual Memory Rhetorics: Understanding Emergence
It bears noting that Cooper’s complex system perception, which result in her
claim that “agency (is) emergent from embodied processes” (436), relies on memory. She
states, “the part of the loop involving intent, action, and the creation of the meaning of
sensory input is largely non-conscious, as is the resultant formation of memories and
dispositions” (429). She further explains “emotions, intentions, actions, meanings,
memories, goals, and narratives” interact within a complex system (involving the agent
and the world) in an “ongoing process of [an agent’s] becoming” (434). As a lynchpin of
her broader argument, Cooper further observes, “the choices [agents] make are not free
from influence from their inheritance, past experiences, or their surround” (421).
Memory becomes fundamentally important to Cooper’s theory of agency, and
generative through interactive processes of agents acting in environments. While I follow
Cooper in sensing a need to rethink the rhetorics of agency (and the agent) through
complexity theory, I part ways in that I suggest the past plays a much greater role in the
present than accounted for in her theory. Memory does not just respond to, but shapes
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perception. Even in Cooper’s argument, which effectively uses emergence to develop a
nuanced understanding of agency, memory remains mostly a passive filter or lens.
Contrary to both Cooper’s appropriation of memory, and the persistent “storage”
metaphor found in various treatments of memory in antiquity or present thought, memory
that begets emergence from individuals and environments.
Within the broad corpus of scholarship surrounding rhetorics of memory,
surprisingly little attention has been given to rethinking memory’s role in increasingly
chaotic or complicated ecosystems in which human agents no longer exclusively possess
agency. The things and places in the system themselves possess novels forms of agency,
particularly as the realms of rhetorical work engage “post-humanisms” of various forms.
Collin Gifford Brooke, in “Forgetting to be (Post)Human: Media and Memory in a
Kairotic Age,” articulates
We have continued to define ourselves in terms of the opposition between the
natural and artificial. Indeed, as Plato’s Diagnosis suggests, there is a sense in
which forgetfulness is implanted in our souls. We are separated from knowledge,
and increasingly we come to rely on our environment rather than our own
faculties. (786)
Brooke continues, “are learning what it means to remember too much” (792). Brooke’s
calls to “reconceive the canon of memory, complicating the binary Plato provides and
reopening a space within our hyper mediated rhetoric for the recognition of experience”
(790). Following Brooke, the artificial—the environmental—becomes a part of the
agential construct, also augmenting our capacity for memory (and forgetting). Further,
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our embodied memories interact with the environmental conditions and externalized
sources of collective memory to generate emergence. Nevertheless, the memory problem
does not stem form disembodiment as suggested by Brooke. Rather, the products of
interactions between humans and environments entail a radical return to memory’s
situated nature.

Experiencing the Present: A Musical Interlude
Highway hypnosis, it is sometimes called. After time, the familiar becomes
rhythmic—a pattern experienced with diminishing returns of vanishing details. The
background becomes consumptive of the foreground, in which sensory perceptions blur
into one indistinguishable mass. Peripheral vision becomes blurred. A lull rolls in like the
tide, as motion requires little conscious effort. The long highway rolls by, with only
occasional interruptions to disrupt a strange sort of relaxation born of repetition.
But this is not the highway.

Fig. 1.2: “Hotels near Gare du Norde” by unknown photographer
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Routine activities in public transit stations generate an audible and observable
vibrancy. Various social conventions like conversations, and pragmatic considerations
such as moving in space, conjoin the activities of with the feelings of placement within
the space. Unmistakable sounds of clamoring trains and passengers hustling fill the air, as
hurried people rush from place to place and metal wheel pushes against iron track with a
distinctive screech. Lights blink by the tracks to signify passing trains, emitting barely
audible clicking sounds as the bulbs briefly illuminate. With a whoosh, doors open for
passengers to get on and off trains. They move quickly to board the trains before the
doors close with another whoosh, and a voice announces the next station. The people
move, not as one but as if certain conventions govern their actions to promote a form of
unity—rituals coalesce from memory (avoid eye contact, watch belongings, speak on
phones loudly, forget the presence of people nearby, read from tablet computers to pass
the time). Amidst the noise and clamor, from somewhere the sound of a violin fills the
air.
While this might seem like the introduction of a fictional novel, Washington, D.C.
Metro commuters once confronted just such a scene. The air filled with the usual noises
as habituated travellers went on their way, inattentive to a violinist plays. Unbeknownst
to the commuters, they were missing a rare chance to hear virtuoso Joshua Bell; but
unlike the crowded halls to which Bell is accustomed, his inattentive audience crossed
L’Enfant Plaza Station’s entryway without much of an acknowledgement to him or his
sound. To aficionados of classical music, the music’s allure would perhaps inspire
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recollections of favorite concerts and performances in which, almost assuredly, they
would not have been so close to the players.
I imagine, as I write this, a conversation between one of the commuters and one
of the aficionados; the aficionado asks the commuter to describe the experience . . . but,
shockingly, s/he has nothing to say. Bell’s style, which classical music critic Scott
Cantrell describes as “sweetness and light,” found no audience: it was largely ignored
during his 45 minute unadvertised subway station concert. Despite the lack of financial
cost, the proximity to a highly talented and well-trained musician, and the sheer beauty of
the music, some reports tell of a thousand or so commuters rushing by with barely a
glance in Bell’s direction. Our imaginary aficionado’s jaw drops at this news. That the
listening crowd eventually grew probably does little to put her/his mind at ease. Why did
so many passing people not hear, or at least pause to acknowledge such a rare site and
beautiful sound?

An Ecology of Human and Environment, Intersecting at Memory
At any historical moment, it is common to discover a number of different
rhetorics, each competing for attention and claiming to be the one, true system.
—James Berlin
Agency speaks, then, to the possibilities for a subject to enter into discourse and
effect change – even change that might serve to further entrench a dominant
social order.
—Carl G. Herndl & Adela C. Licona
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While it is possible that the notion of habituation associated with “hypnosis”
invoked earlier may account for Bell’s transient audience—which, given their inattentive
response to Bell’s play, I hesitate to call them—a more likely prospect is the presence of
a larger problematic. Bell’s performance in 2007 at L’Enfant Station invokes the
complications associated with blurring divisions between agency and places
(environments) of rhetoric, and illustrates the need for a revitalized theory of memory.
More specifically, as illustrated by this dissertation, complexity theory provides a means
by which the tradition of memory in rhetoric can extend into ambient domains.
To understand the role memory plays between the individual and the
environmental, two intersecting terms that receive more elaborate treatment later in the
dissertation are needed: ambience and emergence. The final section of this chapter
provides an overview of the dissertation’s organization, and specifically mentions the
points at which these terms are raised for more thorough treatment. For now, they are
used simply to describe the exigency underwriting this dissertation. Ambience, which I
visit in greater depth in my fourth chapter, can for present purposes remain defined as
environment affects; it explores the collapse of exteriority within interiority. Emergence,
as a body of theory for self-organizing (complex) systems), models the consequences of
entwining agent and scene. Emergence is explored in greater depth in the third chapter.
The interactions exemplified by “Landscape of Thorns” or Joshua Bell’s music—
the scene of play and passing non-listeners, an effort to shout a warning without a
common language—are perceptual matters that interface the individual and the
environmental under a rubric of memory rhetorics. Moreso, they indicate the present of
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an emergent construct aligned with the conjecture of this dissertation, in which memory
rhetorics exhibit emergence. And as an added exigency, it bears noting that the
consequences of new materialisms and post-humanisms are still only beginning to be
explored within the fields of rhetoric. Memory, as informing emergence, serves a vital
role to these broader theoretical undercurrents.
Returning to the questions of subjectivity interjected at this chapter’s onset, we
could assert that the context refused to grant agency to Bell’s music. Admittedly, given
his accomplishments as a universally regarded great violinist, it seems odd to make that
claim. For the purposes of explaining the motion to broader questions of ecology, it
stands to reason that the link of agency to rhetoric requires much greater explication.
Marilyn Cooper asserts that “any theory of agency that depends upon a notice of the
subject is thus hamstrung at the start, struggling with how to account for any action that is
not either determined by or resistant to semiotic, social, political, and material others or
orders” (423). Cooper’s claim acknowledges various critiques of the subject that serve to
trouble agency; she recognizes that, from this broad corpus of thought, agency appears on
the verge of conceptual fragmentation. As Cooper admits, it becomes all but impossible
to “deny that a subject can ‘have’ agency” (423). Bell’s failure to capture that audience
may support such a position. However, as Cooper proposes, rhetors confront the choice
either to lament the loss of or rehabilitate an agency. She chooses the latter option on the
grounds that “individual agency is necessary for the possibility of rhetoric” (426).
For illustration of the close entanglements inherent to agency within rhetoric,
Raúl Sánchez in “Outside the Text: Retheorizing Empiricism and Identity” observes:
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. . . critical theories of the subject have offered the idea that agents, texts, contexts
are interconnected – the idea that they are all, in fact, participants in
thoroughgoing textuality. But network and new media technologies have given
textuality a materiality of sorts, rendered it a daily, lived experience as a well as
an interesting concept. (235)
To both Cooper and Sánchez, the capacity to do the symbolically and materially heavy
work of rhetoric, with its varied definitions, stems from a sense of agent-subject (one who
acts and influences others in that action). Carolyn Miller’s arguments in “What Can
Automation Teach Us About Agency” and Michael C. Leff ‘s “Tradition and Agency in
Humanistic Rhetoric” offer similar arguments, in which the knowing subject cannot
cleanly equate into rhetorical agency or be divided from the broader ecology.
Yet, these articulations of agent and subject struggle with the absence of “I” as
theorized by Taylor. Cooper in part addresses this issue through processes of embodiment
and situatedness. Along similar trajectories of thought, Sánchez turns to identity as “an
aspect of the idea of traffic between textuality and the ‘outside’ of textuality” (236). Both
approaches, in Sánchez’s terms, articulates a “complex relationship” resulting in a
“moment . . . best theorized via a concept insofar as such a concept can speak to temporal
concerns by focusing on the rhetorical vicissitudes, rather than the ontological or
epistemological stability, of agency” (241). Relying on formations extended from
Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Post Human: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics, and Stuart Hall’s “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity?’,”
Sánchez contends that his resulting notion of a writing-subject then “erases the boundary
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between individual and environment” (245). Further, that the “the study of writing is the
very site at which [the complex which exists beyond the inherent feature of experience or
objects of philosophical scrutiny] might be pursued” (244).
Agency to both Sánchez and Cooper represent the intermediary of the rhetor and
the rhetoric—that is, the agent and the ecology into which rhetoric attempts to prove
impactful. And these mechanics of emergence are, in this dissertation, positioned as
extensions of memory rhetoric.

Alchemic Moments: Memory in the Environment
The collapse of internal and external, under the auspices of a memory rhetoric
accessed through theorizing agency, finds additional support in Carl G. Herndl and Adela
C. Licona’s arguments. Herndl and Licona observe, “we are left to question not only who
has the authority to speak and represent, but also what the conditions and opportunities
are that allow subjects to change or to reproduce social, institutional, and discursive
practices” (134). Further, they argue, “we need a more careful understanding of the
interaction between agency and those regulative forces that stabilize institutions and
practices” (134). Like Taylor, Herndl and Licona position agency as a pre-condition of
the agent in order to uphold their argument.
The postmodern subject becomes an agent when she occupies the agentive
intersection of the semiotic and the material through a rhetorical performance.
Agency here does not reside in the individual, and this conception does not deny
the power of language, (con)textuality, the unconscious, and capital. Agency is a
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social/semiotic intersection that offers only a potential for action, an opportunity.
(141)
We may immediately revisit assertions made by Jeff Rice who, like Herndl and Licona
claims “agency exists at the intersection of a network of semiotic, material, and yes,
intentional elements and relational practices” (137) and sees interactivities within rhetoric
as invoking agency (and, by extension, an agent). Rice’s “drawing attention to how
networked exchanges distribute writing across authors and places of writing” reinforces
the notion of a rhetoric derived from agency, when agency is seen as Cooper positions it:
as emergent and embodied.
With Joshua Bell in 2007, I can comfortably offer several points of explanation as
it relates to the rhetorical issues visible within his denied agency. Agency, we can
comfortably conclude, is indicative of deeper theoretical questions derived from
interactivity. The listeners moved within a rich sensory environment to which they were
habituated. The sound waves of the violin encountered other elements of the sonic
environment, meshing and comingling to become an acoustic assemblage of sorts. By
consequence of the people’s habituation in that already crowded space—in other words,
their memories as applied to it—an agency was not forthcoming to Bell. However, as
predicted by Andy Clark’s treatment of active memory, the agent assimilates these
external elements through processes of extension and association. Sara Vanderhaagen
calls this a form of “agential spiral” surrounding memories embodied in publics—in
groups that implicitly or explicitly sanction certain memories. Or in terms Edith
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Wyschogrod poses, we begin a confrontation with a “subjectivity in crises forced to
recursively think itself” (878).
As agency across these theories predict, the issue was to be found less in the
environment than those inhabiting and, in so doing, assimilating it from invocations of
past experience. Suddenly, we return yet again to the question of how to perceive
something beyond our memory, and find an inability to do so. To gesture towards the
emergence memory rhetoric forecasts, I offer a term formed of Kenneth Burke’s sceneagent ratio: the “alchemic moment.” To Burke, transferability between natural and
subjective orders becomes possible at such moments. Burke would simplify things
somewhat for us, offering a third term by referring to a form of “supernaturalism”
(Grammar of Motives 50). At these alchemic moments, Burke sees the boundaries of
inside and outside as permeable: one bleeds into the other, generating something else—
something irreducible to either the inside or the outside. One immediately may be
reminded of the tipping point harkening the arrival of emergence. It is, indeed, a
connection to which I return later. For now, suffice it to say that a synthesis of Burke’s
alchemy and Mark Taylor’s emerging agent mentioned earlier renders the “I” of writing a
construct born of past experiences and their affective associations in the present. We
could also add that alchemic moments resemble rhetorical kairos, further implicating the
problematics of time and affect involved within the notion of the emergence. And in so
doing, the need to explore emergence as a theoretical construct comes into sharper relief.
It also bears noting how this trajectory of thought blurs and collapses the writer, the
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subject, and situations of rhetoric into one another. Something unpredicted, a different “I”
than its predecessor results.
An alchemic moment can be thought of as a moment of construction and
generation across boundaries. On one hand, such crossings are of interiority moving into
exteriority. Yet at other times, as William A. Covino’s idea of generative magic in Magic,
Rhetoric, and Literacy: An Eccentric History of the Composing Imagination reminds us,
the demarcation of normalcy seems particularly germane. To explain, symbols, language,
and rhetoric become means to animate previously arrested discourse. At least a part of
memory’s function is to afford stabilizing patterns that offer senses of order; Covino
positions magic as the rhetoric needed to break those patterns and to un-arrest the
stabilizing influence so that something new can take root. Mark Taylor similarly sees
critiques of the sort in which agency becomes irreconcilably fragmented as blinded. To
Taylor, non-totalizing systems offer an openness that is susceptible to change (or
generation of contra-arrested discourse). In such systems, the author or artist for that
matter is not dead, but distributed and extended across the ecology of writing.
Taylor and Cooper engage the question of authorial “I’s”—who or what is
writing, or coming into being from environmental queues (textual or otherwise)—as the
tip of a web of interconnections, which the sphere of continuously and dynamically daily
encounters continuously reshape. Writers or producers of creative content, extending
Taylor and Cooper’s lens, exist less as a matters of being than of becoming—or, more
colloquially, of works-in-progress in which ecological factors affecting the writer become
the writer her or himself. Amongst the swirl of interactions that generate the writer “I,”
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Taylor interjects remains incompletely reconciled within rhetorical theory. Cooper
provides a useful framework in her arguments to the effect that agency is not to be found
in the ecology, but is of the ecology. “I” is continuously made and remade by virtue of
connections within the surrounding environment, including most especially the affinities
or identifications that produce a general sense of the familiar.
As the corpus of scholarship examining agency illuminates, alchemic moments
spring from hyper-connected ecologies over time. Consequently, the questions of “I”
derived early on in this chapter infringes on and encompasses several related terms:
subject, artist, writer, context, and non-human. Although not synonymous, the rhetorics
of memory vitalize and invigorate the alchemic process of emergence.

Vitalizing the Past
Out of the same store do I myself combine fresh and fresh likelihoods of things,
which I have experienced, or believed upon experience: and by these do I infer
actions to come, events, and hopes: and upon all these again do I meditate, as if
they were now present. Memories here are not simply reproduced: they are
likenesses that are ‘combined’ or, in another translation [of Augustine’s
Confessions], ‘woven’ (contexo), that is, shaped in the process of remembering –
and memories that ‘I . . . myself’ combine (or that ‘I can myself weave’) are
hardily reducible to servile reproductions
—Zsolt Komáromy
To Cooper, agency conceptually aligns itself with the resonances of the past as an
integral part of a complex system of which rhetorical agents are a part. She notes, “order
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is a provisional and temporary achievement, because agents are always doing things that
make a difference” (425). Quite literally, building from complexity theory, the presence
of an agent supposes the existence of an agency—consciousness and deliberation may
(but need not be) a part of the scheme. As she notes, an agent (unlike a subject) are
“unique, embodied, and autonomous individuals in that they are self-organizing, but by
virtue of that fact, they, as well as the surround with which they interact, are always
changing” (425). Material conditions collide with subjective influences, resulting in
alternative possibilities of production that trouble efforts to fetishize the intrinsic or
extrinsic as detached constructs.
I replay Bell’s violin from this point of origination, in which I note that agency’s
inevitable presence indicts the presence of a rhetoric that requires a sense of the past.
Fruitfully, rhetoric / composition scholars such as Thomas Rickert, Nedra Reynolds,
Byron Hawk, and Margaret Syverson revisit the “I” questions as a part of their theorizing
complexities of the social and material. Neglecting the binaries of either/or, social or
material, the trend of scholarship of which Rickert, Hawk, and Syverson are a part invoke
terms of interconnection—which I, in this dissertation, argue possesses emergent
characteristics that stem from memory rhetorics. A number of fields, perhaps sensing the
same trade winds, express related ideas. Artists have explored site specificity to consider
how expectancy and place conspire to produce material affects on the patron. And
historians look to the means by which context contribute to the subjects of study.
Assemblages of the emerging “I” illustrate interconnectivities derived from
several converging lines. However, rhetoric’s turn to theorizing emergence is in its early
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stages. As an element of this dissertation’s broader argument, Burke’s alchemistic
moments gain newfound significance in “post-human” and “new material” rhetorical
contexts. Such moments invoke and respond to emergence across this dissertation’s
weaving of several foci. Within new materialisms, the things that make up our ecologies
of writing move from passive to active and vibrantly engaging. They engage us as much
as we engage them. In this “post-human” landscape, the agency of things cannot be
overlooked. Consequently, swirls of interactions generate new constructs. Rhetorics born
of complexity align with the epoch into which this dissertation enters, in which
expanding networks and cross-disciplinary engagements of actors, things, and places
breed new connections. Under such conditions, the rhetorical canon of memory gains a
newfound (but under-theorized) importance.
Although born of the scientific, complexity represents a corpus of thought
rippling into the humanities more broadly within the rubric of new materialism.
Concurrently, there is also presently a proliferation of memory. Both fields—those that
study memory rhetoric and those that study complexity—engage networked thought.
Memory remains, in part, in the human body (interiority). Musicality itself depends on
certain familiarities, and of terms including harmonics and symphonics, which reside (in
part) in memory. Joshua Bell’s skills were honed with practice, his memory eventually
assimilating the actions associated with making music to the point of intuitive gesture.
Amongst his audience, the often-mentioned “trained ear” becomes little more than
metaphor for remembering a broader range of musical style. However, memory also
abounds both in the proliferating technologies and cloud-informatics surrounding the
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human subject, and fabrics of the cultural collectives of which any given human is a part
(exteriority). Such exteriorities are of the sort complexity theory endeavors to simulate.
As a further point of intersection, the assorted models that simulate events represent in
much the same way memory does. Archival spaces preserve the past in ways from which
efforts may be made to apprehend past events. In these synchronous gestures, of
memory’s proliferation and the complexities of rhetoric, comes a theoretical gap to which
this work responds – a sense of emergence.
It bears noting how memory tends to fall into problematic languages of “false”
versus “accurate” divisions. Yet, to the rhetorics of memory broadly construed, such
labels are of little consequence; memory accomplishes more than retrieve semblances of
the past (translating prior experiences and encountered ideas into present contexts), it
provides mechanisms of emergence by which the present can be understood (perceived)
in affectual terms. What led to particular patterns of thought (manifested in actions)
where Bell’s music was so often overlooked? In that day’s ecology of media, music,
hustle, and moving sea of humanity, many overlooked a rare sound. Surely, our
imaginary aficionado thinks, the commuters lost something—something that could have
inspired, and remained with them.
We can’t say it was forgotten in that it was never perceived, but it was not
perceived because memory’s manifestations veiled it. Yet, that was the absence as
experienced by one commuter; had the same conversation included one of the fortunate
few who stayed to hear the music (even if with untrained ears, vaguely aware of but not
quite able to discern the nuances of the music), another recollection may have been
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discussed. In this alternative course of events, the commuter assimilated the music into
their experience of moving through the terminal. The aficionado, I imagine, would be
pleased to hear how Bell’s violin made the space into something new and unexpected
(even if amused by the commuter’s rudimentary sense of music).
Each of the imaginary aficionado’s responses, who is her/himself an amalgam of
various people I (or you) have seen or met in the past, would have required an act of
translation—a placement of past situated experience into the present—had the
conversations actually occurred. We could endeavor to entitle the processes involved
remembering or imagining, neglecting the subtle distinctions between these concepts.
And depending on our attitudes toward historical accuracy, memory may seem like a
safer theoretical harbor than imagination. As a brief note of differentiation, the passing
crowds who walked by without pause—we could not apply the related term “forgetting”
(for to them, after all, the passage would assuredly not be recalled for its intersection with
Bell’s music). But if we treat the case as an articulation of a type of memory, we must do
so aware of several points. These include subjectivities associated with any experience—
that even amongst shared happenings, some variance inevitably occurs. Also, we must be
sensitive of the challenges of translation and translatability into different contexts. We
conjure modified semblance of the past that, awash with allusion to other memories,
bleed into a new wholes.
Following Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey, contemporary theories of memory
rhetorics are of two sorts relative to any agent of rhetoric: external and internal. I find this
taxonomy appealing in that it acknowledges the potential for media storage,

22

commemorative sites, and archival space as extensions of the canon. Further, their use of
“internal” places is a sufficiently broad category to encompass both “mind” and “body”
(rather than mind/body), offering a path to negotiate a tradition of contentious thought. I
continue, but more radically extend in this project, the holistic system suggested in
Pruchnic and Lacey. In accepting a binary of “internal and external” forms, as advanced
by Pruchnic and Lacey, memory invokes a tradition of rhetoric in which “broad systems
in which past experiences and associations are captured and/or strategically leveraged for
persuasive effects” (475). At the most generous of articulation, memory systems
“function as mediator or interface between human interiority and exteriority as well as
the impact of rhetorical memory on suasion in general” (477). Agreeing with Pruchnic
and Lacey, I discuss how memory’s rhetoric functions as easily at the space of interface
(the flesh of gatekeeping between that which is inside and that which is outside) as it does
either internally or externally.
Systematizing memory’s intrusion into rhetoric as a collapse of external/internal
opens a theoretical need, one addressed in this dissertation. Being reluctant to detach
memory from situated and embodied rhetorical assemblages, I argue thinking complexity
and ambience revitalizes memory. As exteriority encounters interiority, the border(s) of
perception and memory become permeable—plastic. Consider that, at its face, the
relationship of memory to forgetting (or, as a matter of subject, the forgotten) appears
antithetical. What memory is to keeping, forgetting is often thought to consist of losing
or, for that matter, deleting. By extension, memory works in opposition to forgetting by
way of inclusion, protection, or preservation. However, such simple binaries vastly
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understate the relationship memory forges with the past in the present. And it is for
purpose—to think the affects of the past in an ecological present beyond external/internal
and remembered/forgotten—that my theoretical exploration follows a path for an
emergent rhetoric, of memory.

Chapter Organization
The chapters of this dissertation are deliberately arranged as a loop, beginning and
ending with a form of memory rhetoric. Chapter 2 establishes memory as a canon in
rhetoric’s classical and contemporary history. It begins with an overview of pre-Platonic
thought, in which memory is described as a web of relationships. Then, the chapter
describes Aristotle’s theory of memory in which he defines it as an affection of the past
in the present organized by nodes—resemblances (phantasmata). Subsequent Roman
rhetors (Cicero, Quintilian, Rhetorica ad Herennium), and contemporary virtual or
phenomenological perspectives (Henri Bergson, Brian Massumi, Elizabeth Grosz, Paul
Ricoeur, Edward Casey) reaffirm the relationship of memory to affect. Finally, chapter 2
illustrates memory’s role in affect by drawing on artists like James Turrell, historians like
Jay Winter and Pierre Nora, and theorists like Paul Ricoeur.
Chapter 3 describes emergence—the processes by which simple components
affect systems, and interactions give rise to complex systems. To Paul Cilliers and Sandra
Mitchell, the study of complex systems requires an understanding of how simple
interactions converge. Such convergences generate complexity as explored in works by
John Holland, Stuart Kauffman, and Manuel De Landa. As chapter five illustrates, Andy
Clark, Evan Thompson, and Terrence W. Deacon’s connect emergence to memory
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rhetoric under the auspices of the extended mind hypothesis. Emergence as a form of
situated memory rhetoric is further theorized using Kenneth Burke’s notion of
perspective by incongruity.
Chapter 4 examines the emergent relationship of agents and environments under
ambience. Ambience refers to the envelopment of subjects in spaces, and finds
expression in the works of contemporary artists Miru Kim and Sally Mann’s themes of
decay. Chapter 4 expands ambience as a product of affect across domains of habituation,
expectancy, and attenuation. Then, specifically drawing from groundings established by
Nedra Reynolds, Thomas Rickert, and Margaret Syverson, chapter 4 describes ambience
as an emergent approach to writing pedagogy.
Finally, chapter 5 revisits (returns) to the theme of memory rhetorics under the
rubric of neuro-scientific turns. Looking at what Barbara Marie Stafford terms the new
“meta-field,” chapter 5 invokes neuroplasticity. Neuroplasticity considers how the brain
rewires itself in response to prior learning, yet retains an ability to adjust to new
experiences. However, rather than await stimuli to facilitate a change of the brain, the
brain actively projects expectancies onto the environment. Only as those expectancies are
violated does emergence occur, and memory regenerates itself into a new order. The
dissertation thus ends near where it began, with subjective (individual) rhetorics of
memory—connecting recent neurological evolutions with longstanding theoretical
discourse.

25

CHAPTER TWO
THE MEMORY PALACE
The way we take up any part of our sensory experience, the way we actually
experience it, the meaning we give to it, is always affected by the rest of our
experience, some of it current as background perception, some of it as something
retained from previous encounters with the world.
—Kurt Danziger, Marking the Mind: A History of Memory

Fig. 2.1: “Blue Planet Sky” (James Turrell). Photo by “scarlettgreen”
Visitors to artist James Turrell’s Blue Planet Sky enter a square room whose
features are, at first glance, completely unremarkable. The level floor, drab paint, and
square corners fit the archetype of any number of routinely encountered built spaces.
However, their sense of normalcy lasts only a short while; visitors quickly find their gaze
wandering toward a large rectangular hole in the center of the room. Blue sky, natural
light, the passing clouds, and perhaps a few birds enter their field of vision. It is not
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uncommon to notice other patrons staring skyward in silence, transfixed at the sight of
open sky in an otherwise “normal” room.
Seeking to “awaken us to perceptions we ourselves are normally unaware of,”
(Blue Planet Sky) Turrell uses a readily available and plentiful media (the light from the
sky) to attenuate his audience to the trappings of their perceptions. Visitors expect a
ceiling with artificial light and the hum of electronics, but instead find natural light from
a skyscape. Turrell’s Sky introduces a sharp divide between expectancy and awareness, as
it surrounds occupants of the room with natural light. Viewers may as a consequence
begin to sense an otherwise masked artificiality of interior spaces. Sky ceases to follow
expectations; once transformed by the light of the sky, Turrell’s installation interrupts the
visitor’s anticipations. However it is not the room that changes—only the light and the
expectancies of the guests within it. Visitors have the same basic senses they did before
entering the room. Their powers of sight, hearing, and smell are no stronger or weaker
than they were.
Essentially, Sky displays a sensibility to the ways in which perception relies on
past experiences. Much as Kenneth Burke sees in literary form “an arousing and
fulfillment of desires” (Counter-Statement 124), Sky calls attention to a form of memory
typically hidden from conscious awareness that affects perception. In more fully defining
and describing this frequently overlooked form of memory, this chapter enters an
intellectually contested land concerning the relation of the past to present (aka: memory
to perception). In sharp contrast to the operations of memory exemplified in Sky, memory
often remains theorized as inert. Such theories describe memory as a form of storage
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awaiting addition or retrieval. Subsequently, under this common formulation, perception
or invention pull from memory to apply past experiences to present contexts. Memory,
such an articulation would hold, awaits activation. However, Turrell’s Sky illustrates that
the acts and processes of experiencing places or things relies more extensively on an
active and generative memory than the storehouse model can address.
Turrell, this chapter illustrates, is not the first to complicate memory’s role in
perception or inspire critiques of the reductionist lens favored by storehouse models. This
chapter first offers a theoretical grounding for memory as a generative rhetoric derived
from classical, Renaissance, and collective understandings. Consequently, as this chapter
discusses, memory conjoins identification and motive. From this common heritage,
memory displays emergent properties (as the next chapter addresses) and manifests itself
in the ubiquitously technologized ambiances of the “everyday” and in neurorhetoric (as
subsequent chapters describe).

Defining Memory in Perception
The greatest and fairest discovery has been found to be memory; it is useful for
everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life. This is the first step: if
you focus your attention, your mind, making progress by this means, will perceive
more. The second is to practice whatever you hear: if you hear the same things
many times and repeat them, what you have learned presents itself to your
memory as a connected whole. The third step is: whenever you hear something,
connect it with what you know already.
“Dissoi Logoi or Dialexesis,” 292-293
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Rather than interrupt or criticize memory, Turrell’s Sky offers a chance to become
attenuated to its omnipresence. Entering a generic room and encountering familiar coaxes
viewers to see all parts anew. The visitors may then witness just how far past experiences
extend into sensory understandings into the present. Experiences of the sort Sky inspires
can haunt, inspire, illuminate, or otherwise drive visitors to certain feelings. Within
contemporary art, “place” resonates with site-specificity (placement as a form of artistic
medium) and aligns space with memory. For collective memory studies, places of
preservation or commemoration become the lynchpin for sanctioned tellings of history.
Yet place remains an elusive concept predicated on the mechanics of perception, which
then rely on certain characteristics of memory. Sky offers a singular illustration of a
broader problematic—both in that places can inform memory, and how memory informs
a given subject’s experience of place. However, there is an intermediary term between
memory and place that becomes more evident when visitors move out of Sky.
Understandably, it may be a disquieting experience to enter other rooms afterward
visiting Sky—perhaps seeing the odd florescent hues or artificial light trigger through
renewed eyes becomes disquieting. It can become difficult to not look for clouds, blue
sky, or a flood of natural light in spaces otherwise “protected” from the natural world.
In other words, the space between memory and perception becomes accessible to
investigation in Turrell’s use of light in a “normal” place. While the perception of light
remains an intuitive process of sensation in one limited sense, memory’s role requires
further consideration. As Turrell’s work signals, this chapter stakes a contrasting position
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to the oft-held perspective of active perception and passive memory by drawing from
rhetorical histories. Memory historically often developed rhetorical inclinations when, in
part, it became designed: memory-palaces created systems of concepts and past
experiences predicated on boundaries of past/present and permissible/impermissible.
Subsequently, the idea of memory as place suggested an ability to divorce memory from
the processes of experience. To offer a synopsis, the palaces of memory (also known as
“loci”) became places that theory began to view as separate than the experiencing of any
given material or physical place. Place represented both a logic of organizing as well as a
sensation of familiarity. A situated person possesses memory, so goes this line of thought,
but that memory would be insolated from the environment of which that person was a
part. Memory palaces and loci remain a part of a broader theoretical tradition, but they
easily overlook another thread of memory theory within the rhetorical tradition.
Memory also serves to produce order in the present even as it surrounds and
envelops us in biological, cultural, and digital forms. Rhetorical perspectives on the
entanglements of past into present can then be understood as that which studies the
formation or reformation of the memory palace, and not just the palaces themselves. The
commuters of 2007 exposed to Joshua Bell’s music (see Chapter 1) employed their
memory to navigate a rich sensory environment—Bell’s music was one part of a larger
scenic whole. Sensory perception engaged the environment, yet prior knowledge and
experience ordered the otherwise chaotic scene. Navigating place or appreciating music
stems from an entanglement of memory with perception.

30

However, interjecting perception immediately troubles the existing boundaries of
past/present (which lend themselves to a limited understanding of memory as simply a
palace). Perception is of the “somewhat.” It is “somewhat” controllable in that we can
consciously affix our gaze on certain details or ignore others. It is “somewhat” a
consequence of method, where training can lead us to consciously use it as a method of
invention or of understanding context. Perception is “somewhat” of the present, but
invokes a particular sense and function of memory. Loci offer one way to approach
memory, but it is a way that neglects the aspects of memory that guide and inform
perception. To provide a basis for the active and generative memory rhetoric required of
perception, an alternative grounding of memory rhetoric warrants consideration.
As an accompaniment to loci, memory rhetoric in classical thought relied on
memory images called phantasmata. As William A. Covino summarizes, “for the
ancients, phantasy denotes cognition, and all prevailing models of mind presume that one
cannot understand without phantasms” (32). Further, Covino notes, “when we investigate
magic or rhetoric, we are looking at the process of inducing belief and creating
community, and looking at how the mind creates impressions and controls their powers
and effects” (33). The mental images created in generating memory become the same
images used to assimilate new experiences; in other words, phantasy connotes the
rhetorical approach of appropriating the past into perception. They are not the things or
experiences themselves, Aristotle argues in On Memory, but shadows cast forward from
(but are not the same as) the things themselves.
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While loci provide a tradition to memory born of place, phantasy considers the
role of visual imagery—and, by extension, considers how imagery from the past interacts
with sensation in the present to produce perception. In David Krell’s treatment of
Aristotle’s On Memory, memory “instigates a peculiar kind of presence” found as an
“object of perception or knowledge without activating perception or knowledge as such”
(15). To Krell, Aristotle connects “imagination” and “psychic images” as related terms,
noting “the role of images in memory, plus the cognizance of time that we take in
memory, time as a bounded magnitude, quantity, or how-much, and as a kind of motion,
elevate memory—which at first seemed a mere aspect of perception—to the status of a
‘primary’ perceptual power” (15). Krell’s connection of imagination to psychic images
results in a tension—he uses “incision” to invoke earlier treatments of memory as forms
of sensory impression retained over time. As a consequence, Krell notes a remnant (an
“icon”) available for further study in its own right. Alternatively the connection of
phantasy to experience could become associated to a particular somewhere, or something,
in “relation to an original” (17). These two perceptions of memory as either iconic or
relational results in, Krell subsequently observes, an “either/or of our psychic scanning
results in a common equivocation: we are often unsure in any given case whether what
we ‘see’ in our minds is actually a memory or not” (18). While further blurring the
distinction of memory and perception in what is sometimes termed “working memory,”
Krell suggests the insufficiency of storage even while drawing from “incision” as a point
of elaboration. Krell’s work applies pressure on the loci as an exclusive and exclusionary
rhetoric of memory. Instead, it lays a framework for drawing from the image—the
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phantastical—as an approach that both reclaims a marginalized tradition that also
assumes a more active position within perception.
Mary Carruthers echoes the mystiques of phantasy Krell describes, defining them
as resemblances of things that spur recollection. For memory, Carruthers reminds,
phantasy generates a “re-enactment of experience” which is “heavily dependent on the
recollector’s skill in being able to form memory images that are ‘rich’ in association”
(76). In this light, phantasy does more than encapsulate the past into something
retrievable: it offers points of entry into loci, serving as the proverbial bricks of the
memory palaces. They also respond quickly and in consonance with emotional or
physiological reactions, thus connecting the experiences of the present with the remnants
of the past. Carruthers’s invocation of emotional resonance in phantasy again positions
memory as informing perception through mental imagery.
More broadly, Aristotle asserts in De Anima “whenever one is contemplating, it is
some image (phantasma) one is contemplating; for the images (phantasma are like sense
data without matter” (De Anima 432a). The habits of experiencing the present rely on
phantasms, and phantasms inform the acquisition of new experiences or knowledge. As
further demonstration of phantasy’s importance, certain experiences of a particularly
jarring nature cannot be forgotten nor remembered using the existing structures of
memory. This is not to suggest an ontological or epistemological anarchy; on the
contrary, the phantasmal consequence of projecting the past in the present provides an
alternative framework for understanding memory-as-rhetorical. Zsolt Komáromy’s, for
instance, discusses that memory arts inform the aesthetics and logics of literary criticism.
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To Komáromy, in the experience of aesthetics “ . . .memories are therefore makings, not
copies; memory produces what we remember; it does not reproduce fixed contents”
(Italics mine, 8). In similar ways, Kurt Danziger argues, “perception and memory do not
constitute two separate systems but are aspects of the same adaptive response” (259). To
Danziger, the separation of memory from other faculties (including perception) necessary
to building a loci-centric understanding of memory had less to do with the subject of
study than the development of sub-disciplines in the sciences. Danziger continues, “what
is retained is the potential for recognition, for categorization, and on the psychological
level this manifests itself as a perceptual achievement” (259). Danziger and Komáromy
demonstrate that phantasy employs a sense of memory that offers an alternative to
storage/retrieval perspectives. As Aristotle would remind us in his treatise On Memory,
we are left not with the things themselves (which are already lost to us), but to
approximations.
In ways Danziger would note more recently, Fredrick Bartlett argues that
remembering is reconstructing (266). To phantasy, such gestures towards reconstruction
interrogate how the past animates the present. While phantasy accounts for organizing
principles born of past experiences, it presupposes also an ability to morph without the
addition of new memory. Essentially, existing memories not only inform present
experiences but also accommodate them. The phantasy would morph to fit the newer
circumstances. In so doing, phantasy exhibits a capacity for the addition of new
experiences without contributing new memories. Such would be anticipated in cases, for
illustration, of why new places invoke feelings of deja-vu. They are sufficiently similar to
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invoke a phantasmatic association, but insufficiently divorced to require a new image.
Such circumstances would suggest that not all phantasmatas are equal. As they grow to
encompass greater varieties of association, phantasy would hypothesize that some
phantasmata would gain both greater pliability and primacy.
Memory as related to perception and expressed in phantasy offers organizing
generative principles of the places a subject inhabits. Phantasy thus provides a means of
recovering memory not simply as loci, but as images in the processes of making place
present. It insinuates a form of memory active in the present and violates the primacy of
loci in theorizing memory. Memory, when viewed phantastically, actively guides
perception even as it is reframed by its encounters with the surrounding environment.
While I am not arguing for a synonymous entity with perception, my reading of memory
extends the fourth canon by suggesting a reliance on the past within the affects of present
experience. When seen in this way, phantasy invokes a sort of memory which is as
concerned with the present as it is with the past. It is also always already material: the
writing, speaking, or the sensory impressions of testimony can be viewed as memory
incarnate.

A Rhetorical Lineage of Phantasy
Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the ideas supplied by invention, to the
guardian of all the parts of rhetoric, the Memory.
—Rhetorica ad Herennium
Nothing is ever really lost, or can be lost,
No birth, identity, form — no object of the world.
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—Walt Whitman
In a problematic related to the exigencies of a depleted understanding of phantasy,
what is it, Giorgio Agamben asks, to bear witness to something that could not be directly
experienced? How can we serve as voices to those unable to speak? Agamben sees the
Jewish victims of Nazi perpetrated genocide as voiceless outside the memory of
survivors. Survivors were touched by something in common, of course, but not in the
same way. The calling forth to the present in testimony is a lacuna in Agamben’s
thought—they could not actually speak for the dead. Agamben turns to an issue of
phantasy implicit in questions of language and writing when he suggests, “perhaps every
word, every writing is born, in this sense, as testimony. This is why what is borne witness
to cannot already be language or writing. It can only be something to which no one has
borne witness” (38).
Agamben derives the idea of witness, in part, from the etymology of martyr:
martis with dual connotations of remembrance and profession (26-27). From these two
connotations implicit to witnessing and to writing, a number of problems arise—notably
the impossibility of remembering in the place of others. Instead, those who cannot speak
for themselves must rely on “pseudo-witnesses” who “bear witness to a missing
testimony” (34). Agamben adds “testimony is thus always an act of an author: it always
implies an essential duality in which an insufficiency or incapacity is completed or made
valid” (150). Therein lies Agamben’s return to the paradox of perception and invocation
of phantasy, testifying to what happens to others relies on an authorial—a productive
instead of reproductive—logic that renders the “knowability” of the non-lived past in
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question. The alternative, a turn to phantasy, favors re-writing the past even as it is
accessed in or guides the experiencing of the present.
This section builds from classical and Renaissance rhetoric to offer a rhetorical
lineage of phantasy; in short, it affords an answer to the problem of testimony Agamben
frames. As Frances Yates articulates, memory as a field of study sprang from divine roots
in which memory was the mother of all other muses. Yates’s frequently cited history of
memory begins with an accounting of Simonides, a poetic magician who illustrated that
the memory palace could be built through application of images to organizing
frameworks. Simonides, the story goes, visually recalled the seating order of a banquet
hall while identifying the mangled corpses killed by a collapsed roof. His method could
be applied to other contexts simply by selecting memorable images to signify concepts,
ideas, or other such subject material, and then finding a place in the mind’s eye for it. In
short, Simonides built a memory palace to house images of each person, which in turn
became the study of memory. The notion of the image, in this sense, immediately invokes
a sense of phantasy. Memory excludes as well as includes, and closely relates to matters
of style wherever metaphor (or delivery in the case of gestures as two examples) were
employed.
Loci, most importantly, house but do not replace images. From the memories of
others, a type of embodied knowledge accessible through dialectic (a Socratic method of
investigation, in common parlance), Plato sees an opportunity to move toward truthprimordial (already present and innate). The young, those untrained, can obtain a material
and physical sense of truth through introspection with basic questions to provoke inquiry.
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Nevertheless such moves cannot be made in the environment to Plato through such
stationary objects as rivers, trees, and grasses, as Nedra Reynolds describes. People and
their mnemonic aviaries provide palaces from which the wisdoms of the past can be
extracted. Yet the wisdoms present in the memory reside beyond loci, as the loci are
merely the points of entry in the Platonic scheme. For further elaboration on the
phantastical history of memory in rhetoric, one of the earliest treatises wastes no time
juxtaposing the contents and hosting of memory. To the anonymous writer of the
Rhetorica ad Herennium, memory is a “treasury” (place of invented things) from which
rhetoric could spring. At first glance, it would appear that the Rhetorica merely invokes
an inert sense of storage. And while that element of memory remains present, this early
Roman treatise of unknown authorship includes gestures towards a phantastical
understanding.
Nevertheless, numerous rhetors dismissively define the memory as storage worthy
of little consideration in part due to an impoverished sense of phantasy. They may neglect
the concept writ large. Under such dismissive attitudes, the rhetoric of memory consist of
mnemonics; the speaker must learn where to look for material that can become
meaningful and, concurrently, learn how to add to memory naturally or artificially1.
Simply stated, a rhetor must simply learn to set things somewhere for retrieval later and
allow the other canons to address current contexts or application. Over time, assorted
methods for keeping information or other materials against the ravages of time
1

See also Sharon Crowley’s treatment of memory-as-methodological.
Heather Pringle suggests an alignment between John Rous’s description of the event
from the period in which it occurred and the bones; it follows that perhaps the most
complete picture of Richard’s final moments results from the material memory of the
2
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(protocols) would be developed to enhance the strength of those stores: which then again
invoked an exclusive sense of memory as storage.
Yet, storage and receipt overlooks a critical consequence of memory—that of
guiding perception. Aristotle observes that what is “recalled” from memory is assuredly
not the event or thing of the past but some façade of it. Such definitions appear
paradoxical, for what has passed is no longer present. More plainly spoken, what remains
of a past that has by definition faded? Potentially useful senses or semblances of patterns,
evidence, and ideas awaiting the rhetor’s conjuring influence, perhaps as pieces of
oratory or proofs refined alongside other significant components of the rhetorical
enterprise, remain in memory’s stores. Those trace-like images interconnect with memory
rhetoric and afford a gaze into the operations of the past in present experience.
Cicero’s concern with the memory/rhetoric connection in De Oratore resides less
with natural faculties than with the ways to develop “the most complete picture” as both
natural “endowment” and the consequence of practice. Relying on sight, Cicero states:
. . .the keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, and that consequently
perceptions received by the ears or by reflexion can be most easily retained in the
mind if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes, with the
result that things not seen and not lying in the field of visual discernment are
earmarked by a sort of outline and image and shape so that we keep hold of it as it
were by an act of sight things that we can scarcely embrace by an act of thought.
(II. lxxxvii 357-358)
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Cicero explains that even images, or the outlines of images, “require an above, inasmuch
as a material object without a locality is inconceivable.” Perhaps the rhetor could simply
envision a walk through her or his home, with images in each room along the way. In this
conception, as a noteworthy correlate to its generative role in phantasy, memories were
not solely grist for rhetoric’s mill as generators of content—memories also checked
against excess and/or superfluous argumentation by guarding against potential abuses of
the past, or at least those treatments that could in some ways be contested.
To Cicero’s rhetorical scheme, memory and rhetoric interanimate each other. “The
efficacy of the whole science, of rhetoric,” Cicero asserts, “is not that it wholly originates
and engenders something not part of which is already present in our minds, but that it
fosters and strengthens things that have already sprung to birth within us;” (II. Lxxxvii
356-7). Memory is positioned in Cicero’s scheme in circular fashion: on one hand, it is
always already present and awaiting hailing through rhetorical invention. Yet, to the
other, it is responsive to that which perception brings to it. Cicero positions memory as a
pre-condition for rhetoric in two noteworthy senses. In the first, it serves as rote material
that the operations of invention and style can refine. Secondly, under the auspices of
delivery, it becomes a means by which to generate an affective response in an audience.
Memory, to Cicero, develops an inextricable relationship the runs throughout the whole
of rhetorical activity.
For illustration, Cicero describes in his preface that the events of the dialog have
been forgotten. Memory does more than simply allow for the recall of those events, but
allows for a form of reinvention—a generation of the past through the present. The leap
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from generation of past through present indirectly invokes the paradox of perception.
While gesturing toward a product of senses, he states “the most complete pictures are
formed in our minds of the things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted on
them by the sense” (II. Lxxxviii 356-7). He further notes, “the ability to use these will be
supplied by practice, which engenders habit” (II. Lxxxvii). As memory-palaces, to use an
articulation of particular note to Jim Spence, the habituation of a trained memory allows a
trained rhetor to spot gaps in arguments. Yet it also affords a lens to guide the creation of
things through perception; Cicero’s circle becomes vicious as habituation leads
perception to adeptly recognize the familiar at the possible expense of the strange.
Simonides showcases an ability to use visual descriptors to enhance natural
abilities—sight and memory rely on each other, which then became a framework for
rhetorical training. Cicero elaborates and extends this co-implication. Yet memory’s
specific and narrower role as a repository, in line with what Freud would much later
describe as a surface upon which to write and erase like a mystic writing pad, neglects the
affectual reach of memory on perception. This antiquated sense of memory arts as only
depositories of information or sensory impressions signifies a rather drastic recasting of
the memory palace from phantasy and loci to exclusively loci. Under memory in a
mechanistic sense becomes “invented” as the “product” of perception.
Paolo Rossi argues that memory became reified not by the subject but by the
specialization of academic labor offers a partial explanation. Rossi suggests that the selfsustaining nature of disciplines of inquiry, which in turn invented vocabularies and
methodologies over time, resulted in the scientific method’s early formation and claim to
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logic. Cuts between inquiry to maintain and perpetuate intellectual division further
assimilated memory along the way as inert, and passive in order to make it a suitable
target for study through any given discipline’s lens. The “primary aim” of this division of
rhetoric from logic “was to remove memory from the province of rhetoric” (98). Rossi’s
history unsurprisingly focuses heavily on Ramus claiming logic as a “reform” and “a
return to the teachings of classical philosophy” following “corrupt[ions and]
terminological confusion of the scholastics and the traditional rhetoric which stemmed
from Quintilian” (98). The “primary aim” of rebutting the follows of Quintilian,
interestingly, “was to remove memory from the province of rhetoric” (98). Subsequently,
in Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes’s thought, Rossi argues “the absorption of memory
into logics and the identification of the problem of method with that of memory gave rise
to the concept of method as a classification of reality, a notion which became vitally
important to European thought in succeeding centuries” (101).
Ramus’s split of logic from rhetoric divorced memory as a subset of logic from
rhetoric and included similar movements of material (ontologies of things, the body)
concern from issues in style and delivery. Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes advance
these dichotomies. Inherent to Bacon’s placement of rhetoric is a division between
mental faculties in which memory serves a function alongside imagination and reason.
Rhetoric, to Bacon, exists as a necessary intermediary—found not in one of the
incarnations of mental faculty, but across and at the borders of all three. To Bacon,
memory occupies a fourth space between moving the will (which we could say is of and
in the present) and the cognitive capabilities of a subject to retain some sense of the past.
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The faculties associated with the past are co-implicated within the processing of the
present to generate a critical role for rhetoric. Still a separate entity in some ways
revitalized by the value it produces in stylistic affect, Bacon’s notion of rhetoric remains
salient.

Phantasy’s Persistence in Collective Memory
Our interest in lieux de mémoire where memory crystallizes and secretes itself has
occurred at a particular historical moment, a turning point where consciousness of
a break with the past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn—but
torn in such as way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in
certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists. There are lieux de
mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer milieux de mémoire, real
environments of memory.
—Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire
A proliferation of work in collective memory interjects a new domain for the
investigation of phantasy. While the subjects of collective (or public) memory are not
imaginary, the assorted means of conveying sanctioned telling of communal events
routinely intersects within persuasive ends. In other words, a particular take or telling of
the event in its aftermath is often preferred as it is performed. To illustrate the
problematics raised in collective memory studies, I offer a recent discovery. Of the many
places that could house a memory of Richard III, Duke of Gloucester, a common parking
lot seems undeserving of much attention. The Tower of London, where some historical
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narratives suggest he executed his young nephews (Edward V and Richard of
Shewsbury), seems like a more fitting location. Alternatively, William Shakespeare’s
Richard III, with its invocation to “the winter of our discontent,” could prove more
insightful. But once recovered from a common parking lot in Leicester, the controversial
monarch’s remains inspired a reconsideration of his significance across the fabrics of
memory2.
The lot and its contents do much more than simply render evidence of certain
accounts of history at the expense of others, or generate a space from which new
questions about the life and times of a single controversial figure can be born—it invokes
and illustrates a fundamentally difficult relationship of internal memory to places and
objects. Rhetoricians can view the lot as at an intersection of memory systems: forensics,
artistic representations, literary references, popular cultures—to name just a few. The
parking lot, when viewed in this way, reminds us that there are several ways of
remembering, that internalizations alone do not suffice as they collide with
historiographical inquiry to interject a critical exigency. Issues and implications
exemplified by this lot extend beyond the figure(s) of Richard himself, instead asking
more fundamental question concerning how memories are constructed or reconstructed
continuously over time and, in short, assume a vibrant rhetorical character.
Some physical places are designed to be the material representations of memory
(monuments, for example). However, phantasy’s concern regarding the relationship of
2

Heather Pringle suggests an alignment between John Rous’s description of the event
from the period in which it occurred and the bones; it follows that perhaps the most
complete picture of Richard’s final moments results from the material memory of the
bones in conjunction with the archival memory of Rous’ testimony.
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rhetoric and memory extends beyond spaces designed explicitly for remembrance and
locations at which archeological efforts of material or metaphorical forms attempt to tell
or retell history. Rather, memory is implicated through more generally as it relates to the
generative and active behavior of memory in the present. For illustration, why do some
places produce comfort whereas others fear? How does familiarity appear at one location
but vanish at another? The role of memory in physical space(s) may induce a sense of
familiarity, which further expands the notion of phantasy from expressively metaphorical
to material. Considering material artifacts and places alongside metaphorical significance
forges a more thorough understanding of phantasy. In other words, collective memory
considers the mechanisms by which groups retain common understandings of the past.
And those underlying mechanisms rely on individual memories (phantasies).
To Maurice Halbwachs, institutions or collectives of people in pluralities are able
to retain common senses of the past through such means as rituals, monuments, or stories.
A wealth of recent scholarship has advanced the relationship of rhetoric within collective
memory studies, including by Carole Blair and Amy Prepon. Halbwachs observes, “we
ask how recollections are to be located. And we answer: with the help of landmarks that
we always carry within ourselves. . . .” Halbwachs’s popular conceptualization employs a
form of social epistemology to situate individual memories within a broader tapestry
(175). But he is careful to note that such collective memories are not “mystical” supraintelligences, or hive minds where memories are house; it is the individual that
remembers (but relies on the collective to do so) (48). As James Wertsch elaborates,
collective memory relies on mediation. Whether distributed or universalized, some form
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of material and physical presence serves as the basis for interjecting the collective into
the individual.
Lyrical poets, some of whom were famously banished from Plato’s Republic,
were in this sense perform a magical and political duty; they were enacting common
ideas about the past, both in what “happened” and what was meant in those happenings.
The challenge befalling the individual was to negotiate personal memories in the context
of shared ones, which quite naturally general political tensions. For example, Alon
Confino would more recently argue collective memory studies relies on metaphors of
collusions and contestations. To Confino, personal experience and public power equally
employ reductionist binaries, ignoring how the personal and the collective result in new
wholes. “That a given memory exists, that it has symbolic representation and political
significance is obvious, but in itself it explains little in itself if we do not place this
memory within a global network of social transmissions and symbolic representations”
(1402). Confino continues,
I would like to view memory as an outcome of the relationship between a distinct
representation of the past and the full spectrum of symbolic representations
available in a given culture. This view posits the study of memory as the
relationship between the whole and its component parts, seeing society as a global
entity --social, symbolic, political -- where different memories interact. (1391)
Sites of remembrance designed with public memory in mind illustrate these principles, at
times neatly (and, at others, less so). Using externalized forms of memory, collectives of
various shapes and sizes attempting to protect their heritage against the ravages of time
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and forgetfulness may resort to symbolic actions that take place in monumental or
ritualistic forms. Halbwachs’s thought generates a thriving industry responding to his
theory of “collective memory,” in which he argued that groups with substantive
connections (families, religious affiliations, etc.) contain mnemonic tapestries that
function as frameworks of common memory.
As a sociological investigation of memory, Halbwachs’s understanding of
memory represents a radical departure within early twentieth century studies of memory
that study the mechanisms of the internal. Memory is not a residual of the group,
Halbwachs would theorize in collective memory, but rather a product of dynamics that
perpetuate social memories. The group, through a plethora of rituals and commemorative
acts, develops ways of guiding relationships to the past. However, within collective
memory, the relationship of individual to collective memories remained hotly contested.
Pierre Nora’s suspicions that forces of globalization and displacement were
destroying what remains of memory, collective or otherwise, inspired him to realign
collective memory studies. Nora began the work of relocating the framework to particular
places (particularly of an archival nature) as locations around which the memory of
individuals can “crystalize.” Thereby Nora reiterates not the importance of
commemorative places to memory, but the affect of place as an invitation to memory.
These loci of memory to Nora serve as anchor points against the maelstrom of collective
lethe and homogeneity—forces that transfigure the cultural and historical landscapes with
relative ease. Defined broadly, such sites of remembrance may include monuments,
preserved locations, museums, etc. According to Jay Winter, sites of remembrance are
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“topoi with a life history” constructed with commemorative actions in mind (312).
Assorted publics, acting out of a conviction “shared by a broad community” build,
maintain, and respond to these sites (313).
Such sites represent not only noteworthy places, but also indicate that the study of
their affect opens broader rhetorical questions. To interject an illustration from one such
site, I vividly recall from my youth seeing two musket balls fused into one, caused by
collision during a battle of American Civil War, on the shelf of a museum. As I
calculated the likelihood of that happening, transfixed by the twisted metal before me, I
envisioned a smoldering battlefield crowded with soldiers. The cries of the wounded, I
thought, surely could not have been heard above the sounds of musket and canon fire
because only in sheer numbers could two musket balls collide in midair. I imagined what
it must have been like for those poor souls, hurt without available aid as shots rained over
their heads. But the fused projectiles could not offer any information about the life of the
soldiers who fought, or the causes that led them to the field that day. I had to invoke my
imagination to picture the battlefield as the fight raged. History could interject, explaining
to me where the field was, how many people were there, and what contemporaries wrote
about it. But to be affected, to vividly recall the event in the eye of my mind, my
memories—perhaps cobbled from books, films, family lore, etc.—had to be invoked. In
fact, I (or for that matter, any museum visitor) could not see those relics without in some
way invoking personal memories to give them a meaning and context. I viewed them
through the eyes of a child’s imagination. How would a veteran, one who perhaps had
participated in battles, see or understand these objects? Would s/he find them fascinating?
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Would they allude to luck, in the sense of the expression “three to a match” (a saying
commonly understood to mean keeping a match burning for as short a time as possible to
light cigarettes, lest the light alert an enemy to their presence)?
When history attempts to contextualize objects or explain events, it cannot do so
in isolation, as Jay Winter argues. Winter gives this intersection of history and memory a
name, calling it “historical remembrance.” To Winter, historical remembrance is a
cultural practice, which “emerges” in the “reconfigured space” between history and
memory (313). However, Winter is careful to interject that historical remembrance may
happen at a plethora of other places, including when encountering ritual, or “unofficial”
sites of remembrance. To Winter, historical remembrance is a “discursive field,” in which
“a vast amount of fundamental work [is] still to be done” (314). The operations of sites
depend on logics of historical remembrance, which informs (as well as is informed by)
knowledge of encountering place. While I agree that historical remembrance is a
lucrative way to understand the intersection of memory and history wherever they should
occur, I suggest that the dynamics that generate historical remembrance are both
rhetorical and needing elaboration (a model I refer to as phantastical). At least a part of
the solution includes studying the proximate zone of memory/history (historical
remembrance, and public memory).
Naturally, an awareness of individual interpretation does not dismiss the notion of
a sanctioned reading of any given mourning site. The historian, artist, and architect of
these spaces can attempt to guide the interpretations that take place. And the memory
sites themselves may attempt to sanction certain dimensions of heritage against the
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ravages of time and forgetfulness through various design elements. In scholarship
responding to Halbwachs’s revolt against individual memory, the functionality of
recognizable populations of groups remains substantive and vibrant. I argue not against
Halbwachs (or a host of subsequent commentators)’s notions of collective memory as
useful for understanding cultural forms of memory, instead, I suggest that these sociocultural frames undertheorize their own mechanics—simply stated, those groups with
substantive connections (families, religious affiliations, etc.) whose mnemonic tapestries
that function as frameworks of memory remains salient, and subject to critique. Alon
Confino asserts:
To accept that none of these processes has primacy and yet to understand the
meaning of memory, we need to understand all of them as intertwined -- memory
as a whole that is bigger than the sum of its parts. This serves as a reminder to
realize what is declared more often than practiced, namely the multiplicity of
social experiences and representations, in part contradictory and ambiguous, in
terms of which people construct the world and their actions. (1399)
But how do individual memories, which extend across a multiplicity of
collectives, operate within a single collective that cannot fully contain them? As
sociological investigations of memory, Halbwachs’s concept of memory represent a
radical departure within early twentieth century studies; he moves toward the ability of
organizations or groups of people to share and retain memory. In contrast to, for instance,
psychoanalytical perspectives that seek memory as “embedded” or “transcribed” in the
subject, collective frames are recognizable through the subjects present in an
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organization. Memory is not a residual of the group but rather a product of dynamics that
perpetuate social memories.
In the sense proposed by Halbwachs, and subsequently addressed by Nora as well
as Winter, the groups that maintain shared remembrances also privilege certain memories
through the use of memory sites. They sanction particular tones or structures to those
memories. When read in this way, Halbwachs suggests visitors to memory sites become
forms of actants, in a way sympathetic to Bruno Latour’s treatment of actor-network
theory. A given interface of the collective links individuals: each participating individual
certainly has memories, but the forces that congeal collective remembrances to which the
individual is a party includes both implicit and explicit patterns that normalize particular
remembrances in specific ways. Consequently, through a plethora of rituals and
commemorative acts, groups establish ways of guiding individuals to bridge the past into
the present.
Within collective memory writ large, the dynamics and relationships of individual
to collective (or internal/external) in spaces of intersection remains hotly contested.
While Nora saw room for a binary of kept/lost (with lost gaining more traction), Winter
began to see an alternative reading in which contestation bred new connections. The
globalization Nora critiques and Phillips & Reyes embrace are, to Winter, possessive of a
creational or inventional logic. However, in contrast to the efforts to design those logics
in the space, the chaos of memory suggests alternative sets of mechanisms (rhetoric) are
present which are not the consequences of purely inventional gestures at work. Rather,
their ambiances and the pasts their visitors conjure, represent products of interaction that
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destabilize the existing memory structures in favor of new wholes. While I agree that the
sites themselves are noteworthy places, particularly when read alongside a dichotomy of
local/global, I am more interested in the study of their affects and the rhetorical
frameworks resulting from these investigations.
Nevertheless, collective memory as a rhetoric of protocol, transcription, material,
and/or metaphor, inevitably lead to a sense of threshold or intersection where external
invokes but is reconfigured by the internal systems. It is this core understanding which so
drastically returns and reframes the rhetoric of memory to prominence as theoretical and
practical lines of pursuit. Richard III’s recently recovered remains are merely human
bones subjected to the passage of time, and yet bisect multiple lines of memory so closely
woven that the remains become an entry point into a larger collective tapestry. Lieux de
mémoire, whether otherwise unremarkable parking lots from which historically
significant human remains or mnemonic architecture of the subject, extend and
reconfigure the rhetorical canon of memory into an era of networks growing increasingly
global (as corpus of conceptual thought and as material/technological apparatus).
Marshall McLuhan’s global village, it may seem, has taken root at last (or some may
argue). Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes contest that global flows of migration
and information yield “memoryscape” born of global interrelations. Migratory patterns,
both physical motions of bodies across geo-political boundaries and information through
networked computing, transforms existing memory places (in the restricted sense of sites
designed with facilitating cultural or public memory in mind) to encompass broader
landscapes of peoples, cultures, and objects in Phillips and Reyes argument.
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Consequently, they argue, geographically fixed places of memory cannot be approached
in isolation.
Through information and media flows, new memories can be found as a
consequence of what exists beyond the places dedicated to memory—in the flows of
people and ideas, technological intrusions, and the motion of bodies from divergent
places. To the memoryscape, “anchor spaces” in the form of built sites, become
increasingly difficult to localize. When approached as articulations of the network of
individual memories, memoryscapes function as forms of assemblage of an inherently
dynamic sort—as the constituent components move and intersect in new or novel ways,
the subsequent site as a whole avoids static behavior.
To pose a question begged by collective memory: where does individual memory
begin and external world of matter end? The affection of internal and external is situated
at places of collision where the binary of internal/external dissolve. Halbwachs’s
conception of memory is commonly aligned with an intellectual revolt from his one-time
mentor, Henri Bergson. To Halbwachs, Bergson’s treatment of memory was far too
individualistic. Social groups, in their interactivities, could serve as repositories of shared
and collective remembrances. However, an alternative reading of Bergsonism and its
cousin, phenomenology, offers an alternative path for memory that retains a focus on the
individual—but, the individual as situated. They open a space for thinking memory as
intersecting with and informing perception—these intersections are neither “real” nor
“virtual,” but in a third (pending) space that reconstitutes internal and external memory.
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In other words, a space opens for thinking memory that addresses Halbwachs’s critiques
of subjectivity.
Halbwachs suggests Bergson moved too far into individualistic thought, and seeks
socially generated means of retaining memory. Nevertheless, the affect and synchronicity
that permit collective memory remain deeply indebted to individual and subjective
expressions of memory. The places that allow for a crystallization of collective memory
must prove affectual to the individual, which relies on an even older notion of individual
memory as a rhetoric. And, these experiences are assimilated into existing memory
schemes—from which, groups may sustain themselves by synchronizing, in part, the
individual remembrances of their membership. Even in collective form, memory relates
to experience (with archives, monuments, cultural narratives, etc.), and experience hinges
on memory. When memory returns to a state of affection, then a critical space needed for
reviving phantasy reopens.

A Consequence of Phantasy: Conjoining Motives and Identification
As described across a broad corpus of histories, including by Mary Carruthers,
Jacques Le Goff, Francis Yates, David Krell, Edith Wyschogrod, and Alison Winter,
memory can be described as a relationship of loci and phantasmata in the present.
Reductionist understandings that explicate loci and phantasmata, in which an experience
could be encapsulated and retrieved for future use without concern for the associations of
images, overlook a relationship of the past to visual perception in the present. Memory as
conceptualized in phantasy entails revisiting the excluded formations that reclaims habits
of the mind—how something will be heard or connected to prior experience through
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common imagery—which ultimately guide and organize perception. Habits of the mind,
however, presuppose two related terms requiring further elaboration: motive and
identification.
Kenneth Burke treats the Freudian concepts of condensation and displacement in
ways useful to understanding the relationship of motive and identification. Burke
suggests that condensation “deals with the respects in which a house in a dream may be
more than a house or house plus” and displacement “deals with the way in which house
may be other than house” (277). He uses these terms as plus or minus, suggesting that the
two emphases “leave no opportunity for a house to be purely and simply a house” (277).
In this way, the house of Freudian symbolism relies on metaphorical reasoning. The
images represent something beyond what is spoken, often through synecdoche (the notion
of a house plus). “Increasingly, however, we begin to glimpse a world of abstract
relationships, of functions understood solely through the medium of symbols in books”
(270). Condensation and displacement revisit, with only a terminological displacement, a
phantastical mode in which the relevant images engage representationally. The images
may invoke conceptual resonances more than physical or material ones, as an alternative
reading of phantasy’s role in perception. Yet the relevance and salience of images relies
on a shared sense of representation.
“We move here . . . ,” Kenneth Burke continues in his essay Freud—and the
Analysis of Poetry, “into the sphere of rhetoric (reader-writer relationships . . . ” (The
Philosophy of Literary Form 281). Burke’s treatment of Freud, in which the development
of images offer a rhetorical function “sensory imagery” plays with a reader’s ability to
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“make himself over in the image of the imagery” (281). Form itself when recognizable as
such pulls and invokes an appetite by way of expectancy and desire. Burke’s reading of
Freud presents a memory paradox of several facets. In part, Burke notes that inviting an
original author to discuss the details of symbolic value in a given work may not be
possible; but the contexts of those symbols may become accessible and rendered visible
even if invisible to the original author. The symbol works beyond and within the author
for Freud and likewise for Burke.
Burke uses “purposeful forgetting” as “the only way of remembering,” in which
someone learns of what something is by forgetting all alternative possibilities for it (271).
In so doing, Burke gestures to a relationship of intent to recollection whose implications
necessitate further comment. Such forgetting can be fueled by ancestry, Burke notes, or
by experience in which means are “engrafted” or “new starts” (271). Most importantly,
the division of ancestry and experience from a phantastical standpoint becomes
permeable. Both draw from a desire fulfilled by or repressed under images retained as
fruits of the past. Consequently, under the yoke of forgetting purposefully, the creation of
images to retain a semblance of the past both employs motive and relies on identification.
Phantasy relies on mechanisms influenced by motives and identification and
consequently offers a connection through which these terms become co-implicational.
For example, Burke sees important limitations in a Freudian approach to symbolic
critique and points to masculine dominations both in the process of employing and
analyzing symbols. As it relates to ancestry, Burke states Freudian thought clouds
“flourished with matriarchal patterns” in concealing “patriarchal terms” (273). The
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feminine vanishes in the translation to symbols favoring the masculine; intentionally, the
images in such cases retain by forgetting alternative trajectories of the past willfully. The
logics of association, masculinity, promote identification while demonstrating motive.
Remembering requires images of a particular sort, which occur through eviscerating
facets or perspectives of the past that fail to reach a desired genus of identification.
Despite purported shortcomings in Freud’s scheme, Burke sees a need to
“introduce minor revisions” to the two key terms of “condensation” and “displacement”
(277). Motives underlie the symbolic domains that conjoin memory, rhetoric, and the
image, as Burke recognizes in Freud. The question of motives in no small part fuels
Burke in his efforts to rehabilitate Freud—which return to Quintilian’s treatment of
memory as a part of his broader treatment of rhetoric, in which the power of eloquence
interconnects closely with the virtues of the speaker. “We must write,” Quintilian argues
for a centrality of memory in De Institutio Oratoria, stating:
as carefully, and as much, as we can; for as the ground, but being dug to a great
depth, becomes more fitted for fructifying and nourishing seeds, so improvement
of the mind, acquired from more than mere superficial cultivation, pours forth the
fruits of study in richer abundance and retains them with greater fidelity. (Book X
Chapter III)
In Quintilian’s rich metaphor of seed planting, memory becomes a means of cultivation
as well as harvesting ideas, experiences, or various forms of content.
Quintilian’s project of intertwining virtue with eloquence contains an invocation to
memory, “good men, on the contrary, a virtuous sincerity of language will never be
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wanting, not (for good men will also be wise) a power of producing the most excellent
thoughts” (Book XII Chapter I). In ways remarkably prophetic of Burke’s later concerns
with motive, Quintilian observes that “we must not consider merely what cause a good
man defends, but from what motive, and with what object he defends it” (351).
Such motives naturally trace either condensation or displacement, as the thing
itself being defended need not be the object as-is, but as the object-as related. Parents
protect their children, in part by instinct and in part by seeing something of themselves in
a defenseless state. Nations defend their borders, seeing not territory but perhaps their
way of life jeopardized. Under such cases, the motives underlying actions result from
identification—and both identification and motive depend on phantasy’s vital language of
representational logics. Troubling the waters that divide identification and motive in turn
moves toward an elaboration of memory’s generative nature. External (identification) and
internal (motive) stem from a shared source: the logics of building representations
foreseen under phantasy.

Looking Forward Back
Chapter two addresses the mechanics by which representations obtain their
symbolic energia. It considers the relationships of material groundings in greater depth,
placing emergence relative to condensation and displacement. However, suffice it for the
present conversation to say that a computational model, comparable in some senses to a
Platonic approach of incision, remains common today. Memory, in this treatment,
becomes a black box from which the past can be retrieved and then applied. Similarly, a
storage metaphor would treat collective memory as only to be retrieved from archival and

58

commemorative sites (in the mind or even in public spaces). These prevailing
understandings of memory as places into which past experience are merely transcribed
for future recall neglect more ecological and vibrant understandings. Memory’
interrogates the mechanisms by which the past returns to the present. Its logics of
association and affect share several principles with historiographical thought.
Nevertheless, a number of vital differences exist between a study of memory theory and
historiography: for instance, association and affect provokes questions not just of
definition but also of the interconnectedness of experience and perception. While
memory can concern itself with validity, narration, or explanation, it can also
comfortably remain strictly patho-logical and a-temporal. It becomes rhetorical, in
substance and function, as a means of understanding place and language as well as the
bodies through which it finds articulation.
Loci of memory function as more than metaphors for personal or individual
memory. Nevertheless, a reliance on the loci-central approaches to memory of the black
box variety overlook shared components of rhetorical inquiry. The phantastical approach
both supplements loci and engages the surrounding objects and places through
representational image-making. Ultimately phantasy invokes the dynamics of affect in a
given place/time. In many respects, my efforts to theorize memory rhetoric as extended
from the phantastic tradition gestures towards a broader effort to reclaim the space
between rhetoric and “place.” As it relates to the consequences of traumatic public
remembrances and diaspora, Marianne Hirsch problematizes the lines between
generations of memory by proposing “post-memory.” Under post-memory, individuals
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who have had no direct experience with a given cultural event assimilate that event with
such vibrancy that it becomes autobiographical. Literally, they were not in the places that
memory endeavored to retain. However, phantastically, the places were constructed to
accommodate a drive for their inclusion. In Hirsch’s example, the generation following
holocaust victims cannot distinguish between the events of their youth and the genocide
witnessed by their parents. Through the saliency of their parents’ remembrances and the
media forms that bear traces of the events in the holocaust, the children of survivors
adopt these “post-memories” as their own. What interests me about post-memory is that it
not only disembodies autobiographical memories, but assigns a viral characteristic to
them. The memories of one person through a shared experience, namely reminiscence
and the sharing of artifacts, allows for the inscription of memories that should fall more
directly into the assimilation of historical narrative than personal experience. And,
rightly, I could observe that the theory of post-memory has no greater universal
acceptance than the related concept of distributed cognition (in which external processing
becomes naturalized, in a manner of speaking).
Notes Alex Reid, there are two virtuals—one a question of the subject, and one of
the media forms representing individual experience. These two virtualities are not
without material grounds, which suggests their interfaces are too expressions of a
materiality. It is this third space, one I define in this project as emergent, that rhetorical
memory occupies—if its ontology and its significance can be approached. The point I
wish to raise here is that virtuality opens space for a new understanding of memory
rhetoric by interrogating the roles memory plays in the interplay of media, objects, space,
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and subject. More broadly, when read within the histories of memory, they suggest a field
whose evolution toward virtuality through subjectivity and social episteme now faces a
significant challenge when adapting to the demands of new materialisms and post-human
thought. As contemporary rhetorical theory applies a pressure to virtuality and social
epistemics accordingly, it also invites a new understanding of memory rhetoric.

61

CHAPTER 3
ON EMERGENCE
Without order the world of experience becomes a shapeless mass. Music becomes
mere noise; a painting becomes a blob of paint; a play becomes a happening. The
human mind, the order of nature, social organizations, art, the solar system – all
dissolve in a chaos of particles.
—Frank J. D’Angelo
The quality which creates the world emerges as a relationship between [a person]
and [his/her] experience. [S/he] is a participant in the creation of all things.
—Robert Pirsig
‘Why do you doubt your senses?’
‘Because,’ said Scrooge, ‘a little thing affects them. A slight disorder of the
stomach makes them cheats. You may be an undigested bit of beef, a blot of
mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of an underdone potato. There's more of
gravy than of grave about you, whatever you are!’
—Charles Dickens
Memory, even when most marginalized at any given moment in rhetoric’s
histories, remains presupposed and lurking in the margins of persuasion, in the affects of
appeals to character or emotion, or in the conjoined realms of motive and identification.
Rhetoric originates in memory and, as the previous chapter explained, a phantastical
approach reclaims memory as generative rhetoric that assimilates material and physical
realms (regardless of whether natural, artificial, or artful). Operating from within a
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tradition of phantasy reverses the relationship of memory as coming from exteriority to
one in which exteriority comes from memory. Sensory impression becomes subsumed to
phantasy. Consequently, phantasy anticipates memory’s active engagement in perception.
Being of memory and informing perception, phantasy extends the influence of the
semblance of things more broadly into organizing principles. The approach to memory
outlined in chapter two does not suggest that memory cannot be guided by conscious or
artificial means. In the alternative and supplemental light described, memory becomes a
means of structuring (and not simply responding to) the external world. By this definition
perception relies as much on the past as it does on the particulars of a given place and
time. It also does not suggest that the external environment is only of memory. On the
contrary, physical spaces and realms of agency exist beyond memory’s touch. They
express a Gorgian trilemma in that they can never be reached beyond the past’s persistent
reach. Any given place is experienced through sensory perception, in which memory
becomes a form of guide.
In a 2008 study published in the journal Psychology Today, researchers Helene
Intraub and Christopher A. Dickinson explore a phenomenon known as boundary
extension. A boundary extension fills the conceptual space between “illusion” and “false
memory,” as Timothy Brady and Adena Schachner describe, and occurs when we
“extend the boundaries of an image. . . .our memory system extrapolates the view of the
scene to a wider angle than was actually present” (para. 5). Intraub and Dickinson’s study
found that it took less than 1/20th of a second for a boundary extension to occur. In less
than it takes to blink an eye, the memory of the event had morphed to accommodate new
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conditions. To Brady and Schachner, the study “thus blurs the boundaries between the
initial representation of a picture (via the visual system) and the storage of that picture in
memory” and begs an important question, “so is boundary extension a visual illusion or
false memory?” A phantasmic tradition of memory would seem to anticipate their
response—they note, “perhaps the two [visual illusions and false memories] phenomena
are not as different as previously thought.” Further, “the work of Intraub and colleagues
ads to a growing movement that suggests that memory and perception may be simply two
sides of the same coin.”
Boundary extensions illustrate that memory demonstrates a remarkable plasticity,
which resists efforts to render it inert, passive, or inactive. “Typically in [William Carlos
Williams’] poems,” Kenneth Burke notes “the eye (like a laying on of hands), by
disguised rituals that are improvised constantly anew, inordinates us into the human
nature of things” (n.p.). Williams to Burke, “was [in essence] an imaginative physician
and nosological poet” (italics mine). A space found between the thing of the eye and the
eye itself was no less human than the possessor of the eye. Seeing the object alone was to
graft a sense of the human into and onto it. Without retaining or transcribing a new
image, which would merely recast the antiquated storehouse model criticized in the
previous chapter, memory instead displays interactivity within its parts and with the
external environment. The physician finds wellness in poetic form in Burke’s treatment
of Williams, and such juxtapositions speak more broadly of the symbolic and the material
interactivity phantastic memory anticipates.
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The alternative perspective suggested in the previous chapter thus expands the
importance of connectivity—both between memory and exteriority, and between the
semblances that become phantasy. Brady and Schachner’s juxtaposition of recall and
recognition under the auspices of newer terminology harken to a pliable understanding of
the past. Burke’s commentary celebrates Williams’ “combined conscientiousness of both
disciplines [poetry and medicine], as a man of medicine and medicine man” (n.p.).
Consequently, as this chapter describes, emergence can provide a lattice for a generative
rhetorical theory of memory through three conceptual parts: complexity, entelechy, and
the extended mind hypothesis. This chapter first traces the applicability of an emergent
lens to the theory of memory rhetoric introduced in chapter two before more fully
explaining its method of employing emergence.

From Memory to Emergence
Complex systems have memory, not located at a specific place, but distributed
throughout the system. Any complex system thus has a history, and the history is
of cardinal importance to the behavior of the system.
—Paul Cilliers
The basic parts of common table salt are poisonous to human consumption until
combined. Yet, only in their combination does the salt cease to be a poison. Quite
literally, two poisons became a food. How could this be? Stuart Kauffman notes in The
Origins of Order: Self Organization and Selection in Evolution that order originates from
either non-order (chaos) or adaption to disruption. In either case the presence of order of
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a like kind is not a prerequisite to the generative process. Like, it could be said, does not
come from like through such a lens. Similar calls to think of the lack of order as
generative are offered by Malcolm Gladwell, John Holland, and Steven Strogatz—all of
whom situate relative absences of organization principles as fodder from which new
orders can spring. Larger and sweeping patterns of self-organizing can rely on the
smallest of bodily cells. A mere rewiring of a neuron can lead to systematic changes in
the body. For the oft-cited the butterfly effect, which theorizes the potential for climate
change as resulting from the mere flapping of wings, small re-associations break and
generate patterns of widespread impact. At least a part of the recent interest in emergence
is not so much with its newness—indeed, emergence’s roots can be traced to mereology.
Somewhere between Heraclitus’s presuppositions of perpetual change and Democritus’s
or Empedocles’s interests in atoms, the notion of interactivity between parts as generative
exists in Pre-Platonic thought. John Stuart Mill and George Henry Lewes revisit it and, as
Terrence Deacon describes, “struggle with the problem of making scientific sense of
living and mental processes” (147). Later Samuel Alexander, C.D Broad, and Conway
Lloyd Morgan (the British emergentists) issues of discontinuity fuel an interest in postmechanistic (also known as non-linear) emergent thought.
Likewise, memory rhetorics customarily consider both non-order (forgetting) and
adaption (remembered). This section expands the conjecture that memory can be modeled
and theorized productively using an emergent lens. Beyond supplying a definition and
context for emergence itself, the linkage and degree of applicability between terms
(emergence to memory) becomes an area of interrogation. Emergence can certainly apply
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to a broad range of phenomenon beyond memory and those non-memory cases of
emergence contribute to the vocabulary employed throughout this interrogation.
However, emergence develops more fully the generative rhetoric of memory introduced
in the previous chapter. Kauffman invokes emergence when he suggests such point of
non-order or disruption become generative of new orders. Emergence, which postulates
that order can arise from the interactivity of parts, exists in several forms. For instance, it
may be displayed when any given order begins to approach a chaotic state through
interactions or chance encounters, but adapts to the conditions rather than falling into
disarray. Along an opposite trajectory, emergence can also describe how chaotic
environments lead to order (as articulated by Nassim Nicholas Taleb). In this alternative
case, an order may appear to spring almost magically from non-ordered states.
Emergence offers an alternative paradigm to several common (mis)conceptions:
that order remains stable or results from a guiding hierarchy, chaotic conditions
necessarily produce only non- or dis-order, and that the parts of an order equal the order
itself. Emergence offers a lens for the creation of orders that can be born of disjunction
instead of junction; essentially the only basic need for emergence to happen is the
existence of some form of interaction. David Blakesley and Thomas Rickert offer the
illustration of a flock of birds in motion. The flock is irreducible to just singular birds
flying in formation—the flock exhibits remarkable characteristics of organization and
coordination. Yet the flock consists of birds following simple rules: they maintain the
same speed, keep distances and proximities stable, etc. From these rules, the birds
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become a flock rather than an aggregate of individual birds. And yet, at a moment’s
notice, they may become disorganized: birds flying into all directions cease being a flock.

Fig. 3.1: “Speicherkoog Flock of Birds” by Dirk Ingo Franke
Despite operating on the verge of falling into disrepair, the flock displays
recognizable (some may say magnificent) patterns. Fig. 3.1 shows a flock resembling an
arrow with a single bird at its front. A grafted human logic would suggest the lead bird
leads in a sense of controlling or commanding the flock. However, birds lack that form of
hierarchical thought. We could make the same mistake in reference to “Queen” ants. As
the most protected and unique member of an ant colony, we could assume the colony
maintains a matriarchal structure. And we would be quite wrong in that thinking, too!
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Fig. 3.2: “Flock of birds-Roma, Italia-23Nov2008” by Paolo
The birds pictured over Rome offer a wonderful window into these dynamics of
emergence. When no longer seen as collections of individuals but as an emergent whole,
the flocks display remarkable adaptive characteristics. Only by photography are they held
in stasis. Otherwise, in time, they swirl, change directions, and “at random” display
patterns. Random, being a term more of chaos than complexity, can only loosely apply
these conditions—these formations are not by chance (nor are other emergent behaviors).
Rather, it is the allure of randomness that is of interest. For much of recent thought,
emergence was aligned dismissively with a form of mysticism. These critiques most
often challenged early emergentists for whom the processes of emergence were
incalculable. Alternatively, with recent advances in computing and simulation as De
Landa notes, the material side of emergence can be modeled. Formerly mysterious
processes under the umbrella of randomness suddenly became recognizable and
predictable. Weather could be forecast with greater accuracy, for one illustration. For
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further illustration on the subject of considering orders born not of random chance or
intelligent design (decree), in what ways can we understand an ant-bridge?

Fig. 3.3: “Ant Bridge” by Geoff Gallice
Ants cannot communicate in the ways practiced frequently by humans in writing or
speaking. They cannot diagram, or brainstorm. And they certainly cannot speak or write.
Yet, when confronted with a gap to transverse, they display the ability to cooperate in
order to build a bridge of their bodies. Oftentimes so-called warrior ants (noticed for their
larger size and stronger pincer bite) ring the moving column prepared to strike in case of
invader. Workers either form the bridge or carry food and other supplies across the
bridge. It takes a remarkable process of coordination to bring these functions into an
alignment where the overarching assemblage results. They communicate via senses more
akin to human oratory through pheromones and physical contact. Without resorting to
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pure chance or a central governing authority, they display an ability to build structures of
their colony as it moves simply through rote senses and instinct.
If George Kennedy’s treatment of rhetoric as energy were to be applied, in what
ways could the bridge be viewed as rhetorical? Applying the term “bridge” to discuss the
function of the assemblage certainly contains rhetorical moves that draw upon what may
simply be lumped memories (if not for the subject, an ant). Their conjoined bodies satisfy
the essential elements of a bridge, of course. However their shape in fully emerged form
no way resembles most contemporary styles of bridge. And the ants employ approaches
to construction unique to their species. Both articulations of energy, as the naming to
understand their behavior or their the means of their coordination, employ what could
grossly be lumped under the auspices of memory. Pheromones, touches, and other
mechanisms of delivery would be moot had each ant not known how to respond. The
living bridge made of ant bodies responds to the specifics of the environment, and the
interactions between ants within that space. Encapsulated within the margin at oftdescribed points of tipping or bifurcation, the edge of disorder (chaos) offers a lens
emergent thought which also gestures to mechanics of memory. Much as the flock
quickly develops new orders (adapts) at the presence of disruptive influences (of
predators, new food sources, wind currents, etc.) and the ants overcome obstacles,
emergence suggests that new organizations result from the interjection of unexpected
sources. Instead of the system falling into a chaotic (dis)order, a new and more
complicated system results—the ants forge structures to cross crevasses.
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The systems that exhibit emergent characteristics, flocks and ant bridges for
examples, are therefore called complex (as the intermediary of simple and chaotic). Thus
complexity exists at the intermediary of order and disorder, and emergence animates the
system. Emergence, as a method for theorizing memory, considers the movements
between order-as-is and order-as-will-be. Manual De Landa observes that “as populations
of neurons grew and proliferated inside living creatures, gathering into layers and folding
into elaborate three-dimensional structures, they provided an ever richer substratum for
the growth and proliferation of more ethereal entities: memory” (94). To De Landa,
memory represents an intermediary between the building blocks (neurons) and the
wholes (species, cultures, societies, etc.). Both social fabrics inherent to any culture and
assimilations of environmental queues by the individual represent not different
mechanisms, but differences in kind and scale. The same driver is present for both
operations—emergence fuels memory. He asserts, “since we will now be concerned with
larger wholes with their own emergent properties the details of how individual agents
perceive and memories can be taken for granted” (110).
Memory, it would seem, becomes entwined with telos—final causes—in De
Landa’s treatment of emergence. However, De Landa quickly restricts emergence to the
realm of the non-symbolic. Yet, as already articulated, such realms are unreachable
without the presence of memory. Thus although emergence may consider physical and
material properties, it cannot do so without a symbolic and non-material dimensionality.
By definition, emergence presupposes the absence of a central organizing force. Rather,
broadly defined, it looks at the phenomenon of self-organization. In more rhetorical
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terms, it can consider the phantastical manifestations of memory—the non-conscious
given materiality through extension into perception. De Landa moves from simple units
(cells) to larger wholes, presuming memory to be a form of glue holding parts to wholes.

Grounding Emergence: A Theory of Complexity
I think the next [21st] century will be the century of complexity.
—Stephen Hawking
By what means could a contemporary emergent lens be approached? Within the
failings of simplicity, an alternative paradigm—complexity—offers resources for the
self-organization of systems. As a foundation, complexity begins with an understanding
that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Through interactivity, often in
unexpected ways, the whole of complexity traces patterns and orders that are generated
from but no longer understandable as constituent parts. Emergence fuels complexity, and
so complexity is a point of entry by which to understand emergence. In this section,
complexity is situated in reference to systems that reject conventions of linear thought. Of
particular note are the ways in which complexity theory has already bled into rhetorical
thought.
Linear systems are reducible to their constituent parts. One can approach linearity
symmetrically with simplicity. The parts themselves reveal the system as a whole.
Working reductively, any linear system can thus be broken into manageable parts.
Linearity also consumes a binary logic—a closed-ness, whereby parts either are or are not
in the system. Consequently, linear systems do not respond well to adaption. To invoke
comedian Bill Cosby’s treatment of his car—it exists in one of two states: broken or not
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broken. Linearity contains the same issues as that of simplicity. And in contrast,
complexity offers a rich alternative. To say complex systems are non-linear is to offer
several clauses of significance: they are irreducible to the sum of their parts, they are
“open” systems of an adaptive nature, and—for the purpose of this argument, most
importantly—they exhibit emergent properties.
Complexity offers an alternative to reductionist tendencies, which may argue that
ecologies and contexts of rhetoric are sharply divorced from subjects. Such treatments
ignore the affective nature of subject and context, reducing towards one or the other.
Music of the sort I read about in the latest reviews exist beyond my sphere of
engagement; I only learn about them through reproductions and commentaries about it in
technologically enhanced domains. When this happens, I invoke a great domain of
reductionism—an “I” of psychological concern. An exponentiality rather than a linearity,
a complexity rather than a simplicity, results. The “I” and the “ecology” interacted, and
forged new wholes (symbolically and materially). Mathematically, linearity and
exponentiality are not kindred spirits. Similarly, reductionism and simplicity are equally
at ends with a rhetoric informed by complexity.
Within rhetoric’s various manifestations, gestures towards emergence can be
found as early as Richard Lanham’s treatment of complexity in his essay “The Edge of
Chaos” and subsequent text The Economics of Attention. To Lanham, complexity
interjects new questions of transaction between the social, the subjective, and the
material; it has the potential to reframe and revitalize these (and other) rhetorical terms,
and generate new ones. Lanham’s examination of complexity begins to open space for
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connecting emergence with rhetoric. Understandably, his point of entry—attenuation—is
one steeped in classical approaches to rhetoric and memory. Lanham suggests a transition
is well underway across the spectrum of humanities and sciences. Lanham calls this
movement the dawning of an “information society” whose citizens are “drowning in
information, not suffering from a dearth of it. Dealing with this superabundant flow is
sometimes compared to drinking from a fire hose” (227). Instead of a scarcity of
information, Lanham describes the presence of a different sort of limiting factor – that of
attenuation – which he works to explain.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Lanham uses the connections between language and
persuasion as the basis for his theory of attenuation (structures of attention). Attenuation,
by Lanham’s interjection, probes mutually informing common grounds across the
sciences and humanities. To the sciences, continuously improved computing power
enables simulations of systems once thought to exceed human capacity for understanding
and buck prevailing uses of reductionism and simplicity. Reduction and simplicity can be
placed on one side of a proverbial fence, where larger wholes are broken into constituent
parts as methods of empirically probing subjects of study. At the opposite side of the
epistemological fence, complexity, suggests interactivity between parts of a whole render
the whole irreducible to the parts. Lanham observes that complexity couldn’t be
approached in the sciences until sufficient computational power was developed to permit
modeling and experimentation with simulations. Simulations represented the next
generation of scientific inquiry, in which interactivity could be liberated from the murky
depths of confounding variables. Simultaneously and similarly, Lanham’s attenuation
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generates a treatment of communications across media that assails what he calls an
Enlightenment ideal of clarity and brevity in style, instead replacing it with artistic
oscillations between “stuff and fluff” born of organic and rhizomatic evolutionary
patterns. Complexity to Lanham represents a corpus of perspectives loosely linked
together without a single unifying theoretical presupposition (which, like rhetoric, often
retreats in stasis to questions of definition).
Although Lanham is neither the first nor most cited commentator to mull links
between rhetorical theory and new forms of artistry across media, his thought offers an
early attempt at invoking complexity theory as a unified tradition. As Lanham argues,
persuasion requires seeing the subjects of discourse in particular agreeable ways (227).
Even within Aristotle’s classical articulation that rhetoric is the faculty of seeing the
available means of persuasion of a given case, the concept of attention remains central.
Aristotle employs a visual metaphor, sight, as in to “see” alternatives in a given case.
Ergo, training can expand the rhetor’s knowledge of Platonic cookery, the decidedly less
alluring perspective of rhetorical functionality observed in the Gorgias in which the
capable rhetor engages in what Wayne Booth terms “rhetrickery,” is born of a rich visual
metaphor. Lanham seizes this inroad to move past persuasion, and instead defines
rhetoric as “economics of attention structures.” To Lanham’s information society, the
volume of things which can be paid attention to far exceeds the capacity of which instead
delineates both what information to notice and how to assimilate it into a larger whole.
Information is not scarce, Lanham feels. On the contrary, it surrounds and immerses
beyond the capacity of any person to soak it all in. In a particularly rich metaphor, to
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Lanham the study of attention structures calls forth a “new operating system” (247). He
uses this term to describe attention structures by way of human-computer interaction, and
in so doing, begins to build a case for placing human subjects in processing roles,
supplanting productive ones.
These systems are not products of electronic discourse or restricted to some forms
of new writing. Rather, the floodgates of information reclaim an older understanding of
language lost along the way: that ways of seeing rely on attention, and that attention can
be influenced through rhetorical means that both assimilates and adapts to the
information flows they attempt to manage. Equally importantly, beyond the adaptability
that grants them a dynamic edge, they are both necessary to and exposed by the
information society. Lanham sees their rise not as the latest trend in rhetorical thought,
but an exigency for why rhetorical training is “of real use” (228). In this way, perhaps to
call them “new” operating systems is a misnomer.
Lanham carefully notes, “this new acculturation of attention goes much deeper
than electronic text” (235). Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the
methodologies and theories of rhetoric in digital or new media domains, much more so
than I endeavor to discuss here. However, my interest is less in discussing those
particular types of rhetorical situation than pointing out that proficiencies in them again
depend on logics of attention. Within a period of time, it is possible to learn forms of
electronic communication and writing and stay current in them as they iteratively
progress. The user can learn programming languages, coding, and the means of
constructing digitally native texts. Such texts can be hyperlinked, shared, tweeted, and
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delivered through any number of means to a plethora of decentralized audiences.
Naturally, the programmer-writer who does these things does so at the expense of other
possible pursuits. In response, it could be argued that efficiency is an answer. With
practice, the writer becomes quicker at writing (whether in codes legible to computing
equipment, or languages processed by human audiences). To this I would agree, and add
that the writer has assimilated a stronger sense of certain types of writing – they are
attenuated to acting within certain parameters, or producing certain forms of texts, or
using certain tools. They have become, again, attenuated to certain dimensions that
promote or respond to production of their texts.
Lanham links attention structures as foundational to the two other consequences
of the information society he discusses: complexity in the sciences, and a new theory of
communication. To the latter, the theory of communication, Lanham assails the classic
“conception of self-effacing, ideally transparent, in truth ideally non-existent language –
the ‘CBS’ or Clarity-Brevity-Sincerity Model for language which fits so well an industry
society that makes things” (241). He continues, the CBS Model “has no place for periodic
structures, for all the careful and ‘sophistic’ rhetorical figures which symbolize … which
symbolize the higher patters of thinking that literacy creates” (241). Moving towards an
information society requires a wholly different understanding of communication, where
so-called ‘good’ communication or writing is a richer concept. Lanham notes that words,
foundations of writing, are the “goods” in an information society. Their operations,
however, are “ambiguous” (229). They assume new meanings, bump into one another,
create connotations and otherwise behave independently of the author’s intentions.
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With information society defined largely as a decentralization of the human
subject, it should come as no surprise that any given author’s control over her or his
primary paintbrush becomes exposed as illusionary. Language grows beyond the writer,
and the writer must learn to adapt to those motions. Lanham graciously affords a
rhetorical precept for doing so: a replacement theory for communication. Entitled a “bistable illusion,” Lanham’s approach calls for a “self-conscious/unselfconscious
oscillation between AT and THROUGH vision” towards language (241). Attenuation
becomes not just the culprit for the problem in that it explains the motions of language
beyond and outside the authors in question, but that it opens a door for an alternative to
the CBS Model. To this, I would add my remarks here on the subject are admittedly
truncated. My interest in raising this connection now is to illustrate the common ground
of complexity in the sciences and a theory of communication, and instead dedicate my
attention to this concept in greater detail. But more importantly, the road beyond
attenuation leads us towards revisiting symbolic action’s material groundings.
Attenuation’s limitations interject two connections with pronounced implications.
Both of which require further thought in these pages. First, Lanham’s notion of
attenuation does more than simply critique basic information theory as it relates to human
communications (a topic about which extensive work has already done), it extends
rhetoric into an age of information as material construct, and radically argues for a
centrality of rhetorical thought across the binary of the sciences and the humanities.
Byron Hawk’s treatment of the rhetorical turn towards materiality largely adopts network
theory, assemblage, activity theory, and several closely related paradigms to inform this
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intermediary space between (but connected to) the scientific and the humanistic. Further,
Lanham’s theory represents an early attempt to connect rhetoric with developments in
complexity.
For demonstration, Lanham observes of earlier eras “stuff” mattered whereas
“fluff” (leisure, style, etc.) could receive lesser treatments. Loosely echoing Bacon’s
tentative forays into empiricist thought, science could tell us about the stuff and rhetoric
could tell us about the science and the stuff. But were stuff and fluff two different
substances, Lanham would have us ask, or were they social (and forging resulting whole
through that sociality)? Could stuff be explicated from fluff to get a sense of the whole in
an idealized form? A core term to the extended mind, attenuation, illustrates certain nonlinear problems (which is, itself, a consequence the propensity for matter to form from
other matter, and affect surrounding matter). Such situations attempt to understand the
dialogical role of contexts (scenes, whether of the real or the virtual) and subjects (actors)
in any given situation. James Berlin, James Gleick, or Richard Lanham’s are but three of
many theorists interjecting applicable terminologies and lenses on the interplay of subject
and context that lead to order by way of non-linearity. In each case, attenuation represents
a vital extension, and privileges certain forms of information as meaningful or significant.
It is an abstraction, a signification for that which would tune the surrounding noise from
Josh Bell (instead of subjugating his work into the surrounding noise). Conspicuously
absent, however, are matters of scale and affect.
In what Berlin terms a transactional model, reality is discovered “in the
interaction of the features of the rhetorical process itself – in the interaction of material
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reality, writer, audience, and language” (155). For transactional approaches, longstanding
linear binaries of subject/object (actors, actants) and reality/virtuality (scenes, situations)
remain solvent. However, linearity itself (wherein parts of a whole can lead to
understanding the whole) is rendered problematic. Informatics and transactional
approaches seemingly reinforce longstanding linear binaries of subject/object (actors,
actants) and reality/virtuality (scenes, situations). However, linearity itself (wherein parts
of a whole can lead to understanding the whole) is rendered problematic in Richard
Lanham’s work. Thomas Rickert would revisit the notion of attenuation and add, “it is
always ongoing, and achievement of some sense of harmony or synchronicity would, on
this account, be fleeting” (8). Lanham and Rickert observe that data, noise, a range of
mediated works produce a dynamic system of self-adaptive attenuation, a possibility that
invites further consideration under the rubric of complexity. It does so by observing that
rhetoric’s long history of definitional and ontological angst often stems from
comparatively safe harbors of persuasion.
At its face, the Berlin taxonomy aligns closely with an approach discussed by
Gleick, whose mold would similarly suggest that audiences cannot perceive beyond the
restrictions of their attention. But where Berlin responded to poetic, literary, and cultural
ideologies, Gleick employs core theories derived of non-human interactivity. At its
inception, information theory approached questions of physical (material) transference
instead of perceptual or cultural dialectics. Using now familiar languages of bytes,
protocols, information theory underwrites contemporary computing. A host of writers
inspired by Shannon Weaver’s sender-receiver model of non-human communication
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would suggest or Alan Turing’s computing machines extend information theory into
human domains as metaphors for communication. It was not a question of perception in
the sense of hearing music to the audience Bell encounters, Gleick suggests, but of the
background becoming indistinguishable from the foreground – or, a flattening of noise
inspired by the limitations of the audience. Yet these models were not conceived in
rhetoric, or approached mnemonically.
At first glance, these may seem like waters of an inventional nature. For clarity,
the efforts to work through memory to theorize emergence represented in this work are
not at the expense of invention; rather, invention presumes an organizer—the agent.
However, not all change requires a central organizing figure (as emergence
demonstrates). Instead, the waters become somewhat post-inventional. As memory
becomes distributed beyond the subject, invention (like agency) becomes difficult to
situate in the exclusive domain of the doer. Invention can guide the loop of perception
and recognition by selecting particular symbols and arrangements to carry forth
meanings; but it is not and need not be the primary driver of how order originates. As
emergence suggests, memory alters and offers new connections of symbol. The
perceptual and experiential apparatus to which invention is beholden becomes vibrant, by
way of mechanisms I am attempting to illuminate. One way, mechanistically, is by
decree. Yet such decrees rarely stand against the passages of time, or against the ability
of language itself to adopt fluidly. An alternative frame remains available. Emergence, it
at least in William A. Covino’s treatment of magic, plays a greater role in connecting
experience by way of language with shared or individual states of experience than may be
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found in decrees. Emergence connects the dueling memory extensions of attenuation or
affect, in which violations of or perpetuations of expectancy.
Berlin positions his vantage points as allowing for “a closer focus on the
rhetorical properties – as distinct from the economic, social, or political properties – of
the systems considered” (6). The rhetorical, to Berlin, interrogates how to apprehend the
“real” – as found in the external world of “material objects” (objective), “truth within the
subject” (subjective), or “point of interaction of subject and object, with audience and
language as mediating agencies” (transactional) (6). Berlin’s taxonomy, born of a
decidedly epistemological lens as he himself notes, treats the audience as either unaware
of or uninfluenced by the sound. Only one of these two failures is found in subjective or
transactional theories of rhetoric, respectively.
As a second consequence of the information age (and extension of attention
structure), Lanham traces a development within the sciences towards complexity. He
observes:
what seem[s] to be happening in the sciences [is] a movement from the
‘philosophic’ thinking of Newtonian physics to the ‘rhetorical’ thinking of
molecular biology. Physical science had spent three hundred years looking for its
lost keys under a Newtonian lamppost, not because it had lost them there but
because, as the old joke has it, the light was better. (249)
Lanham notes, the hard sciences (so-called) spent much of the past three centuries (to
select round numbers) focused extensively on the questions they could address – things
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accounted for through linear, mechanistic interactions. Dynamics, like weather patterns,
were very difficult to explore under such a lens.
However, within an information society comes a rise in computational ability that
permits more extensive modeling. It no longer benefits many, if not most, sciences to
focus extensively on the questions it can address linearly (through simplification, looking
to constituent parts to understand the whole). What becomes possible, and desirable, in
such a world is an examination of the patterns of wholes – behaviors that account for
interactivity, or that which can be found between the parts of the whole, as well as
between the whole and the external environment. Lanham notes this is a computer-driven
motion, in the sense that modeling and simulations only available through the
computational power of a machine could allow scientific explorations into it. Such
conditions cannot be replicated in a lab, but they can be programmed.
The ambient networks that invite complexity are prolific, and foreseen through
the hyper connectivity theorized in the works of Duncan Watts and Albert-Laszlo
Barabasi. To Watts, interfaces collide so frequently that they are easily overlooked as a
matter of routine. The node, or crux of these interfaces, Barabasi asserts, represents
places from which new orders emerge. The interface represents place of a particular sort:
areas when multiplicities of memory (places) become a singularity (place). Naturally, the
term itself harkens to a display of some technological sort. However, as I use the term
more generally, I view it as a conceptual abstraction. Interface is the façade, the entry
point, or the pronaos of place. A critical rhetoric of ambience, with which this chapters is
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concerned, extends but rehabilitates memory from antiquities of rhetoric to present
contexts of inhabiting a (any) place.
Other scholars of rhetoric, such as Byron Hawk, Margaret Syverson, Thomas
Rickert, David Blakesley, and Nedra Reynolds, follow the track of probing complexity as
a rhetoric. Broadly construed, from this corpus of thought, a possibility for the
construction of new histories and theories of rhetoric begins to take shape. In the years
since Lanham’s essay was published, new materialisms have both proliferated as a
transdisciplinary field and influenced rhetorical scholarship. Complexity continues this
trajectory, allowing for a recasting of borders as interfaces rather than divisions. As
partially derived from a history of rhetoric, Lanham’s treatment of attenuation results
from metaphorical senses of computer “operating systems.” He endeavors to continue
Walter Ong and Eric Havelock’s sense of electronic literacies, and, in so doing, interject
a different sense of division. His operating system metaphor, an approach that echoes an
interfaced approach to prominent divisions, suggests an inherently dynamic nature that
both mitigates and adapts to the flows of sensory data that mark his information age. As
in theories of networks, attenuation to Lanham is akin to the affects born of interfaces in
complexity.

Entelechy: Emergence and Symbolic Action
For I take it that, just as each good poet speaks an idiom of his own, so it is with
each symbol-using animal—and there is a kind of reciprocating relationship
whereby the Self selects its key words, and they in turn become formative, to
shape further developments of the Self, along with countless such unchartable
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interactions, including reactions back upon the behavior of the Self’s sheer
physiology.
—Kenneth Burke
According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, entropy (a measure of
disorder as related to energy) in any given isolated system increases until it reaches a
maximum value. Simply stated, the Second Law presumes all systems contain within
their borders the tendency towards equilibrium. Work is needed to push a given system
into disequilibrium, in at least a physical sense of the term. Yet a paradox was introduced
by James Clerk Maxwell to showcase that the second law has only a “statistical
certainty.” Perhaps unbeknownst at that juncture, Maxwell’s “demon” had interjected the
field of chaos into thermodynamics. In Maxwell’s formulation, a gate with a keeper
divides a container of gas into two parts. The keeper allows molecules that are moving
faster to move to one side of the container, while keeping the slower moving ones on
another side. Technically, no work was done—the molecules divided themselves. In Leó
Szilárd’s famous response to Maxwell’s demon, work was done (but in the form of
thought). The gatekeeper had to recognize, in some fashion, that the molecules were
moving at different rates. Thought itself was given a thermodynamic, physical nature—
even if in the form of a concept, in order to balance the needs of an accepted law with a
paradox presented to it.
Thought as energy, energy as thought: the congruence of conceptual with material
bears directly upon the problem at hand. Attention structures, defined as dynamic
operating systems for information, fundamentally inform Lanham’s gestures towards a
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conjoined space between the sciences and rhetoric. Or put more accurately (and strongly),
operating systems serve as cornerstones of his broader project. Lanham senses attention
as the limiting factor to assimilating informational floods into some form of meaning.
However, Lanham also observes that these structures demonstrate emergent qualities.
The attention structure, it bears noting, is the mechanism for doing physical work Szilárd
forecasts. To more fully flesh out this interactive interfacing of the symbolic and the
material, I draw from Kenneth Burke’s concept of entelechy.
Attention structures accept that the volume of information projected in a given
moment exceeds the processing capability of the individual. Therefore some means of
organizing the world becomes necessary—the demon becomes manifest. Attention
structures, as Lanham defines them, resemble the schemata of Fredrick Bartlett—means
by which to apprehend the world—and return to the canon of memory in noteworthy
ways. Lanham builds his argument from a point of departure with “persuasion,”
following a trend of surprisingly little attention in networked rhetorics towards the role
memory can play (or how to define memory for that role). To explore the emergent
mechanisms of memory as made manifest by Lanham, it becomes necessary to more
closely consider the relationship of the external and the internal. Assume that the work is
done at the point of the gate: the interface between the two. However, rather than the
internal (memory) being inert in contrast to the external (environment-as-perceived),
presume memory also accepts the gate-keeping role: perception is internalized only to the
degree permissible by memory, and in so doing memory becomes reformed. The work
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done at the keeping of the gate, in which memory expands into the external world, also
consists of some exertion of energy.
For explanation, when considering the space of two spheres—one of cultural or
social construction, and one of genetics—biologist Edward O. Wilson observes a
proximate zone of co-evolution. As he suggests, “culture is created in by the communal
mind, and each mind in turn is the product of the genetically structure human brain”
(Consilence 138). Paradoxically then, as Wilson gestures towards, the space of memory
involves an intersection of the material and the symbolic. However, to Wilson, these
constructs are in their own right always in motion, with the other inspiring changes in
trajectory. What, we could ask Wilson, leads to the assessing of genetics or culture as
primary? His answer is a form of creative non-answer, born of velocity. Culture simply
moves faster than genetics, but both exhibit protocols for modification in response to the
other. His answer situates the degree of separation as reflecting the rates of cultural and
biochemical adaption. He continues, “culture allows a rapid adjustment to changes in the
environment through finely tuned adaptions invented and transmitted without
correspondingly precise genetic prescription” (139).
Culture, in the sense Wilson uses the term, references a product of Kenneth
Burke’s symbolic action. To Wilson, something becomes cultural by virtue of
identification—a concept not far removed from a core of Burke’s thought—and shared
language. These traits promote a uniqueness of what it is to be human, Wilson notes.
However, it is at this point that Wilson and Burke significantly part ways. As Burke
asserts, the basis of symbolic action is motion—which he defines as of the material,
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physical realm from which symbolic action becomes possible. Motion exists before
symbolic action to Burke, and will persist beyond the symbolic actions made by the
species. Conversely, to Wilson, the realm of the physical—his genetics—remains a
separate construct accessible beyond the symbolic. I would suggest, given the textual
means by which he produces a sense of the genetic, such a position is one inconsistent
with the necessity of symbolic action. Or spoken more plainly, the actions taken to
discuss motion are not of motion, but of symbol—thus, the object cannot be motion, but
remains symbol.

Fig. 3.4: “The Treachery of Images” by René Magritte
Symbolic action in Burke’s articulation stems from but becomes irreducible to
motion—which is to say that it depends on it, is of it, but cannot revert to it. Wilson
conversely seeks to carve a guiding space of dynamic nature: the space found between
action and motion, in which the symbolic can affect motion’s material domains. In this
reading, Wilson’s realm of pure genetics offers a type of reversion into motion. Burke
offers a similar position but suggests that entering the symbolic becomes a one-way
street. Through actions like naming or defining, things like the difficult to theorize “I”
discussed in my first chapter exist as more than the biological organism presently typing
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these keys on the page—yet, the symbolic floats free from them. The originary thing
moves, but so too do the associated symbolic actions.
In both articulations, the space between the symbolic and the material becomes
generative. Burke explains that “a social relation is established between the individual
and external things” (Grammar of Motives 237). Relationality, Burke observes in his
treatment of George Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society, constructs and reconstructs
(“to a degree”) the individual by virtue of his “becom[ing] aware of himself in terms of
them” (237). He writes that “his attitudes, being shaped by their attitudes as reflected in
him, modify his ways of action” (237). Language to Burke represents the “major social
instrument” from which relationality stems (GM 238). When the symbolic can no longer
comfortably consume the material, the symbolic undergoes a metamorphosis. And given
that the material remains in motion, presumably the symbolic cannot remain stationary.
Inevitably, even if the symbolic were to reach a plateau in which it could rest, the
material realm would necessitate its evolution. Likewise, the non-symbolic motion from
which symbolic realms emerge create the affectual zone of material and symbolic. Both
cases stem from the same conceptual location and mechanisms: entelechy and
emergence.
Emergence addresses the affect of one thing on the other when the result cannot
be described through the originary parts. Common examples include flocks, hives, and
schools (of birds, ants, and fish). All can be described as collections of individual parts.
Yet their behavior as a whole cannot be understood just as a congregation of discrete
units. Bird flocks adapt to changing weather patterns, ants work socially to accomplish
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great feats, and fish deter larger predators in packs. A fair visual representation may
seemingly be that of the pulled rope’s converse. When one side moves in proportion to
the other, emergence has not occurred—not all order, of the sort arranged by the motions
of the pulled rope, come of emergence. Such is rarely the case when entering the realm of
symbolic action, which humans as they develop memory enter. It is the realm from which
orientations stem; but those orientations cannot be simplified to an aggregate of the
materials that inspired symbolic action. Orientations become inevitably informed by
symbolic actions.
John Urry briefly describes the consequences of “attractors” when explaining
emergence. Attractors exist between order and chaos and, as the name suggests, attract a
given system to equilibrium between the two extremes. Fritjof Capra describes these as
“visual shapes” in a system’s pattern. To Capra, attractors animate, or lead to “living
systems to be analyzed as functional, open, operating far from equilibrium and, most
significantly, self-generating” (9). A simple metaphor may be the pendulum: the system
oscillates around a simple attractor (the base of the arc), which then leads to an
understanding of the system writ large.
Regarding what he elsewhere calls entelechy, Burke explains that “a region of
ambiguous possibilities” invokes realms of incompleteness—where beginnings are
“metathesis for ‘chaotic’” (GM 242). It is, Burke notes, an application of “potentiality”
(defined by way of Aristotle, as the “possibility of doing something”). Within this realm
of “the incipit, or attitudinal” is the realm of “symbolic action par excellence; for
symbolic action has the same ambiguous potentialities of action” (243). Burke links this
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realm to the force of images—a term of general interest to studies of memory. In essence,
the link between the realms of action and motion—the same realm of attenuation
maintained by Lanham—relies on incompleteness and potentiality.
These complications—of symbolic action’s genesis in motion, and entelechy’s
development as a part of a broader corpus in human motives—suggest a rubric by which
culture and genetics (symbols and motion) can be approached as some thing (instead of –
things). The notion of a living system hovering at the space between chaos and order
suggests that a tipping point is a generative space. The resulting construct can be
examined as something other than a zero-sum game; a pulled rope may move
disproportionately from one side to the next. In essence, the rope becomes more of a loop
open to both inside and outside influence. Symbolic, motion, and a third term—
interactivity (of the two) conspire to produce unexpected consequences. Expanding
memory to recover its primordial non-symbolic, unconscious, and active presence then
brings forth an interactive zone that conjoins motion and action as well as nurtures
emergent possibilities. Moreso, it is zone in which the extended nature of memory gains
particular sway.
Entelechy offers then grounds the work done at the points of connection (external
and internal)—at which emergence transpires. First, the realms of motion and symbol
conjoin to display generative characteristics. Second, the logics of memory serve as topoi
for the mechanisms of entelechy that interject symbolic evolution either mimetically (in
response to other symbolic interventions) or in response to non-symbolic motion. At
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issue, a problem further explicated in the next section, is an internal consumption of
external realms through the work of the distributed mind.

Beyond Brainbound: Emergence and the Extended Mind
But when you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as
human relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem, you thereby embark, I
believe, on fundamental error, which in the end will surely hurt you.
—Gregory Bateson
Exploring industrial ruins and structures made me look at the city as one living
organism. I started to feel not only the skin of the city, but also to penetrate the
inner layers of its intestines and veins, which swarm with miniscule life forms.
These spaces—abandoned subway stations, tunnels, sewers, catacombs, factories,
hospitals, and shipyards—form the subconscious of the city, where collective
memories and dreams reside.
—Miru Kim
Speaking to the E.G. Conference in 2008, artist Miru Kim observed that her
curiosity about dissecting animals and love of New York City converge in her art. She
began to realize within this convergence that she could approach the city as “a living
organism,” and wanted to “dissect it and look into its unseen layers.” Radically, perhaps,
her thought turned to emergence within the recognition that urban spheres can be viewed
as living systems of a merely higher order. Cities are, in part, the product of design—
builders, designers, architects, and a host of other groups contribute to what will become
the urban environment. Yet, those planned efforts cannot account for other realities to the
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city: human conduct, the economics of buying or selling real estate that in turn leads
some areas to remain perpetually new, the natural forces labeled “decay” that could as
easily be called “nature,” etc. Notes Jane Jacobs, the parts of cities (including their
inhabitants) remain heavily indebted to each other. “The look of things and the way they
work are inextricably bound together, and in no place more so than cities” (14). Jacobs
would continue that the “seeming disorder of cities” was more aligned with an “intricate
social and economic order” (15).
To Jacobs, the most basic element of a city was the perception of safety on its
arteries of sidewalk and street. Without such perception, which inevitably invoke a sense
of the “hobgoblins” of the mind, the city could not exist as any thing beyond a sick
organism (30). People, the constituent parts of the city, needed the ability to move and
interact in order for the city to thrive. What if the city were viewed through emergence—
as a single system born of all these interactive parts? And could the sites of interaction be
explored materially as well as conceptually? As Kim began to dissect the city by
extensively examining the urban ruins overlooked in daily New York life, she realized
something was missing. The spaces alone “wasn’t enough” for Kim. They needed to
involve a human. At first, the most “expedient means” of interjecting a human form was
to model herself. And she decided not to clothe herself in order to protect the human
figure from “cultural” queues. Her nakedness, she felt, also contributed to a focus on the
living body’s presence in “derelict” spaces. In moving towards dereliction, the spaces
were becoming “reclaimed” by nature. “In a way, I wanted the human figure in the
picture to become a part of that nature,” Kim asserted.
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Fig. 3.5: Screen Shot of “Bennett School for Girls” by Miru Kim
“As I stood on the stage of the [Bennett School] auditorium, I remembered what a
harrowing experience it was to be on stage for the first time. As the sounds from my cello
resonated throughout the school auditorium, I felt my limbs go numb, wishing that the
seats were empty” (Miru Kim). The aura of dereliction, to Kim, encompasses both a
history and an active engagement of natural motions within the space. To her, it cannot
be reproduced. “You’re actually feeling the hand laid bricks,” she observes of being in a
ruin. Those brinks have been felt by others, and were laid at a particular point in history.
Reproduction cannot replicate their smell, or feel (as but two examples of many).
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Fig. 3.6: Screen Shot of “Michigan Central Station” by Miru Kim
Kim observes:
Detroit was once one of the wealthiest cities in the world with the rise of the
American auto industry in the early 1900s. Now, the population of the city is
reduced to about hal of what it was in 1950. The desolation and poverty are
plainly visible. Every direction I turned, I saw an abandoned building from the
Gilded Age. The streets conjured up what I imagined New York’s SoHo or
TriBeCa to have looked like in the seventies.

96

During one photographic session, Kim encountered a homeless man and realized
she was intruding in his space. After explanation, he seemed unbothered by her work.
Later, he offered her his shirt to clean her feet from the grime accumulated in the tunnels
and escorted her from the area. It occurred to her then that these spaces, beyond falling
into a new repair often associated as decrepit (but more accurately thought of as a
recovery of motion in the form of natural reclamation), were being repurposed as shelters
for the marginalized members of society. In her statement of the scene—Freedom
Tunnel—she notes the “implicit meaning of its name” as “freedom to live beyond
surveillance.” To go underground, in Kim’s treatment of the space, is to borrow deeply
beneath the flesh. The ruin becomes a hidden space, a spleen, which while far from view
serves a role no less vital than the eyes, face, or other identifying characteristics of a
body.
Kim, in her projects, captures emergence: points where a confluence of factors
make new symbolic possibilities possible. In essence, she invokes and brings Jacobs’
argument to new life in the co-implicated spaces of her person and spaces in decay. The
living body, ever in motion, responds to the spaces it inhabits—and, without clothing, the
body’s vulnerability and universal identification comes into sharper relief. In spaces
usually overlooked or nonchalantly termed “ruins,” dereliction (better defined as the
passage of time) can be seen in new lights that showcase their relationship to broader
society contexts. Moreso, a naked body in a derelict space highlights change in
unforeseen ways. She as human being emerges within the context of an emergent space,
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which in turn becomes the city. The mind, the body, and the space interact and develop
new orders dynamically and continuously.
In her work The Pig That Therefore I Am, Kim turns her attention to flesh more
specifically. Here interest in the flesh comes from its realization of sensation, which
operates concurrently with memory to generate perception. However, Kim’s treatment of
the flesh complicates its theoretical role:
All senses mingle on the skin, the largest organ of the human body. Not only is it
an envelope, a container keeping the body intact and safe, it is also a membrane
that allows exchange between the inside and the outside of the body. Through
millions of pores, temperature is regulated, impurities are secreted, and vapors are
absorbed. . . . The skin is also a defining medium for the internal consciousness of
the body.
In part, her turn to considering the skin as a site of consciousness is indebted to the
philosophy of Michel Serres in his work Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies.
To Serres, the present scientific age has marginalized the senses. In contrast, Serres
argues that the perceptive apparatuses inherent to sensation offer a richness for
epistemology that needs to be reclaimed—alongside a need for rethinking the sites of
memory. “Historicized skin carries and displays a particular history. It is visible: wear
and tear, scars from wounds, calluses, wrinkles and furrows of former hopes, blotches,
pimples eczema, psoriasis, birth-marks. Memory is inscribed there, why look elsewhere
for it?” (24). The skin, in Kim’s work, exhibits the physical wounds of the past. It also
serves as the intermediary of inside to outside.
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Her choice of pigs is therefore significant for two reasons: the flesh of pigs and
humans closely resemble each other. And the space of pigs—the pens—emerge both of
design, and of interaction (between pigs, from the primordial slop in which they dwell,
feed, and excrete, with the constructed materials of the planner, etc.). Kim’s art examines
the processes of proximate realm of interaction, and distributes memory across the body
and the space.

Fig. 3.7 Screen Shot of “NY 3” by Miru Kim
Distribution and interaction gain significance beyond Kim’s thinking about the
body in space, and come into sharper relief as manifestations of emergence. Under such
conditions, phantasy’s assimilative posture towards perception and memory informs the
ways in which symbols come to be, and thus becomes a fitting simulation for emergence.
At some stage, an originary semblance gains associative value with some related item.
Over time, as memories grow into engagements with other perceptions, the network of
memory expands and moves into the realm of the symbolic. In parallel, Burke in his
theorizing symbolic action observes that the rhetorical agent moves away from the realm
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of mere matter (but does not depart it). And Edward Wilson offers a similar logic
between culture and genetics. For the sake of demystification, it bears noting that motion
persists beyond the realm of symbolic action, and, likewise, symbolic action may
influence other symbolic actions. Memory permits an engagement with emergence of a
particular sort more broadly.
Burke explains “the vast symbolic realm of tribal sociality, or orientation, as
shaped by the influences that you encounter by reason of your being a symbol-using
animal, whose ‘reality,’ at every stage, is determined by such terms” (817). Burke’s
scheme of motion/action employs emergence repetitively: first to enter the realm of the
symbolic, and second to account for actions in symbolic domains. In both times of
emergence, memory’s presence persists. Memory becomes a basis from which the logics
of emergence construct the symbolic. And once symbolic, emergence accounts for
change and perhaps even consciousness. For Burke, the realm of motion becomes
impenetrable except by, in Andy Clark and David Chalmer’s terms, the extensions of the
mind in which the body ceases to be a boundary to thought. While not to be confused
with un- or dis-embodied, the extended mind eliminates the binary of external/internal
memory.
From a basis of cities, bodies, and minds an emergentist lens may articulate that
the former exists beyond the latter, irreducible to it. Conversely the extended mind
hypothesis challenges the notion that mental processes are fully housed within the body.
The mental and conceptual actions termed mind exist within the actions within a given
space. The mind itself is an emergent construct, of and not merely in the city. Jacobs’
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treatment of the city certainly nods in the direction of the mind as both originary unit and
existing within the sidewalks of the urban spaces. She notes a call for relationality and
“togetherness” as indicators of connections (62). Present in the works of Edward
Hutchins, Andy Clark, and David Chalmers, Clark suggests that proponents of the
extended mind argue that “the material vehicles of cognition can be spread out across
brain, body and certain aspects of the physical environment itself” (1). “In other words,
for the purposes of identifying the material vehicles of cognitive processes,” Clark
explains, “we should (normatively speaking) ignore the old metabolic boundaries of skin
and skull, and attend to the computational and functional organization of the problem
solving whole” (2). Clark asserts a mnemonic basis to this relationship of affect and
emotion, noting that “biological brains, I want to say, are by nature open-ended
controllers.”
In this light, a resolution of the paradox of perception brought forth by reclaiming
phantasy is that the external / internal binary ceases to be viable. The external—or to be
more precise, the experience and meaning of it—comes from the relationality of the
trailing memory-image to the surrounding environment. Consciousness of the city, or for
that matter any surrounding area, is an emergent system always reconstituting itself.
Fueled by the entelechial unfolding of identity, its mindfulness remains in a perpetual
state of becoming—only, however, insofar as the embodied memory of the individual
reaches into the space and adapts.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPLEXITIES OF THE EVERYDAY
Earth is physis, the word designating both the power of emergence that is at once
the process of being rooted in native soil. . . . Here, in the thick of [Heidegger’s
purpose ‘to think what the Greeks have thought in an even more Greek manner”],
the idea of earth provides the overall ambiance, the pattern through which this
connection to the pre-Socratic mentality might be accomplished.
—Bernard Alan Miller, Rhetoric’s Earthly Realm: Heidegger, Sophistry, and the
Gorgian Kairos
Help. I (a manifestation of every writer) need a word here. What is the word? I
take an image from my mind, and describe it here: cat. No, not a cat, an animal. . . feral . .
. what is it? I highlight “cat,” and enter the thesaurus function of my word processing
software. I jot notes on a sheet of paper in an attempt to brainstorm. I ask a colleague—
what is that thing, you know, it is like a cat but not a cat. What’s that word? Perhaps one
of these sources can help: the mental imagery of my own recollection, the collective of
born of my colleague and I, or perhaps a digital device’s stored data. Figure 4.1 offers a
similar confession—the opening section as presented in version 1.1 of Mackenzie Wark’s
GAM3R 7H30RY did not arrive willingly. With the words “you would not believe how
many times I rewrote this opening section. . .” Wark seeds a conversation. There may
remain, Wark notes “from experience,” some “dumb-ass mistakes still here” (and perhaps
here). Almost three months later, “Steve” asks a question: has Wark read Richard
Powers’ book? Wark replies with a question: which of Powers’s works should be brought
to bear?
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Fig. 4.1: Screen Shot of Comments in McKenzie Wark’s Gam3r 730ry
It appears I am in good company with Wark; we both share authorial frustrations.
But beyond this analogous relationship, these two touch points bear a number of
significant differences. Unlike Wark’s work, my text (the one being currently read)
cannot host a conversation that either extends or reconfigures itself. It is not possible,
without another form of intervention or place for the proverbial meeting of minds, for
readers to communicate amongst each other or with the author. I would need other spaces
to ask my readers for their take on what word(s) correspond to something like a cat. This
sentence, paragraph, and page remains mired in an approach to production and
consumption that represents more how texts are perceived than the ways in which new
digital technologies can reconstitute their form. Wark’s draft, with support from the
Institute for the Future of the Book, became an interactive web text that questioned the
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traditional textual mold by offering readers an invitation to become actively engaged
within a generative conversation. A similar generative conversation for my text would
rely on emails, conversations in various domains, and other tools for discussion. So while
Wark responds to two questions: “can we explore games as allegories for the world we
live in” and “can there be a critical theory of games” (“The Original 1.1 Welcome”), his
web text offers another intervention related to the relationship of reader to writer. Wark
invites readers to approach his web text “as a way to think [about the research
questions],” and then attempts to “facilitate discussion around it.” The readers could
become something more than readers in a work that offers a glance into a different
relationship of place, production, and reception. My text cannot offer similar
functionality.
Wark’s text and my writing allegory illustrate cases in which the dynamics of
exteriority entwine with the projective and generative nature of memory, which this
chapter entitles the everyday. Although I have offered only two illustrations, examples
abound beyond reading participatory texts, engaging in conversation, or opening a
dictionary. The everyday, which this chapter expands using theories of ambience and
interface, speaks to a post-emergent construct: those technologies, rituals, places, and
actions that congeal from regular usage to become an irreducible whole. Beyond situating
the everyday as an extension of memory and enriching it through ambience and interface,
the work of this chapter comes to considering it as manifested in the most ordinary sense
commemorative sense: the cemetery.
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Technology and Memory: Introducing The Everyday
The ordinary practitioners of the city live ‘down below,’ below the thresholds at
which visibility begins. They walk – an elementary form of this experience of the
city; they are walkers, Wandersmänner, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins
of an urban ‘text’ they write without being able to read it . . .The networks of
these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither
author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alternations of
spaces: in relation to representations, it remains daily and indefinitely other.
—Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life
The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.
—Mark Weiser “The Computer for the 21st Century”
While prior chapters offered a generative understanding of memory, this chapter
now introduces how various memory systems interact with each other to generate the
everyday. Jeff Rice recalls visiting a digitized Detroit in which he accesses more than one
network to guide his path. His GPS device helps him navigate the city with its functional
memory and cartographic display, but it functions concurrently with his nostalgic
recognitions of the urban environment. Detroit to his experience exists only across, and
in, these networks.
As Rice notes, networks exist in two forms: as physical networked space of the
sort often enriched with technology and as the conceptual abstraction of things being
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interconnected and co-affective. The everyday approximates a web of relationality, a
point of intersections between networks, which points towards both conceptual and
material manifestations in a state of dynamic adaption. There is, of course, a tendency
toward restricting the domain of everyday to one or the other understanding of networks.
However, these definitions conspire and intersect in certain nodes (which could as easily
be places, shared acquaintances, or social medias). Such co-implications trouble
reductionist moves to one or the other. When new wholes result from parts being brought
into contact at nodes, the terminology could perhaps be best understood as engaging
networks in plurality. Within any given node multiple networks converge with the
possibility of becoming a singularity.
The everyday intersects with and can be understood through memory in two
significant ways. In Wark’s webtext, for illustration, guests can join or view the
conversation at any time. In other words, his e-text becomes a hub that both houses the
discussion and connects the various readers through one mediated space. As a type of
archive, Wark’s work serves as a focus for multiple divergent lines of individual and
collective memories. A dual understanding of the archive as both a process of retention
by an archivist and the place that, in Jacques Derrida’s treatment, commands recall of a
particular sort can prove useful. As another application of memory, both illustrations rely
on projections of individual memory. For the case of I as writer, I must find a missing
word by expanding my working memory to include a variety of external devices. The
memory system associated with a particular facet of the everyday becomes distributed, in
which constituent parts (whether the author, media storage, or a collective) each share a
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commonality. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun connects memory to software more explicitly
through a similar connection, and describing an inherently vexing set of political
problems that then result. In one sense the text itself is “stored” electronically for
visitation by future readers on technologies that include their own memory systems, and
at another the readers extend and distribute memory. These senses of memory offer a
sense of the everyday as a site of expression for memory.
Memory exists in each of the aforementioned forms—collective, individual,
technological—as well as in another perspective that extends beyond and emerges from
them, as prior chapters have theorized. Wark’s conversation is predicated on the relative
hospitality of the text as well as the systems of memory connected through it and can thus
be read as emblematic of the forms of space that nurture emergence. However, the
problematics of do not remain confined to Wark’s text. Participatory texts suggest
another important function of memory as related to the everyday: usage of and motion in
all forms of space affect the space itself, naturally, but in turn that reconfigured space
levies new demands on memory. Such recursion between projections of memory and
affects of space respond most directly to the problematics of what has been called the
everyday.
Participatory texts like Wark’s or the various outlets creators use to employ their
memories in their creative processes, however, do more than house conversation. They
offer a lens into the potential for recursive reconfiguration. More colloquially, the
creation of interactions involves a type of feedback loop. Rather than only read or
analyze objects or contexts, subjects explicitly affect objects and environments and then
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become affected by the reframed surroundings. A subject’s presence influences the thing
and the context (and vice versa). Erving Goffman’s now seminal study of the everyday
demonstrates the importance of an individual in social interactions as the foundational
basis of the everyday. Similarly, a participatory text invites response both through its
interface and the conduct of other readers. The various supporters who help me identify
the cat-like thing similarly intervene in a network of relationality that extends from
interiority into exteriority.
Memory extends into the everyday through manifestations of affectual logic,
which can be enriched by other rhetorical traditions but not reduced to them. I may need
help finding a word, but the environmental queues my phantastic memory (again as an
every-author) construct are unmistakably as present as the objects used along the way. As
the everyday can be defined as an understanding of places (virtual, physical, and/or
augmented) in which independent memory systems intersect, memory becomes a route
through which the everyday can be understood. However, it is a non-exclusive and nontotalizing approach. The everyday can be understood using other forms of rhetoric. For
instance, there are matters of delivery present in Wark’s text as well as in my authorial
trials but delivery alone, as one of several alternative rhetorics to memory for the
purposes of understanding the everyday, cannot alone account for the animation of
Wark’s text or the author seeking help with a word choice. Rather, another type of
memory that cannot be reduced to its constituent parts blossoms before the gaze of the
visitors to Wark’s web text (as they themselves become party to it).
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The everyday, an already complicated term as the observations presented thus far
signify, becomes increasingly troubled by ubiquitous computing (referred to as pervasive
for the remainder of the chapter). Pervasion interjects electronic media that, drawing from
the extended mind hypothesis, challenges the boundaries of internalization and
externalization. Thus the paradox to be confronted spatially everyday exists more broadly
within a nexus of daily rituals and technologies. In an everyday pierced and in part
defined by pervasive computing, conversations and ideas (like the respondents to Wark)
rapidly proliferate. As Mark Weiser projected, the technologies loosely affiliated under
the term computing have become sufficiently pervasive that they vanish into the tapestry
of the everyday. Rice experiences this first hand as he understands Detroit across purely
digital, purely material, and hybrid perspectives. In much the same way it can prove
difficult to consider the affordance of a historical site without considering the
contemporary contexts and lens through which the site is translated, it becomes difficult
to visit the everyday without thinking of the various tools present to help navigate it. The
question of the everyday is a question to be approached anew under the auspices of
prolific and pervasive computing.
Externalizations, including physical spaces or mediated traces, often follow
senses of memory defined merely as forms of inert repositories. The everyday typically
understands memory in a much more fluid sense, more aligned with the generative form
explored in this project. Beyond these repositories, memory may be viewed through a
collectivist lens via sites that may be commemorative or archival in nature. Such places
present materials that can be extracted and extended into a narrative form. In these cases,
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the I of the every-writer unmistakably leaves her or his proverbial fingerprints on the
subsequent composition. So yet again, this second sense of stored memory fails in the
everyday—the everyday relies on a more dynamic and projected sense of memory.
Even if overlooking the critiques of the previous chapters (and these two
observations within the everyday), storage metaphors served as the basis of segmenting
memory from the processes of perception in early designs of computing technology.
Cybernetic and computational designs delineated processing as separate from, but related
to and dependent on, storage. A prevailing and limited sense of memory supported
defined computing as processing, and reinforced the existing paradigm. To apply
computing terminology, random access memory relates directly to the operational
protocols of software. The protocols ultimately present and reproduce in ways to be
consumed by a subject. By viewing these as separate—the procedural as distinct from
storage—required inventing an alternative understanding (Random Access) of memory.
Quite literally, new forms of computing memory had to be invented to work within and
promote an existing theoretical lens that neglected phantastical perspectives.
To further complicate the difficulty associated with separating protocol from
memory, there remains the substantial and as-yet undiscussed role played by independent
external memory systems. These would be the types of memory systems that are tertiary
to the everyday. Assuredly computers, especially more recently designed ones, operate
independently in some ways. However, these various devices that perform computation
work within the network of operations of which the human user is a big part. Thinking
more specifically of mobility in which the devices are constructed with portability in
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mind and through various approaches to input such as global positioning, the computer
becomes merely yet another extension of the mind. Working with a device, in ecology of
usage, can be viewed as performances of cognition as well as executions of embodied
protocol. Data inevitably collides with individual memories when accessed, and those
protocols of collision are as much a part of the study of memory as are the senses of past
subjected to memorization.
Wark’s text, for instance, represents an interface between the digital memories of
other users and the projected and generative conduct of any given reader’s phantastic
design. Yet the same principles apply when the scarred remnants of a physical monument
and the stories of those scars interact with the perception of the visitor to a park.
Regardless of materiality (digital, physical, ephemeral, etc.), the emergence described in
the third chapter presupposes interactivity that results in a new whole. Interactivity
happens in zones of everyday connectivity using nodes, which also cast an important
gaze on the contexts of use. The everyday can thus be introduced as a function of
memory and pervasive technology (which has, as was noted, influential types of memory
not accessed by the user).

On Everyday Living
Rhythms. Rhythms. They reveal and hide, being much more varied than in music
or the so-called civil code of successions, relatively simple texts in relation to the
city. Rhythms: music of the City, a picture which listens to itself, image in the
present of a discontinuous wall of the façade . . . but beside the other windows, it
too is also within a rhythm which escapes it . . .
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—Henri Lefebvre “Seen from the Window”
With media pervasion, select traces may be stored (archived) or reproduced and
distributed for subsequent ease of access using a logic Collin Gifford Brooke calls
“persistence.” And as oft-called new media technologies encompass ephemeral (in the
case of data) or biological (vectored/expressed genetically) materials, the frontiers of
everyday living expand. The potential for the rhythms of daily life to directly relate to
access, buffering, and reloading as they do to walking, breathing, and eating becomes a
theoretical exigency. What is it to compute pervasively within a context of living, and
life?
Network access stems from memory in several noteworthy ways, such as in
mapping (understanding visually) place. To map is to apply a phantastical logic to the
dynamics of space. With a map, it becomes possible to ignore that which is off the
proverbial beaten path. The neglected spaces of decay Miru Kim explores, as the
previous chapter describes, exist beyond the fringe of the map—to visit them is to work
beyond or outside the constructions of space a map provides. When approached as solely
a matter of placing ideas or experiences in easily retrievable ways to be retrieved at a
moment’s notice, rhetoric describes memory as rote storage—what Brooke calls not
persistence but “present/absent.” In a “present/absence” perspective, the rhetorical
actions surrounding memory become either remembering (retrieving) or forgetting
(deleting). Understandably, placement paradigmatically functions to focus on protocols to
invent from memory or mechanisms by which memory can be built, but otherwise offers
little consideration of memory as a vital rhetorical theory. However, such a dismissive
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treatment is a far cry from the “guardian” role assumed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium in
which memory not only stores but guides orientations of the environment. Brooke’s
persistence, in which memory remains salient in the space between absent and present,
represents a consumptive move of daily life: the digital media has been folded into the
place such that its as much a part as the walls around a room.
It may be tempting to remain in a world of pure symbolic gesture in which a spirit
of cultural epistemology affords a mechanism where material realities remain
consequences of (rather than initiators of) action. When thinking of this specific problem,
Michel De Certeau suggests:
Stories about places are makeshift things. They connect with the world’s debris.
Even if the literary form and actantial schema of ‘superstitions’ correspond to
stable models whose structures and combinations have often been analyzed over
the past thirty years, the materials (all the rhetorical of their ‘manifestation’) are
furnished by the leftovers from nominations, taxonomies, heroic, or comic
predicates, etc., that is, by fragments of scatter semantic places. (107)
De Certeau sees the everyday as a sufficiently pliable concept to capture fragmentations
in a larger whole. The buildings along today’s or yesterday’s commute assuredly possess
stories or histories of their own. They may function as nodes that play a vital role (as
landmarks) or be passed without much notice. Along similar veins, evolutionary scientist
Edward O. Wilson notes a propensity for comfort within certain geographic topologies
born of perceptions of comfort. Perceptions of comfort or security are merely phantastic
echoes—the perceived situation is simply one that fits neatly within a prevailing narrative
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of the past. Wilson describes images of the Serengeti from which our species most likely
emerged as intuitively comfortable to a majority of viewers. For further demonstration,
Gregory Bateson senses that the mind engages the spaces it inhabits in material ways.
Bateson positions the physical world of context (which could as easily be called a scene
or setting) as inextricably bound to the processes of engaging that world. From Bateson,
it is not a far cry to situate physical spaces as reducible to lived experience. In arguing for
a primacy of perception, not unlike the notions of attenuation later discussed in rhetorical
circles, Maurice Merleau-Ponty returns the notions of absolute or rationality to the realm
of experience. By primacy of perception, he notes:
that the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things,
truths, values are constituted for us; that perception is nascent logos; that it
teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it
summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing
human knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to
make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the conscious of rationality. (25)
Everyday living dissolves the boundaries of objects, spaces, and subjects under the rubric
of perception. Perception, especially as informed by a generative theory of memory
rhetoric, acknowledges the realm of motion concurrently beyond and within the
symbolic.
Invoking a primacy of perception, however, calls for and forth an organizing
principle. Maps, limiting they may be, support the negotiation of space as much as its
navigation. Images serve as grams to the phantastical tradition of memory and also
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compress (and contort) prior experiences. The elements within the scope of the subject’s
perception, Merleau-Ponty note, are understandable as “references to a whole which can
be grasped, in principle, only though certain of its parts or aspects” (16). This collapses
the subject/environment (or, to apply a more Burkean frame, actor-scene ratio) into a
reified state lacking a central organizing principle.
Yet within Bateson’s treatment of physical space and in Wilson’s treatment of
representations of comfortable spaces from an evolutionary point of view, everyday
living acknowledges material and symbol dimensions concurrently. Perception relies on
sensation and of affect from objects and places, yet a storage metaphor of memory
rhetoric neglects to address these elements in relationality. Memory drawn phantastically
affords a toolkit from which the intersection of lived experience, material and physical
elements of place, and technology intersect experiential in the everyday.

Heterotopics
The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion
of our lives, our time, and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at
us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a
kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not
live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shads of light, w live inside a
set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and
absolutely not superimposable on one another
—Michel Foucault “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias”
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Near my home in Pendleton South Carolina, there is a local legend surrounding an
old grave marker. The weather-beaten stone marks the earthly remains of an evil and
vengeful spirit. Murdered by her brothers for turning to prostitution, or so the tale goes,
the ghost can be commanded to do the bidding of any visitors for the low price of the
correct incantations and ritualistic offerings. Local legend suggests that the colored stones
scattered nearby remain from efforts to channel her spirit in various cult actions, and that
her blackened headstone retains marks from repeated lightening strikes. Many fantastical
stories in folklore begin or end in the cemetery for understandable reasons: they are the
most everyday of spaces, second perhaps only to the sidewalks with which Jane Jacobs
was concerned. Cemeteries serve commemorative roles – both for those who have died,
and for the collectives employing cultural practices to sanction certain practices.
Foucault remains interested in describing sites by their “set of relations,” with
special attention to the “certain ones” that have the curious property of being in relations
that “suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations.” These spaces of contraction, he
notes, function “something like counter-sites” that are “outside of all places.” To
Foucault, such sites are not metaphorical or to be confused with Marc Augé’s
understanding of non-places. Whereas Augé theorizes an absence of relationality,
Foucault forecasts an inversion in which relationality turns relationality back upon itself.
Foucault’s understanding of such places stems from “real sites” that “do exist and are
formed in the very founding of society. . .” The term he uses to refer to them, the
heterotopia, works in opposition to the idealized utopia. He defines heterotopology as “a
sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live.” Such
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turnings are akin to the recursion gestured towards previously in this chapter within
memory as it extends into the broader everyday environment. Topia, or topics, are of
course longstanding themes within rhetorical inquiry. Yet the turn towards and against
the utopian offers a glance at the everyday to further consider.
Rather than addressing the matter through familiarity alone, heterotopology offers
a series of principles by which normalcy ceases to lend itself explicitly to self-replication.
The vocabulary of heterotopology remains unmistakably steeped in memory, as much of
Foucault’s invention of the concept relies on the problematics of time and temporality.
He describes opposites of the heterotopias either linked to the accumulation or flow of
time. As opposites, the museum or archive as a heterotopia “are linked” to the latter. Sites
like “the festival” consider the converse, a “flowing” and transitory understanding. To
explain the heterotopia “par excellence,” which consists of both understandings to some
degree and a reserve of imagination, Foucault references a ship. Without ships, Foucault
notes, “dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the
place of pirates.”
Navigating the everyday can, the heterotopic gaze reminds, benefit from
productive tensions within normalcy. Rather than look to the external or abnormal things
which can similarly disrupt, the regularly encountered and routine everyday can offer an
alluring mechanism for the construction of possibility. Maps guide our view back to the
distinction between agents and ecologies, restricting our mechanisms of using typical
spaces atypically. The map and the everyday are not, for that simple reason, productively
equated. To elaborate, Elizabethada Wright situates cemeteries as simultaneously “very
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usual and unusual memory place[s].” In this question of heterotopology and the everyday,
cemeteries occupy a space somewhere between material sites and creation of practices
that perform inversions (51). Wright observes, harkening back to Foucault, a paradoxical
form of referent: the mirror. A mirrored reflection offers sufficient similarity for
recognizability, but enough strangeness to approach counter-memory. And perhaps no
place better recycles the gaze than the everyday cemetery. Foucault describes the
cemetery as “a place unlike ordinary cultures” in which “each individual, each family has
relatives.” The cemetery can become thus both universalizing and connective, however
disquieting and routine. Wright comments, “the cemetery’s memory is like the mirror and
its reflection: real because of the physicality of the grave yet unreal and easy to distort.
Finally as a heterotopia, the cemetery is connected to all spaces and places, allowing all
in as it also juxtaposes all” (55). Cemeteries and sites of mourning in general may be
designed with public memory in mind or, in the words of John Bodnar, “public memory
emerges from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions” (75). As
Bodnar reminds, memory is not at issue as much as the disruptures of idealized and
normal spaces.
As a way of entering the everyday, Wright attributes significance also to the
cemetery’s everywhere-ness (69). Their ordinary commemoration falls rapidly into
normalcy and expectancy, but also renders the everyday-ness clearly visible. Wright sees
in the ordinariness of cemeteries a chance to makes a strange gesture: she points to
cemeteries as rhetorical spaces that affect those still living. The everyday derives from
their basic equations of affect, which can be matters of routine and normalcy—domains
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of memory. The cemetery attracts not those looking to remember but those wishing to
construct recollections. They as living bodies inhabit and move in a material space
attenuated to the presence of their mortality. The space is not simply “there,” it manifests
the tendency to leverage the present to facilitate a reconstitution of the past of the past.
As Wright treats them, although not in the language now invoked, cemeteries
express everyday logics—and as such, the corresponding heterotypical inferences bear
explanation. Wright is not alone in sensing the influence of memory as a persistent
rhetoric in normal places. Marianne Hirsch’s efforts to theorize “post-memory” rely on
similar understandings. Why is it possible, Hirsch would ask, that a memory from a
previous generation could obtain salience in the present? While cultural stories and public
memory sites can maintain collective memories, what would lead particularly acute
memories to be accepted as individual memories without personal experience? As a
genesis of Hirsch’s theory, the generation whose lineage included Holocaust survivors
would often assimilate painful and traumatic memories that predate their birth. It would
seem that objects, the relics and representations of their parent’s ordeal, and the stories
they experienced develop such enough potency to become personal (individual
memories). It may be argued, at some length, that the notion of post-memory owes no
small debt to Walter Benjamin’s theory of aura, in which the questions of affect and
semblance become entangled and enmeshed.
However, rather than theorize the issues of proximity associated with memory and
material reproductions, the question of the everyday moves towards affect. When
approached heterotopically, affect resides in the contradictory affordances of highly usual
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spaces rather than in subjects in space, the relationship of subjects to other subjects, or
media forms present in any given space. By turning the interconnected nature of all of the
above in any given moment, the everyday proliferates more broadly in spaces in which
the action (symbolic) and motion (non-symbolic) discussed in prior chapters coalesce. As
rhetoric adopts various material lenses through which to ascertain the consequences of
such interactions and interfaces, critical new vocabularies and symbolic actions are likely
to result.

Ambient Interjections: An Interrogation of Arlington National Cemetery
Arlington National Cemetery has developed ANC Explorer, an application that is
available across common web browsers and on mobile smart phones. This app
enables veterans, family members and the public to explore Arlington's rich
history. This first version of ANC Explorer allows users to locate gravesites
events, or other points of interest; generate front and back photos of a headstone
or monument; and receive directions to those locations.
— “Visitor Information: ANC Explorer” (From the Official Website of Arlington
National Cemetery)
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Fig. 4.2: Screen Shot of “Arlington National Cemetery” (Google Maps)
The writer I (as employed at the onset of this chapter) once navigated Arlington
National Cemetery. Arlington, as a reprise and symmetrical illustration to the Detroit
discussed by Jeff Rice, operates across several domains of experience. It can be
understood as the physical place of commemoration as well as an electronic intervention
of a newly released navigation application. The digital mapping of new forms of
cartography directly connects with the collective memories it sustains. However, it no
longer can be productively viewed as exclusively of any of these sites. An alternative
approach would be to see it as an illustration of everyday-ness as informed through
ambience.
Arlington is, of course, a unique place—its size, scope, and significance to a
national audience grants it more extraordinary than routine. Yet the everyday represents
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less a matter of normalcy than the affects resulting from being situated in a node of
relationality. And as far as nodes go, perhaps few approach Arlington’s stature. A way to
tell its history would be, for instance, to look at its conversion during the American Civil
War from private residence to cemetery. Alternatively, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
permits reading it as a space for responding to anxieties and traumas of unnamable loss.
Yet it could also be told as a personal narrative in the lived experience of its many
annual visitors. I recall being lost there once amongst the countless rows of headstones. A
storm moved in quickly, bringing rain by the torrent amid ground shaking thunder. Like
many other people caught in the open ground, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier became
a shelter from the weather. Shivering, huddled, and hoping for a break in the weather, we
awaited an opportunity to leave. The elements conspired to interject hospitality into the
space. I vividly remember the face of the guard at the door. Unbothered by the weather,
the water from the rain billowed off his bill of his cap. To others, it may be a place
associated with personal loss. The stones, especially the newer ones, are connected with
the presently living in intimate ways. That day, when the weather finally did clear, I
passed the casket of a soldier on its way to burial. Drawn by horses, the casket and its
enclosed remains headed for another addition to the commemorative space: a grave.
Perhaps that too could be the way to tell of Arlington’s everyday-ness: the individual
stories of each person there—living, or not.
Arlington as transformed across lived memory, the application intended to
intervene in the experience of visiting it, and as an articulation of the cemetery, invites an
ambient logic. Before a performance of “Waterwalk” on the TV show I’ve Got a Secret,
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John Cage defined music as the willful production of sound. Our feet, passing cars, and
the hum of the computer can form musical rhythms and compositions by his broad
definition. Cage’s approach to music offers a number of elaborations regarding sound and
space of concern to the everyday. In his demonstration, by design, many of his
instruments were ordinary devices. Dripping water from an ordinary kitchen sink and a
whirling blender, for instance, added their unique sounds to the symphony. Cage, to
express their musicality, used a stopwatch to account for the matters of time inherent to
any rhythm. The clock governed his musical gestures and aided in the emergence of
music from individual sounds. There’s a unique sound to Arlington as well, which at
times relies on the motion of wind and trees.
The ear would recognize music based, Cage surmised, on the “precision” with
when each instrument was added. To Cage, the piece required careful control of time,
which in turn could become musical to the listeners. Endeavoring to approach
chronological time consistently yields, however, a spatial challenge. Navigating the space
to meet the rigors of a particular schedule required frequent adjustments to his motion.
He would at times stand over an instrument awaiting the appropriate entry point for its
addition to the music. At times walking from “instrument” to “instrument” and at other
times frantically scurrying, his concern with time was evident in the pace by which he
moved across the stage to create various sounds. Motion and space remained integrally
connected to the questions of time Cage attempted to navigate.
Cage’s piece invokes something of a boundary question surrounding motion and
time in space, as controlling for one applies pressure to adjust in the other two domains.

123

All three are relative, of course, yet also cannot fall squarely into a subjective category.
The alluring possibility raised in the interjection of a fourth term, which includes all three
domains as co-implicated, necessitates further consideration. Thomas Rickert, in Ambient
Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being, employs “ambient” to discuss rhetorical
conditions of dissolving boundaries between agency and scene, and subject and object.
To a text, for example, ambience references an approach to rhetoric in which memory
serves a vibrant function. For present purposes, ambience also informs a contemporary
understanding of the everyday.
Don Norman, although contrarian in the sense of adopting mental models more
broadly to sort and sift an otherwise cluttered world, can inform turns towards affect
(moving beyond text to interface-as-space). Such turns maintain a constructive nature.
Any given context in Norman’s articulation similarly consists of a variety of networks,
resources, cultural perspectives, etc. Rejecting a division of user, object, and setting more
closely replicates the conditions of complexity. To invoke a language expanded in the
next section, such motions exhibit ambience. They remain objects in an environment (as
in the books scattered around my computer as I or Wark struggled to find the right word)
of which the writers or readers are a part, and the texts also maintain literary and ludic
richness across contexts. Unmistakably, however, the ambient perspective invited in the
next section contrasts almost categorically with Norman’s conceptual mapping. It
advances technologies and texts beyond stationary artifacts to instead gaining agency
inseparably as parts of the broader conditions in which they are placed. And from this
comes a brush with affect in sharper relief. Affect represents a view on the connectivities
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of artifacts, settings, and subjects that resists neat partitioning. Thus, ambience becomes a
turn in concept by which interfaces connect various systems (subjective, objective,
cultural) to become emergent constructs. These can include other users, of computer
memory, and of the symbolic remnants of the original authorial efforts by the composer
of the text. Ambience, especially when read as a continuation of interface theory, resists
linear binaries of division in everyday contexts. The either/or of individual subject or
collective or technological domains fail to account for the organic growth exhibited in
such domains. Memory exists within each existing system, of course, yet none (as argued
in prior chapters) can account for an emergent state. Rather it could be better considered a
state of co-implication, in which the subject’s phantastic memory performs within other
networks of relationality (which then, in turn further extend the situated memory into new
domains).
Rickert’s argument enmeshes place and sound with rhetoric. As Cage’s example
demonstrates, motion and time necessarily follow. Dramatically, a turn to ambience turns
from the simplicity that Rickert treats as the consequences of comedy—a singling out of
particular situational or environmental attributes for persuasive purposes. It should be
noted that some of the work of this dissertation, to interrogate memory’s revitalization
using complexity, closely traces a rubric of ambience. Ambience offers a rhetoric of
“enmeshment” of subjects, environments, and languages according to Rickert. Such
networking across materialities and species of rhetorical inquiry extends but the
everyday, and invokes memory whenever inhabiting a (any) place:
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. . .an ambient age calls us to rethink much of our rhetorical theory and practice,
indeed, calls us to understand rhetoric as ambient. Rhetoric can no longer remain
centered on its theoretical commonplaces, such as rhetor/subject, audience,
language, image, technique, situation, and the appeals accomplishing persuasive
work. Rather, it must diffuse outward to include the material environment, things
(including the technological), our own embodiment, and a complex understanding
of ecological relationality as participating in rhetorical practices and their
theorization. (3)
The paradigm Rickert introduces unhinges several rhetorical mainstays as exclusive
domains of rhetoric. The “material and informational environment” begins to take an
“active role” in “human development, dwelling, and culture” (3).
Such a broad and sweeping invitation to revisit rhetoric non-reductively benefits
from an assimilation of four themes in Rickert’s work. There are, he notes, cognitive
science, hermeneutic phenomenology, ambient music, and new materialisms (11). All of
these threads begin to converge in any and every place, as is the case with the new
approach to rhetoric he champions. So for these reasons, these threads become
components of a larger whole—in part, the question of ambience can be approached
through them. Yet the notion of ambience, as situated in this chapter, also represents an
intersection of rhetorical theory within everyday-ness. It is a contested territory, in which
Rickert offers a clear line of division. “By implication, rhetoric from an ambient
perspective can no longer be situated solely in human subjective performance” (29). He
continues, “place affects us—it is an occasion for the world’s revealing—and is not best
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understood in terms of messaging” (31). Moving towards a centrality of affect as
underwriting ambience from the perspective of four themes offers a point of congruency
for co-implicating the everyday with ambience. And it also questions how to understand
those points of interconnectivity from which each theme becomes enmeshed with others.

Interfaces & The Everyday
Much can be learned about the nature of interactions in everyday spaces from
interface theory. For instance, the consequences of presence often confound the original
design intentions. As visitors invoke memory in their visitation experiences as a part of
their perceptual actions, they may bring something novel and beyond the original design
intentions. Wright works to collapse Michel Foucault’s definition of a heterotopian space
with Michel de Certeau’s definition of place in order to discuss how sites of mourning
can become inclusive rhetorical spaces for marginalized discourses. The smell of a place,
an olfactory physiological action, relies on the intersection of small particles with the
processes of the body to translate stimuli into smell. Particles of dust, chemical
elementals, and the cilia of the nose detect certain presences in the air. To De Certeau,
walking in a space resonates with “the believable, the memorable, and the primitive”
(105). These elements relate and develop signifying practices as the subject moves
through a space. They essentially offer a reminder, one Henri Bergson uses to mediate the
matters of time and memory: the material body is the genesis of spatial experience.
Perhaps our skin, our eyes, our noses bring to bear the original interfaces of recognition,
perception, and ecological post- or non-human agencies.
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Sensation is the first interface, but not the only or last of its kind. Rather than
address one or the others, this section endeavors to expand their theoretical rigor to
unpackaging their connections to (and complications of) the everyday. In many respects,
the work of Richard Bolt—who builds from a metaphor of meeting places to understand
the interface—interjected a profound way for sensing the intersection of the everyday
with interfacing, long before the advent of mobile or pervasive computing. The tenants of
pervasive computing suggest the interfaces of technology are, themselves, sufficiently
ubiquitous to align with experiencing the everyday. However, more broadly construed,
interface references a zone of proximity that closely traces a turn present in much of thing
theory, object orientation, and post-humanism’s efforts to assimilate rhetorical thoughts
into various materialisms. The interface thus represents a site of conceptual expression
for phantastic memory, a lynchpin for several contemporary rhetorics, and a core part of
thinking (and experiencing) the everyday.
Wark’s text blurs a terminological line, as both a text and a living memory of
responses. Yet the line that demarcates text and memory has itself has been blurred
elsewhere. Mary Carruthers, in The Book Of Memory, asserts that the term text bears an
etymological symmetry to weaving—as in, the various layers of language and reader
intersect at (not in) textual engagements. To Carruthers, text itself is a nexus of different
intersecting memory forms in language and the tangible book-artifact, which then
engages the reader’s perceptions and memories through reading. It could be said, to apply
Carruthers’s observation more generally, that “texts” gain significance only in the
ecology of everyday interactions as a point of connectivity in which different forms of
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memory converge. The term “text,” as Carruthers positions it in thinking memory,
references a perspective that connects with “media” (or, more accurately, technologies of
memory) more broadly. Further, text (to print) bears an affinity with a spatial
understanding of the interface as Derek Van Ittersum suggests. Text possessed a woven
and networked nature prior to the invention of mediated or networked media.
Interfaces, as existing both beyond (and before) textual frames, inform the
activities of reading (interacting with or within texts) and bear a remarkable affinity with
the anchor points (le lieux) of collective memory proposed by Pierre Nora. Nora
famously observed that lieux exist in the absence of more authentic forms of memory.
They are especially different in the sense that they are not merely points of consultation
(traces): they are material zones within a larger networked memory system comprised of
subjective, collective, and mediated parts from which new frameworks of memory can
come into being. They can also reinforce the existing frameworks, or offer reaffirmations
of existing ways of gesturing towards the past. To Nora, the primary lieux is archival—
which itself possesses conceptual and metaphorical significance beyond the physical
(historiographical) definition of the domain. Considering the archive as a point from
which to theorize more broadly interface theory invokes a gesture towards ethos, because
the archive consists both of the physical materials retained and the subjective memories
(and methods) of the visiting historian.
In this treatment, interface extends beyond the limiting and limited sense of
physical entry points. Instead, interface becomes metaphorical and conceptual for those
spaces that, regardless of design intention, bring otherwise divergent systems into
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synchronicity. From Carruthers, who sees in text a gesture towards memory in the form
of a weaving structure, the leap towards the word “archive” is not far removed. Jacques
Derrida recalls a dualistic nature, in which “archive” references a “principle” where
things commence as well as a “there . . . from which order is given” (1). Assuming such a
stance, whereby the text and archive assume a similar property of both physical thing /
place as well as an entry point for structure, the logical of interfacing seemingly
transcends the given media (as text or texts, in archive). To return to the matters of
contextualization, whereas previous chapters engaged a historical and theoretical lens for
these actions, this chapter concerns itself with the places of interactivity from these
behaviors happen—it situates the interface conceptually as a space of proximity between
otherwise independent memory systems, at which new systems emerge. It visits the
questions of conjunctive experiences discussed by Anna Munster, but as expressions and
vitalizations of rhetorical memory.
The interface is thus a routine and everyday species. Text and archive, whether
separated as entities or explored for commonalities, exhibit interface logics as do driving
a vehicle, walking on the sidewalk, or riding an elevator. The challenge becomes to better
understand the interface as it finds manifestations across and beyond these articulations.
However, the invocation of interface in the everyday does not represent a blind turn to
collision as generative or of memory without interrogation. A proliferation of interfaces
can be traced to hyper-connectivity theorized by Duncan Watts and Albert-Laszlo
Barabasi. To Watts, interfaces arise so frequently that they are easily overlooked as a
matter of routine. The node, or crux of these interfaces, Barabasi asserts, represents
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places from which new orders emerge. The interface represents place of a particular sort:
areas when multiplicities of memory become singularities. Naturally, the term interface
itself harkens to a display of some technological sort. More generally, however, interface
(like the networks to which they gesture) can more productively be viewed conceptual
abstraction. Interfaces account for the façades, the entry points, and the pronaos: those
thresholds into networked domains.
In what Wark experiences alongside “Steve” in their discussion of Richard
Powers, text becomes a space in which new orders of thought generate. Reframing text
(as but one technology of memory amidst many) then manifests a broader set of logics,
which can then lend themselves to facilitating connections between memories in various
forms. To read a text is to connect a reader’s framework of memory with the types of
collective and material memory retained by and in the text, for instance. Yet similar
logics are present in the conceptual space of connectivity writ large. Consider sitting on a
park bench, when two walkers nearby begin speaking. In hearing their conversation, the
onlooker conjoins his or her perspective with the physiological acts of hearing. The park
becomes a space of meeting, in which several people (working through oral modes of
communication) at a particular place and time engage each other in conversation.
Interface thus gestures more broadly to other types of encounter that rely on cartographic
applications of memory. And text becomes species of a wider genus: technologies with
memory writ large, and spaces designed to facilitate interactions. Consequently, it is from
interfaces that emergence transpires.
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From Augmentation
Although interface in the sense used in this chapter more broadly invokes
thresholds than exclusively sites of human-computer interface, the efforts to “augment”
human intellect by way of interface design pioneered by, amongst others, Douglas
Engelbart necessitate acknowledgement. Notes Engelbart in a summary report for the
Director of Information Sciences of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research,
“[human] population and gross product are increasing at a considerable rate, but the
complexity of his problems grows still faster, and the urgency with which solutions must
be found becomes steadily greater . . .” (1). In response, Engelbart develops a systematic
framework for “improvements in performance.” Amongst the possible enactments of
Engelbart’s conceptual framework, the computer seems particularly promising as a
“clerk” able to complete requested actions with greater speed. Engelbart, however, sees
the computer as extending beyond human frameworks for problem solving:
In such a future working relationship between human problem-solver and
computer ‘clerk,’ the capability of the computer for executing mathematical
processes would be used whenever it was needed. However, the computer has
many other capabilities for manipulating and displaying information that can be
of significant benefit to the human in non-mathematical processes of planning,
organizing, studying, etc. Ever person who does his thinking with symbolized
concepts (whether in the form of the English language, pictographs, formal logic,
or mathematics) should be able to benefit significantly. (6)
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Engelbart speculates computing machines can exercise a type of thinking that not only
augments human patterns of thought (the “clerk” functionality), but approaches
computational activities uniquely and independently of human frameworks. His notion of
“direct aid to an individual in comprehending complex situations” (8) both complements
and contributes to human thought through the computer. The interface, at this stage of its
inception, makes possible a two-way flow of affect: the inputs of the human user prove
affective to the machine, and vice versa.
Interface more directly applies to the zone through which flows of affect can be
traced and localized, but remains indebted to the influence of early computer interface
designers. That much of the research under this era was in the name of national security
or defense raises certain political and ethical questions, however, remains a subject for
elaboration under a separate project. The framework Engelbart proposes early in his
career remains crude, by his admission, yet of lingering significance in no small part due
to a matter of pattern congruency lurking below the surface. He identifies four classes of
augmentation: artifacts—designed physical objects, language—the “way in which the
individual parcels out the picture of his world into the concept that his mind uses,”
methodology—the ways of organization, and training—human conditioning to work
effectively (9), all of which rely on a mnemonic framework. We may immediately harken
back to the method of loci, in which vital information is both sorted (given a place in a
mental palace) and assigned a visual attribute. From this model, the parallels to
Engelbart’s system are unmistakable. The way in which to build an interface, as a
conjecture, is to align functionality with memorability. Thus, Engelbart sees in the
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interface a move towards transparency (which, subsequently, will be critiqued by David
Bolter and Diane Gromola).
However, to explore the theoretical motions of the everyday that rely on the
memory, it becomes necessary to first look more directly at the consequences of interface
theory. Text as treated by Mary Carruthers lends itself to a relational, associationist
orientation (evidenced by common nomenclatures, such as “within” or “from” any given
text). Similarly, the “augmentation” developed in Engelbart’s early theory also operates
using an associational frame. For illustration, the basic unit of writing—the letter—
represents a typographical marking: a subunit of language, contained within text.
Nevertheless, in turn, letters become meaningful only when aligned with the recognition
of readers. The question of signified-signifier becomes important at this
acknowledgement of association. As a significant problematic, however, the influence of
setting of reading on the acts of reading in which the scene conjoining text and reader
encapsulates particular affordances, remains to be seen. And also, the notion of direct
association between interface affordance and interface affect necessitates elaboration.
The spaces surrounding an act of writing or reading heavily occupy Donald
Norman’s treatment of simplicity. To an untrained gaze, Norman writes, a cluttered space
may appear unkept and disordered. Yet to the occupant of the space, who has gained a
familiarity within it, a relocation of things would produce a sense of confusion. Sherry
Turkle expands the relationship of a situated user within an interfaced space, which as a
theme also receives consideration in Lucy Suchman’s treatment. Simplicity exists within
inevitable domains of material complexity, Norman argues, only insofar as a mental
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model or cognitive map exists in the occupant (user) of the space. Beyond an obvious
connection to the method of loci, attributed to Simonides in which cartographic
resonances permit the development of subjective memory systems, the matter of posttextual space trouble the waters of interface theory.
Notes Norman, “the problem lies in the interaction of the complexities of
technologies with the complexities of life” (6). Norman sees both sides of the equation,
the technological and the encapsulating world as already inherently and irreducibly
complex (to be read as a separate term entirely than complicated). The positioning of one
meeting the other, as in whenever a given technology is engaged, does not reduce the
subsequent nature. To Norman, only as a consequence of conceptual models, defined as
“the underlying belief structure about how something works” (34), can these complexities
(in plurality) become manageable. Models arise naturally, Norman asserts, from the
desire to “understand what is happening” (39). These explanations can be, Norman
admits, “sometimes newly created while we are trying to understand our experiences”
(39). Norman co-implicates and associates expectancy and interpretation, ultimately
assigning a looping quality to their evolution. Norman’s assessment implies that, by
virtue of experience, an interpretation reinforces or modifies expectancy. Subsequently,
expectations guide experience (but remain open to modification).
Metaphorically speaking, Norman’s intersection can become akin to writing the
map to navigate a given space while walking through it. Thus experience can serve metacartographic ends by triggering new expectancies that, in turn, promote understanding the
experience in particular ways. One user may find a given interface pleasurable, and
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another indicates that the interface is difficult. Norman asserts, “whether something is
complicated is in the mind of the beholder” (45). However, in this reduction to
expectation from co-implication, Norman seemingly nuances his argument away from
interface-centricity. While the so-called “mind of the beholder” remains able to modify
its stance to better fit the circumstances as experienced, Norman seems largely wed to a
predominantly phenomenological lens. It is, however, a position that runs afoul of the
materialism present of and in the space. My task therefore becomes to explore the notion
of the interface more fully, as generative sites from which emergence of expectancy
results. It bears repeating that, without the memory rhetoric previously described in prior
chapters, we may simply see things like what happened within Wark’s text as merely a
happy consequence of fate or function of delivered design. Such interpretations, however,
overlook the presence of a collapsing internal and external binary, which then
acknowledges a confluence of otherwise independent memory systems. And Norman’s
turn to the structure of cognition as a means of extracting simplicity from complexity
offers little when it comes to the external contexts beyond apprehension.
The barriers that separate text or technology from reader or user (in any given
context) lose their saliency when viewed through a spatial lens. Engelbart’s treatment of
interface as augmentation runs in contrast to Norman’s concerns. For demonstration, a
question posed by George A. Miller offers a productive invocation. Miller asks, “where
in the world is information?” (3). Miller articulates a “priority of space as an organizing
principle” in which information located spatially employs association as a means of
promoting recognition. Information, Miller finds, extends beyond physical accessibility
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of tangible artifacts. Accessing it therefore pertains less to moving than having “a
conversation with it on some console whose spatial location relative to the information is
completely irrelevant to the system” (5). Users could better encounter information if
organized graphically, Miller argues. Such designs represent ways to apply natural
tendencies, again harkening to memory as a guiding trope for the delivery of computer
functionality. The interface in Miller’s sense of information exchange relies on natural
inclinations towards spatial association as a queue for building memory. It is from this
general idea of familiarity that the user-friendliness of any given interface finds its
footing. More significantly to the present discourse, familiarity renews the cartographic
understanding of everyday.
Association, whether expressed as Norman’s treatment of simplification or
Miller’s spatial reasoning, places a very high premium on training and conditioning. In
Miller’s and Norman’s treatments, technology may be complicated based on the
congruency of mental models with the interface’s design. The simplicity and
complication exist in the interpellation of the user’s gaze. Yet, to this outlook, the thing
being accessed remains stable and separate from the user. Also, the interface remains
passive and inert until the users animate it through his or her actions. While technological
trees may fall in the forest in the form of advanced features beyond the knowledge of the
user, Norman and Miller would answer something to the effect that such noise is
unimportant. However, Norman and Miller neglect the possibility for the setting around a
given artifact blurring with artifacts itself, as users (aka: readers of texts, players of
games, etc.) negotiate the totality of circumstances. Where, we could ask of Norman’s
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conceptual model, does one complexity begin and the other end? The subjects themselves
are not only within the materially complicated domains, but accountable for developing
models that permit the navigation of what otherwise would be unrecognizably dense
scenes.
It would appear that the interface represents as much an activity, an act of
“linking” divergent systems. John McNair, in studying the iconography of graphical
computer interfaces, offers a similar conclusion. Subsequent scholarship by Nathaniel
Rivers and Stewart Whittemore extend McNair’s intervention in computer icons as
expressions of memory, and suggest a memory can broadly inform the design and
critique of graphical computer user interfaces. However, interfacing imperfectly links
memory to computing: the threshold space that is the interface speaks neither system’s
tongue naturally, and each “side” (the human and the nonhuman, or the human with other
humans through a nonhuman intermediary) requires a translator. The interface thus not
only includes associational and spatial correlates to become affectual by linking divergent
systems and developing transferability. Bonnie Nardi would consider this a function of
interaction within a rubric of context and consciousness as related themes.

Imagining a Future for the Everyday
. . .all this witnesses not just to man’s physical presence but also to the
omnipresence of consciousness human activity. So do other things under the
surface of the landscape that I cannot see—tunnels, basements, subbasements,
sewers, electric and gas conduits—and above the surface, when the atmosphere is
being worked on to free it from the fumes man pours into it and is streaked with
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the vapor trails of planes in which and between which human consciousness has
established incredibly complex controls and informational patterns.
—Walter J. Ong, S.J., Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness
and Culture
The interface, most especially as theorized by Brenda Laurel, Sussane Bødker,
and Alexander Galloway, provide a way to expand the question of affect within an
interface space. Interface theory, as either conceptual space or material structure, relates
to the capacity of affection in Alexander Galloway’s treatment. Galloway asserts “an
interface is not a thing.” Instead, he offers a broader and more conceptual understanding
in which “an interface is a relational affect.” For elaboration, to Galloway, engaging the
matter around us represents more than crossing a threshold (as in the case of interfacing
with a room by walking through its door).
Similar affectual consequences remain present in other forms of interface, such as
syncing with cloud storage through the dimly lit screen of a personal computer or
establishing the protocols by which physical computers engage each other, as described
in Alex Kirlik’s intervention. In Galloway, the capacity for affection arrives in several
forms—physical proximity being but one possible incarnation. Problematically,
interfaces involve permeable barriers between systems. Dust particles detected by the
cilia, and the sound waves impacting the eardrum offer means of not just of attenuation to
the particulars of the space, but affection in the sense that the room connects by way of
expectancy or familiarity from entering agent. Affection represents a strong turn from
augmentation in the interface, and suggests a possible future for the everyday.
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Galloway establishes as his goal two goals, to define and interpret interfaces,
those “mysterious zones of interaction” and “autonomous zones of activity” (preface). It
would appear, at the highest order of granularity, that the interface to Galloway
represents an activity threshold as much as a physical or conceptual space. When
divergent things influence one another, they could be said to interface (thus resituating
the theory of space to one of activity). In this juxtaposition of action and space, affection
begins to take form. Galloway observes that the interface becomes “a general technique
of mediation evident at all levels; indeed if facilitates the way of thinking that tends to
pitch things in terms of ‘levels’ or ‘layers’ in the first place” (ch. 2). The interface thus
takes a step past being a screen for systems and space in which connections between
systems takes root, and encroaches instead on becoming an organizing (cartographic)
turn. At the heart of the relational affect rests a guiding function: to interface is to
connect, in particular ways, across distinguishing characteristics of process and protocol.
Interfaces, in Galloway’s treatment, move from spaces of augmentation to spaces
of affect. When conceived of as the spaces that link independent systems (whether of
some facet of human experience, such as thought) or the operations of a computer,
interfacing becomes increasingly conjoined with the everyday. Yet turning to affect
represents a large and significant challenge to the concept of interface. Technology
responds to user input amidst a swirl of other processes and the user builds or corrects
her/his mental map from prior experience. Interfaces surround and envelop writers and
reader(s) of text, in the same way the context of and technology being used connect with
the users. Technologies, with their various protocols and databases, connect (with) users
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with their associated habits (with affiliated senses of familiarity, locality, or decorum), as
matters of routine.
Technology as an extension of agency, broadly construed—whether in a cloud of
storage or unrelated to computers—relies on the presence of networked ecologies. The
actors in these scenes are barraged by stimuli well beyond their capacity for
apprehension. Norman, in interjecting a language of subjectivity to the conversations of
complexity, neglects the conceptual and material intricacies of interface theory. While he
sees and speaks of the generative nature resulting from mental models attenuated to the
surrounding conditions, his thought cannot account for non- or post-human agencies.
That machines may talk to each other, affect the material surrounding, or resist input
cannot find lodging in Norman. Miller approaches this issue more carefully; his treatment
of the subject senses that information remains salient beyond the mental constructs of
use. It is not a far cry to see associational logics similar to those deployed by Miller or
Norman in several similar theories familiar to rhetoric, such as the terministic screen
developed by Kenneth Burke or the paradigm of Thomas Kuhn as two examples.
Engelbart’s early developments of interface as simple extension instead turned towards
developing spaces of affect. And the similarities between these ideas may indeed benefit
through a close comparative analysis across these terminological inroads. Yet, such
analysis rests beyond the scope of present study. Rather, suffice it to note that the lines of
subjective gaze and material conditions begin to fold inwards in ways associational gazes
cannot account for.
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At the onset of this chapter I invoked a logic aligned with Norman’s situation
reading as I placed writer (me, Wark, etc.) in the midst of situated activity. The writers—
I, Wark, Wark’s readers—struggled to recognize a fitting language to the situation and
looked to the available outlets at that place and time for guidance (memory, the resources
of the computer, a peer’s response). Help was found by transgression of boundaries, and
related languages. Wark, or I, could no more assume ownership of the product that
resulted than those people and things contributing along the way.
A conceptual space—which correlates with physical zones of interactivity—gains
prominence by virtue of affectual consequences. Settings are not simply inert awaiting
processing through the activated conditioning of the subject, as each subject possesses a
unique and active memory. Once conjoined at a given space of inquiry, the various
memory systems began to synchronize into a recombinant whole. Yet the space itself,
with its particular affordances facilitated the alignment of otherwise independent systems
of memory, contained a logic contributed to the emergent process that transpired.
Norman places the intersection of systems as subjected to conceptual models. However,
the interface also resides at the fringe of the body and contains dynamic properties
beyond the cognitive map of a subjective gaze. Norman’s answer essential boils down to
developing alignments between mental models and interfaces. Simplicity results, which
in the sense Norman proposes neatly occupies the conceptual space of a non-linear
emergent construct. Norman hinges on a reductionist tendency—but, before taking that
fateful step, more closely positions “simplicity” as the consequence of encounters within
a complex space. In sharp contrast to his interests in complexity, the conceptual map
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remains a means by which to avoid complications. The everyday in this articulation
represents all possible interactions within a complex space. While his concession that at
any given point of intersection both systems adapt allows room for qualification,
adaptability and affect remain blind spots to his conceptual thinking. In retrospect, it is
these vary spaces that may best paint a future for the everydayness yet not experienced.
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CHAPTER 5
A NEURO-RETURN

Fig. 5.1: “La Conversion de Saint Paul” by Luca Giordano
Now as [Paul] was going along and approaching Damascus, suddenly a light from
heaven flashed around him. He fell to the ground and heard a voice . . .
—The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the
Apocrypha
In the conversion narrative of Paul, heavenly light and a booming voice initiate a
transformation from zealous prosecutor to early leader and eventual saint. His experience
on the road to Damascus leaves him blinded and temporarily crippled for a period of
days. As a consequence, or so goes the story, he becomes a prolific writer and missionary
in early Christianity. Paul’s story, of course, can be understood in a variety of ways
including those beyond the realms of theology or spirituality. Booming voices and bright
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lights may be viewed as products of an imagination run amok or, as suggested in The
Last Temptation of Christ, impossibilities that simply never happened and were invented
for strategic reasons. Perhaps his story could be alternatively viewed as emblematic of
prose from a historical period; after all, much of historical note can be extracted from the
intersection of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman philosophies (and rhetorics) his writings
represent. And, of course, Paul could be treated as a form of “Rollo Tomasi” (a fictional
character invented to represent an anonymous subject in the film L.A. Confidential) in
which a group of writers use a shared pen name to draw upon the authority of a
pseudonym. Such varied readings position Paul as ambitious writer seeking political
capital, a zealot, or an opportunist.
Each of these treatments (and many others unlisted) could be mined lucratively,
but this chapter has different reasons to begin with his conversion story. Paul recounts a
sensory experience that becomes a sign of sincerity for and basis for the authority of his
writings. To offer a relevant speculation, what if Paul experienced a form of false
memory or hallucination? If so then the activities of the smallest of cells would become a
loud voice in theological, cultural, and spiritual circles. Rather than hear a light or voice,
his reported brush with divinity becomes merely a function of his brain. Understanding
the bio-physiological functioning that contributed to his writings would then furnish
another way to interpret his narrative.
Paul’s conversion narrative points to an intersection between rhetorical memory
and neurorhetorical discourse that serves as a conclusion to this work. At this
intersection, rhetoric gains a interjects an alternative trajectory for future studies. For
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instance, neurorhetoric approaches memory as not merely adaptive or responsive to
environmental stimuli, but rather as anticipatory and plastic. While focused on that which
resides “in” the human subject, neurological studies of memory sympathetically question
the common notion of encapsulation by illustrating an extended approach that cannot be
comfortably reduced to the cellular processes embodied within a mind. By treating the
internalization of memory less as a function of localization and more as a function of
examining memory’s situated and material facets, the neurological approach latticed in
this chapter challenges the internal/external binary. A neurorhetorical reading of memory
revisits the phantastic tradition, which both theorizes plasticity and supports moving
memory from “brain bound. Rather than a move towards simplicity, the neurological
frame interjected in this chapter produces a generative lens that suggests that the next
frontier for rhetorical memory can be found in situated neurological networks.
Ultimately, a (re)turn to the neurological offers a conclusion which demonstrates and
extends several components of the theory of rhetorical memory explored in this
dissertation. An exploration of neurorhetorics for its implications on memory offers a
potential direction for future research, and conclusion to this dissertation.

Illuminating the Possibilities and Problems: Considering Neurology and
Psychê
Speech is a powerful guide, which by means of the finest and most invisible body
effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and
nurture pity . . . Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come
upon its hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in good
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fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, the soul is wont to
experience a suffering of its own.
—Gorgias, Encomium of Helen 8
In the Sophistic treatise Encomium of Helen, words gain agency as they become
physical in the brain of the hearer. Gorgias positions the seduction of the symbolic
actions found in speaking and hearing in the physical body through engaging the soul.
Essentially, the nebulous property of the body referred to as a soul becomes a core part of
the agency of words in that it responds to some languages more than others. Words gain a
corporeal form, the argument continues, through their ability to resonate with and entice
an immaterial but influential soul. Sophistic training of the sort alluded to in Gorgias’s
Encomium can be read then as an education into the means of finding speech patterns that
entice the different types of souls to respond in ways desired by the rhetor. In Plato’s
Phaedrus, which is admittedly rarely read in concert with the Encomium, the character
Socrates observes “hence a certain type of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain
type of speech to take heed such and such action for such and such reason, while another
type will be hard to persuade” (271). Again, but in a treatise often read to conflict with
the Sophistry attributed to Gorgias, the soul becomes a basis for the susceptibility and
responsiveness of a person to a speech act. Any listener’s intrinsic characteristics develop
into susceptibilities (or lack thereof) for certain types of speech, the character Socratic
notes. Concurrently, the ways in which a person physically responds to speech—whether
through emotional states or attentive ones—stem from the influence of the words on the
soul.
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As recounted by numerous commentators on the relationship of rhetoric to
philosophy in both Platonic and Sophistic texts, the soul (psychê) exhibits an
interdependence with the technê offered through rhetoric and/or dialectic. Ramsey Eric
Ramsey once quipped that his deliberate misreading of Plato’s Gorgias productively
situated rhetoric as vanishing within rhetoric in the text. Ramsey employs this slight of
hand to demonstrate “this telos of rhetoric [to be concerned with winning the conviction
of one’s hearers] is ultimately concerned with the human psychê because any conviction
one holds or can come to hold, for Plato, is held in/by one’s soul” (250). Fridrich
Solmsen offers a similar position by drawing from the commonality that psychê also
references life force. Solmsen’s reading could be viewed as an early invocation of what
Henri Bergson would later term the élan vitale in reference to an irreducible organizing
force. Solmsen recounts that the psychê to Platonic thought was to be protected from its
susceptibility to corruption (359). Plato, in this very brief recounting of a very broad and
longstanding conversation, could be read to find agreement with a Sophistic position
concerning the capability of a soul / psychê to respond strongly to the magical gestures of
rhetoric. Rhetoric could then, as a possible interpretation, become a study of affect and
symbolicity. This reading would suggest that a philosopher in a Platonic sense would
properly revere the psychê as more essential than its house (the body) in contrast to a
Sophistic approach to rhetoric would view the soul as something to exploit and
manipulate.
These observations do not endeavor to valorize one approach at the expense of the
other, nor do they construct a rhetoric of the soul, if such a construct were to exist in
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anything beyond a metaphorical realm. Rather they point towards a historical relationship
between memory, body, and rhetoric. In other words, current interest in the neurological
seems remarkably similar to historical debates concerning the place of the soul in
argumentation. Yet there are multiple counter-readings that could easily render the
connection problematic. For illustration, an agreement between the Platonic and Sophistic
positions concerning the soul’s capacity for being led astray by rhetoric overlooks the
possibility of an active soul. Each perspective sees the psychê as somewhat inert and
defenseless. Souls, if they accept the various invocations and engagements that are
presented, adapt and can be readily led astray when presented with an agreeable rhetoric.
To account for such passivity, each position suggests a need to employ a structural
taxonomy of souls to account for why some will respond favorably to certain conditions
or overtures while others will remain resistant. Charting an agreement on the concept
offers something of a prescription the various witchdoctors (whether real or imagined by
a calculating Plato) can write. As the psychê goes, by way of this logic, so too would the
mind, the body, and the lens through which to see the world.
Interjecting an early treatment of the soul and showcasing the shared
presuppositions present extends beyond claiming a stake in that debate. Instead, it
highlights the risks associated with pathological approaches. It is not too far leap to start
by developing a concept like the soul or psychê and end by suggesting a flaw in a given
case can be reduced to a type of disease. The problematics introduced by an immaterial
concept (soul) on a physical and biological construct remain salient to early forerunners
building a neurorhetorical construct. Their efforts reopen old questions concerning the
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conceptualization of the mind, its relationship to metaphor, and how the affects of the
past underwrite or trouble the waters. It would seem, from these early forays, that the
relationship of the internal (“neurological”) and the rhetorical enjoy an existing and
longstanding symmetry. Other than performing an understanding of rhetorical history
relative to these related questions, a gaze at the past relationships between brain and
rhetoric under the vocabulary of psychê offers a cautionary note about reading through
neurology to inform rhetoric.

Against Simplicity and Equivocation

Fig. 5.2: “Visualization of a DTI Measurement of a Human Brain” by Thomas Schultz
Contemporary neurological inquiry and rhetoric introduces the problematic
possibilities of simplification and equivocation. However, the brain cannot offer a
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proverbial silver bullet to resolve or explain fundamental questions that benefit from
remaining open to multiple lines of inquiry. Instead, normalizing human functions
becomes immediately problematic for ethical reasons. Also, the invocation of a
neurological framework may suggest terminological equivocations that overlook the
value of maintaining productive tensions between the bases of knowledge. A critical
neurorhetoric must avoid these perils.
These issues are demonstrated when a shared conceptual standpoint sensitive of
Platonic and Sophistic positions on the soul haphazardly lead to localizing susceptibility
to persuasion to one part of a given hearer or reader. Neglecting the complexity and
richness of the rhetorical and the neurological permits falling into several mistaken
understandings of the intersection in which the whole—in this case, of memory—can be
localized to one particular part of the brain or neurological network. A critical neurology
challenges decontextualized brain research that generate such reductionisms. The
relationality of two divergent fields—neurological science and rhetorical inquiry—can
too quickly find points of agreement without looking to points of tension as productive
points of inquiry, and a part of the neurorhetorical method must remain deliberation as a
means of avoiding such infolding. Neurorhetorical methods could easily violate any of
these obstacles if they did not watch their footfalls carefully.
To explain, brain activity and the susceptibility of a soul in a classical Greek
sense can be hastily and problematically viewed as symmetrical. These terms can be
brought into fruitful conversation, provided their places of divergence are not neglected.
Sketching a method of investigating neurological inquiry on memory requires addressing
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the various issues of simplification. In Plato’s or Gorgias’s articulation, the soul can
overwhelm and outweigh other faculties of reason and logic. If so, it would
understandably remain a controversial position to any humanistic perspective that values
rationality as an exclusive domain of agency. If an irrational soul can either constrain or
advance convictions, the rational brain need not apply to discourse. And suddenly, a
conventional reading of Platonic anxiety can be brought to bear on the problematic. Yet
such iterations of susceptibility to guile would require a commonality or a sense of
familiarity with which to work.
Looking to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s treatment of metaphorical
reasoning, for example, it would seem that memory gains a similar primacy to
understanding affect. To Lakoff and Johnson, all reasoning is done in relationship to
other concepts. From birth onwards, things are learned and unlearned based on their
relative strength of association with other concepts. Lakoff and Johnson use an
associational logic to revisit the existing line of thought concerning the relationships of
psychê to rhetoric. While Lakoff and Johnson do not employ Platonic perspectives on
body and soul to generate their conception of metaphor, in all three schemas memories
become prescriptive insofar as they generate material reflexes. Metaphoric, Platonic, and
Sophistic thoughts on the intersections between symbolic actions and physiological
responses correspond to how certain words, smells, or images influence a bodily
response. All sets of terminology align physiological with rhetorical perspectives, and the
neurological, without undue reductivism, reclaims a sense of memory’s influence in the
present. Neurology cannot, of course, discredit an existing line of rhetorical thought.
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Instead, it may permit productive revisitations of existing discourses without returning to
a reified or reductive view of the brain. Rather, neurorhetoric offers a collaborative and
transdisciplinary lens that can also revitalize the phantastic tradition (as well as other
themes within rhetoric). The work of this chapter becomes to address neurological
intersections with memory more fully, without resorting to pitfalls like simplification and
equivocation.

From Paul, A Neuroquestion
In thinking of the availability of an audience to be persuaded, it may be helpful to
reconsider the remembrance mechanisms of prior experiences. For illustration, Paul’s
story can serve as a site for interrogating a neurologically infused pathos. William
James’s 1902 Varieties of Religious Experience lecture examines “medical materialism”
as a means by which religious experience could be understood through neurology and
notes, “. . . medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simpleminded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up
Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the
occipital cortex, he being an epileptic” (14). The now familiar conversion narrative of
Paul has yet another reading associated with it in James’s lecture: that of an honest
accounting of dishonest (diseased) perception; but, as James senses, the reified view of
merely placing sensation and perception as products of physical (brain bound) processes
lends itself to an unduly simplistic viewpoint. Viewing a given experience as pathological
also becomes generative of ethical and political problematics. Essentially, to think of
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Paul’s grounds, his lived experience, as products of disability interjects an allure of a
decidedly problematic nature.
In a synopsis of neurological research by John S. Duncan et. al., seizures of an
epileptic variety come from an “abnormal excessive or synchronous neuronal activity in
the brain”	
  (1089). Duncan et. al. outlines a “present belief that most common epilepsies
are complex traits with environmental effects acting on a background of multigenic or
oligogenic susceptibility, mediated by common genetic variation . . .” (1090). The
epilepsy William James connects to Paul’s conversion, Duncan et. al. positions as
resulting from a complex interplay of factors that meet at a given place and time. Quite
literally, the brain becomes wired to fail in certain contexts. Epilepsy exists not on a fixed
place in the body (a brain, a central nervous system, etc.) and cannot be reduced to even
small anatomical units, such as of genetics. However, those various interactions are
unmistakably salient to the broader response of overactive brain activity under certain
conditions, as Duncan et. al. are quick to note. The contemporary view of epilepsy relies
on a complex interplay of factors, from genetic to environmental, to explore beyond a
diseased or disabled frame.
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Fig. 5.3: “EEG Recording Cap” by Colin.
Neurology seems well poised to inform from the intersection of multiple relevant
themes when applied to stories like Paul’s. And, consequently, it becomes a means of
unpackaging rather than normalizing a given affect and permits the application of a
widely varied toolkit to sense dimensions that otherwise may be overlooked. For
instance, viewing the grounds from which Paul would subsequently write morphs from
the product of disease or disability to that of a unique material experience. A neurological
frame can initiate an alternative reading without having to resort to an unduly reductive
lens, as such possibilities suggest.
Using the idea of epilepsy resulting more from brain in context than expressly
context, Paul may have had to be at a particular place, a particular time, a particular set of
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conditions, and a particular familiarity for the reaction to have occurred. Like a key and a
lock, only that particular and peculiar combination could forge a ground from which to
write. Interrogating physiological affects in Paul’s conversion narrative illustrates a need
for another lens in which the biological and the social no longer compete or divide. An
alternative reading of Paul’s conversion that suggest brain (mis/)behavior underwrite the
rhetorical gestures within his conversion story further demonstrate the potential for a
constructive neurorhetoric. Paul’s seizure and conversion represent most closely perhaps
a story of bio-cultural connection in which Paul’s recognition of a booming voice and
bright light collapses the imaginary and the perceptive. The connection itself begins to
invoke a false binary in which neurological outlooks fail to offer rhetorical insights. A
physiological rubric, on the contrary, becomes a point from which the binary of physical
and symbolic begin to congeal as an alternative rhetoric.

Defining a Critical Neurorhetoric
Having acknowledged pitfalls, the objective now becomes to offer a more explicit
and functional method. The prefix neuro- has become a popular one affixed to a variety
of fields including economics and politics. Diverse fields converging on neurology can
create or reframe other pre-existing but mutually informing terminologies. This broad
interest in neurology can create or reframe other pre-existing by offering mutually
informing terminologies. Compound considerations of cultural and biology represent a
broad neuro-turn, one discussed as a rapidly congealing “transdisciplinary field” in
Melissa M. Littlefield and Jenell M. Johnson’s work. To Littlefield and Johnson, the
neuroscientific fields represent more than the application or grafting of biological or
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physiological findings. While such endeavors are not entirely without merit, they note,
the possibility for collaboration offers particular promise. Littlefield and Johnson
describe how “the neuroscientific turn has required and continues to require the
thoughtful invention of a multidisciplinary, interpretive language” (16). Developing a
multidisciplinary lens most directly benefits from several sources, they argue:
Conceived as a partnership between the arts, sciences, and cultural criticism, a
field like neuroaesthetics, for example, not only needs to examine the structures in
the brain that allow us to perceive the beautiful but also might ask how art might
alter the human brain; how literary movements have changed the way that we
think; how art, politics, and the body intermingle in productive and unexpected
ways. (15)
Littlefield and Johnson’s “neuroscientific” turn exemplifies the sort of gesture James
once employed to question Paul’s narrative opens a space for the productive juxtaposition
of material (environmental, genetic, biochemical) alongside linguistic / cultural factors.

Fig. 5.4: “3DSlicer-Kubicki” by Wenples.
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Kélina Gotman argues for a “seductive portrait” of the application of neuroscientific
principles, in which “society and human life” become “networked, changeable, full of
flowers” (72). The neuron, to Gotman, performs an equally metaphorical and “real”
function engaged in being “shaped” as much as shaping “in a rhetorical to-and-fro
between science and culture, scientific modeling and philosophic analysis” (72). A
neuron’s “tenor” can be fundamentally seen as an “interaction” that “perpetuates the
postmodern and post-structuralist projects of additive modes of intellection;
reconciliation between opposites” (73).
Gotman offers a fetishized view of the neuron that generates a productive bridge
between the interactivity of neurological thought and the additive modes of various poststructuralisms and -modernisms. Without unquestioned acceptance of either term as
emblematic or reification of any field (neurological, or post-structural/modern), her
connection warrants additional consideration as a point from which to develop a
neurorhetorical gaze. To Gotman, the neurological metaphor synchronizes external and
internal into one flux, one that is “not all in the head (or nerve center)” (83). Evan
Thompson similarly situates the logics of the nervous system, in that nervous systems
exist universally and operate to certain autonomous specifications. Thompson views
autonomy in a particular way, not in the sense of insularity but rather selfdetermination—in the sense of being sustained by its own dynamics, but not as insulated
from the surrounding world. He notes “should this process of self-production be
interrupted, the cellular components no longer form a unity, gradually diffusing back into
a molecular soup” (46). Further, Thompson argues that nervous systems “integrate the
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organism, holding it together s a mobile unity, as an autonomous sensorimotor agent”
(47).
Thompson and Gotman point to a troubling paradox—nervous systems are
embodied, bodies are contexualized by environments, and nervous systems delineate the
body from the environment. It would seem that the scale—of nervous system, body, and
environment—enmesh and inform Thompson’s warning that “the animate form of our
living body is thus the place of intersection for numerous emergent patterns of selfhood
and coupling” (49). Thompson is able to “forestall” an objection to his model by
synthesis: “the operation of the nervous system loops through the body (via sensory and
motor observations, and therefore it is not possible that the nervous system has
operational closure . . . . the organism cannot have an operationally closed dynamic” (49).
Thinking of the problem with memory, the notion becomes one of projection
(into) rather than reception (from) the world. Thompson extends emergence as an
individual process, using “dynamic co-emergence” as a guiding theme (60). From this
notion, he argues that “an autonomous system, such as a cell or multicellular organism, is
not merely self-maintaining, like a candle flame; it is also self-producing and thus
produces its own self-maintaining processes” (64). As suggested by Thompson and
Gotman’s understandings and applications of neurological thought, even the most ardent
of neurological scientist would refrain from situating the study of the brain as distinct
from context. Rather they would see the study of neurological activity as attempting to
quantify the ways in which the body is affected in various contexts. Those not yet
accepting the extended view discussed in prior chapters would likely still assert that the
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brain is merely a place in which the physiological processes often termed cognition
happen. It is a place that not only shares the characteristic of heavy interconnectivity
(with new connections forged continuously), but it is reliant on environmental and
ecological stimulation. For the extended view, the interconnection that transforms
neurons into neuro-nets need not remain bound to within the body. In both cases, whether
of a radically embodied, extended, or hybridized model, the viewpoint of neurological
thought invokes as much interest in environmental queues as internalized responses.
Consequently, the turn to neurorhetorics is a return to memory, one in which the past
extends from the agent and distributes as a generative construct.
Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached offer an analogy that summarizes this
return neatly. The growing field of neurological inquiry and those fields looking for
inspiration from it (neuro-economics, -politics, etc.) represent “not destiny but
opportunity” (15). The brain, under such emerging technologies as the Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) or Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scan permits
analysis of brain functionality in addition to anatomy. Rather than looking to simplify the
complicated questions of what it is to be human or to experience as a human, the
neurological pursuit of a plastic brain looks to examine how a part of a whole adapt to
conditions. Alternatively, using the projective lens a generative rhetoric of memory
provides, it allows the laboratory to become a place from which the affects made possible
of the past can distribute and extend from a network of neurological cells. Rose and AbiRached would also note that the study of brains as plastic sites of malleable bodily
behaviors “happily co-exists with longstanding ideas about choice, responsibility, and
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consciousness” (21). It would be tempting to repeat a bio-political error of situating
conduct or misconduct as signs of health or disease. Such a move, to invoke a
nominalized lens on the plasticity of the brain, would run afoul of the neurorhetorical
gaze developed thus far. Rose and Abi-Rached instead situate the internal frontier as a
space from which the phenomenological questions of experience can be fruitfully probed
alongside the material questions of brain activity.

Fig. 5.5: “PET Scan nasopharynx carcinoma” by Snako.
A transdisciplinary rhetoric has the benefit of drawing comprehensively, to enrich
the vocabulary using the contestations and tensions a diversity of fields can produce. To
rhetoric scholars, including Jordynn Jack, Chris Mays & Julie Jung, and Jeff Pruchnic, a
neurological rejection of a reductive lens in favor of a plastic one illustrates the value of a
neurological frame. The neurorhetorical framework their work begins to interject does
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not simply harken back to a heavily criticized cognitive or empiricist view of rhetoric.
Rather, it is informed heavily by the criticisms afforded earlier bids to explore rhetoric
using cognitive perspectives, which frequently became unduly deterministic. The
implications of their efforts to extend neurology into rhetoric require further explication.
In part, this interjection offers a means of distancing the line of inquiry from a heavily
criticized reified viewpoint. However, it also seeks to further develop the significance of
neuro-plasticity and -connectivity—either within or beyond the brain—as a core trope
and metaphor for rhetorical inquiry. In short, the material, the subjective, and the
technological can become a groundwork that neurorhetorics begin to explicate.
Mays and Jung carefully recount a tumultuous history of cognitive reductionism
as a part of their situating of neurorhetorics as a rhetoric of science. Their goal, to
“prohibit [neurorhetoric] from ending up anywhere” (42) aligns with the risks fetishizing
a material part of the body can incur. For instance, recalling criticisms raised by scholars
including Mike Rose and Brenda Jo Brueggemann, brain research if not carefully situated
could revert to antiquated ways of nominalization. Those with “normal” functions,
however defined, could become forms of benchmark against which others were judged. A
stigmatization could result that also overlooks how a reading of neurology as a rhetoric
benefits from probing the “discursive networks constitutive of contemporary
neuroscience” (42). These points of departure represent critical moves to Mays and
Young to differentiate the neurological from the cognitive, and refrain from returning to
waters previously troubled. For further elaboration, they would note a discounting of
cognitive research in composition studies due to the assignment of “truth values” to
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“observations and descriptions of phenomenon” (43). They draw extensively from
seminal texts, such as by James Berlin and Mike Rose, to make their case.
The need to situate a neurorhetoric as distinct from a problematic tradition of
cognitive research cannot be overstated. Yet this is not to discount the value of a close
reading of neurology for its value to rhetorical inquiry. As Jordynn Jack argues,
neurorhetoricians should consider both the rhetorics of neurology and from neurology.
Mays and Young offer a very similar alignment of the relationship between the fields, as
a critical participation in new brain research can unpackage implications for writing and
rhetoric pedagogy. In both articulations, the neurological viewpoint not only contains a
rhetoric but also becomes generative for rhetoric. Provided the warnings of avoiding
reductionism and refraining from nominalization are met, the neurological frame can
entice new perspectives.
Mays and Young turn towards an effort to synthesizing two divergent fields, to
“make more compelling” arguments “by the combined ethos of two disciplines” (51).
Working bi-directionally, the neurorhetorical lens Jack begins to sketch both draws from
and speaks to both fields and also remains sensitive to the concerns over reductionism.
Jack situates neurorhetorics shrewdly as not simply concerned with the uses of rhetoric to
frame neurology, although she sees such an approach as a viable line of inquiry. Instead,
in her framework, the objective becomes more broadly to work both into and from
neurology. While she admits that the communications inherent to the endeavors are rife
with their own rhetoric, her approach invites working through a neurological frame to
build rhetoric. She invokes a collaborative series of frameworks from which the fields
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can converge. Nevertheless, despite the initial work calling for a bi-directional approach
suggested by Jack, much work remains to be done to theorize and situate the confluence
of realms as a method of inquiry.
The cybernetic or psychotropic, which could be viewed as efforts to model
neurological rhetorics via computing or pharmacological interventions, can inform the
intersection of rhetoric with neurological thought. In Jean-Pierre Dupruy’s treatment,
cybernetics parallels developments in deconstruction, post-modernity, and poststructuralism. Dupruy pauses on a debate between two schools of thought: the analog and
the digital (roughly equivalent to the continuous and the discrete). To Dupruy, these
schools of thought gesture more generally to the challenges of separating physical and
material investigations from cultural or philosophical ones. For neurorhetorical theory,
Dupruy’s invocation of the digital and the analog offers an exigency—they insufficiently
address the problematics of materialisms. For illustration, Dupruy carefully observes that
cybernetics represent efforts to unpackage the physics of information, not the meanings
inherent to symbolic exchange. In this definition, cybernetics is a “general science of how
the human mind works” (3). It further concerns itself with the “artificial totalities” and
“simulacra” (models of models) also of concern through art (128). “Cybernetic totalities
are always artificial totalities, in which the parts are prior to the whole. In other words,
they are nominal totalities that are made wholes only by the organizing consciousness of
a third element, external to them . . .” (italics mine 128). He further notes that “the world
and its representations thus found themselves flattened by logic. In this respect, Dupruy
positions cybernetic models as anticipatory of themes familiar to postructuralisms: they
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were only models of themselves or else of other models, “mirrors of mirrors, speculums
reflecting no reality beyond themselves” (139). It is a third order, an “emergence” that
consists of “knowledge without a subject” that is “embodied in norms, rules, conventions,
institutions, which themselves are incorporated in individual minds in the form of
abstract schemata. . .” (157).
Dupruy “offers a “nonreductionistic” view “without having to accept holism”
(157) by asserting “complex methodological individualisms” and a “spontaneous social
order alongside natural and artificial order” (157). The digital and the analog results in
“deep affinities“ between the physics of cybernetics and “the deconstruction of the
metaphysical conception of the subject carried out by the structuralists and their
successors” (158). To elaborate, Dupruy projects strongly from a materialist perspective
and observes,
All of this is to say that the weakening, indeed the deconstruction of the
metaphysical (i.e. Cartesian and Leibnizian) concept of subjectivity took place at
the intersection of the social sciences and cognitive sciences on both a macro- and
a micro level. On the macro level, the attributes of subjectivity are not the
monopoly of individual subjects: collective entities can exhibit them as well. On
the micro level, the attributes of subjectivity are not attributes of an alleged
subject: they are emergent effects produced by the functioning of subject less
processes.
The deconstruction of the subject proceeds from recognizing a complex network of
interactions among simple entities—formal neurons in the case of the individual
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quasisubject, or schematic individuals in the case of the collective subject—and exhibits
remarkable properties (160). Dupruy’s sense of emergence (a “neoconnected” sense of
irreducible codependent) upends the gap between information theory (the physics of
cybernetics) and meaning (the domain most often associated with rhetorical activity) and
instead places a high demand on the neurological as symbolic and material. To Dupruy,
the “meaning” and “physics” offer a third space of abstraction, where the studies of one
informs the other (the physics/materialisms and linguistic/rhetorical collapse into what he
terms a “subjectless” process).
In many respects, Dupruy’s third space beyond the digital and the analog bears an
affinity with the “ecology of mind” theorized by Gregory Bateson. Also, it endeavors to
illustrate the inherent insufficiency (a “wrong[ness” of cognitive science) of exclusively
materialist perspectives (25). In short, neither camp—the analog or digital, material or
representational—offers as lucrative an understanding of memory as the generation of a
third order. Whether under the umbrella of automata or a mathematical theory that also
describes how “real objects . . . .embody the faculty of the mind”) (58), cybernetics
require the abstraction of the physical and interjects problematics of scale (the neuron/the
individual/the collectives as connected). The digital, analogical, physical, and symbolic
become parts of a larger whole which explains the “process by which living beings
become more complex” (italics mine 117). He continues, “if every organism is
surrounded by information, this is simply because it is everywhere surrounded by
organization, which itself, by the very fact of being differentiated, contains information.
Information, because it is part of nature, is therefore independent of human interpreters
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who assign meaning to it” (118). While Dupruy’s assertion challenges a relationship of
symbolic action as a basis for information and accounts for a possibility in which the
former exists outside the latter, it bears noting that realms beyond the human agent fall
outside the scope of this inquiry. His recognition more applicably aligns information as a
material and physical construct distinct from symbolic intuition, which offers
groundwork from which cybernetics can underwrite a connection of neurological and
rhetorical thought. To read Dupruy for this context is to rather see the forest from the
trees: pointing towards an ecology of information as informative to the ecological view of
the neurological mind relates memory and sensation to the same basic processes. Further,
reading through a history of cybernetics points towards an alternative history of
neurorhetorics. Given the relative newness of the terminology (if not the debates
represented) the value of counterhistories cannot be overstated.
Jeff Pruchnic’s treatment of neurorhetorics builds from a similar concern with the
juxtaposition of the physiological with the subjective, but he gives further consideration
to the notion of pharmacology. He also explicitly connects neurorhetorics with the sizable
corpus of rhetorical scholarship surrounding the body in rhetoric. For example, he draws
from scholars including John Schlib, Debra Hawhee, and Jack Selzer to offer an
embodied rhetoric from which the neurological framework can spring. Contemporary
human subjectivity, he notes, “has become inextricably marked by a mutating distribution
of agency and cognition, a circulation of shifting networks gathering interior and exterior
capabilities” (168). To Pruchnic, Marshall McLuhan’s suggestion that new media
technologies offer “an extension of man” could more fruitfully be considered a
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“distribution” of man. In many respects, his notion of a “distributed” subjectivity harkens
to precisely the form of phantasmic memory sketched in this project. To offer a synopsis,
Pruchnic identifies two converging trajectories of thought as they related to a
neurological frame. These build from the cybernetic and psychotropic frames, which
account for a convergence of affective and physiological—what he terms an “intension”
of self concurrently with question of affective states (externalization). Essentially a
compressive gesture results in which the exteriorities and interiorities of agency and
subjectivity wed themselves to a frame, which bears a kindred spirit with the notion of
emergence framed in my third chapter. For illustration, Pruchnic argues
Both conditions—the exteriorizing of subjectivity and the intension of the
material body—mutually create not so much feelings of alienation or
interpolation, but a certain sense of ‘internal alterity’ produced by being at the
center of various tangles of internal and external motivations, physiological and
ideational forces. (169)
Pruchnic describes the notion of alterity by drawing across the frames of social,
physiological, and technological. To Pruchnic, the interest in a distributed and material
neurorhetoric stems from the surge of scholarly interest in coding and recursion. Pruchnic
read’s Norbert Wiener’s hypothesis that a human may be reduced to transmittable code
alongside a relative wave of psychotropic interventions in the body as scenes of rhetorical
recursion. Essentially, to Pruchnic, the notion of the human is integrally related to the
material realms accessible in neurology’s networked structure. Jeff Pruchnic builds a
notion of neurorhetoric by rending permeable its borders with cybernetics, psychotropics,
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and materiality. Consequently, a neurorhetorical frame gains other fruitful point of access
for theorization.

Arts, Neuro-lessons of and from
Language, the prime example of the human mind, is characterized by its
combinatory power and infinite potential to create units of meaning through
vocabulary and syntax. In this regard, art and language share the same cognitive
underpinning. Art can be infinitely combinatorial too. It should thus not be
surprising that the art of many human societies is nearly limitless in creativity and
skill.
—Dahlia W. Zaidel
Painting isn’t an aesthetic operation; it’s a form of magic designed as a mediator
between this strange, hostile world and us, a way of seizing the power by giving
form to our terrors as well as our desires.
—Françoise Gilot, Carlton Lake, and Duncan Carse
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Fig. 5.6: “Optical Illusion 1” by TheGuyWho3433
“. . .stare at the center and let your sight go blurry, then move your head towards and
away from the screen in turn.”
2004, some ten years prior to the composition of this project, marked a significant
year in the intersection of neurology and aesthetics. Three separate experiments all
seemed poised to offer significant insights into the nature of the affects of art as described
by the functioning of the brain. The “decade of the brain,” to use a descriptor for the
1990s used by then President George H. W. Bush, was not too far in the past.
Consequently, the prospect of using brain research to understand the various processes
associated with value judgments seemed promising. In one study, Camilo Cela-Conde
and colleagues considered how eight female participants responded to an aesthetic
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presentation. Approximately half the respondents raised a finger if they thought a
stimulus was beautiful. Over 300 pictures were carefully selected to represent a mix of art
works from many genres. The results of scans completed during the test showed works
deemed beautiful correlated with significantly higher cerebral activation. In another study
Hideaki Kawabata and Semir Zeki examined the brain activity measured in response to
paintings from across a variety of genres. Participants had been exposed to the works
several days before the brain scan. Their study provided no conclusive localization
between works perceived beautiful or ugly after the passage of time. And in a study by
Oshin Vartanian and Vinod Goel, forty viewed paintings were ranked based on
preference and correlated with a brain scan. Only in the most strongly ranked cases was a
recognizable brain pattern observed.
These three results not only neglect to provide a silver bullet—a definitive place
or space in the brain from which aesthetic judgments can be made—but illustrate the
inherent difficulties of employing a neurological perspective to understanding aesthetics.
While this is not to say that the neurological perspective lacks merit, it is to illustrate the
inherent limitations to it. Consequently recognizing these efforts, with their related
shortcomings, also allows for recognizing those times and ways in which the intersection
can bear fruit for the broader conversation.
The problematic illustrated by these three studies are perhaps synthesized best
into a single question. How, Dahlia W. Zaidel asks, are “we to understand the
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological underpinnings of all” artistry regardless of
medium (5)? We may immediately harken, of course, to a Platonic critique of rhetoric vis
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a vis his Gorgias—one in which the rhetorical enterprise represents not art but knack
(like cookery). Yet the purpose of Zaidel’s invocation to peel back the notion of media, in
part, rather than move into the domains of what is (or is not) artistic, rhetorical, or at
some intersection thereof. Instead her project plots similarities across form rather than
compresses expression into bio-physiological affect. Juxtaposing the spoken word in the
contexts of all other forms of art based on their patterns of influence using the
terminology “cognitive underpinning” may, at first glance, seem like Zaidel performs a
reductionist reading which runs afoul of the previously described barriers. Looking as she
does, for instance, for possible material places associated with emotions like fear or
appreciation of beauty, or attempting to identify some sorts injuries to the brain that can
stifle appreciation or creativity certainly do function to situate the brain at the core of
aesthetic or rhetorical reasoning. For instance, Zaidel adopts a perspective that “the most
useful insights into the neuroanatomical underpinnings of the complex process of
creating art” can be found in studying brain damage (5). Or, in other words, she notes
“the arts exemplify neuropsychology in action” (6).
However, despite the attention she gives to the relationality of brain functions to
production, Zaidel’s work more directly looks to the vocabulary a neurological
perspective can bring to bear on the matters of artistic critique and affect. For instance,
the ability to convey a form of realism also includes the capacity for violating
expectancies for how things do or should work. Hyper-realistic or surrealist lenses afford
a recognizable quality that, in turn, can be turned onto itself. The more real, in such cases,
the less reality—or, more succinctly stated, the scope of representation becomes stretched
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to question the notion of representation itself. Under such a line of thought, the idea of
recognizability gains a prominence that a neurological frame could be useful, which is to
say that the ability to describe how far a signifying representation could depart from the
observable characteristics of the signified without losing its familiarity would offer a
number of tangible benefits. Zaidel also offers a very important form of qualification,
which echoes previously described sentiments, when she notes that the relationships
between the “art and the brain” remain “somewhat elusive because the components of art
have not been fully defined” (19). Indeed, provided the notion of art remains variable—as
well it should, to account for generations of new forms of production and critique, as but
two offices of art—so too must its neurological affinities. Rather than resolve old
perspectives or quantify the affects of art locally, the neurological perspective instead
seeks to offer a complimentary and enriching vocabulary that keeps things open and
malleable. The essential grounding offered, to interject a vocabulary that appropriates
neurology without requiring a simplification to it, aligns with the objectives of this
chapter and thus enriches the chapter. Zaidel’s intervention within a trend in aesthetics
and criticism can be productively milled to inform a neurorhetorical approach to memory.
While Zaidel probes neurological correlations with the arts that turn to
reductionism at times, her synopsis also illustrates the capacity for an enriched
vocabulary to serve the ends of critique. From the ancestry suggested in the previously
described section’s frames—the psychotropic, the cybernetic, and the cognitive—a
critical non-reductive form of neurorhetoric becomes less speculative and more
accessible. Yet neuro-rhetoric shares a common border with neuroscientific approaches

173

to art, which as a concurrent form of inquiry necessitates additional consideration. Irving
Massey offers a means of describing the enriched vocabulary of neurology for the arts
under the auspices of neuroaesthetics that pinpoints a point of co-implication neatly.
Massey draws more extensively from representation as a trope in order to demonstrate
that “the act of perception is itself a partly an act of imitation” (57). More specifically,
situated between the “endogenous and the mimetic,” perception is a “negotiation” and at
times “a struggle” (57). The neurological can inform sub-behavioral patterns that, in turn,
become projective in a phantastic sense. But before arriving at such an analysis, which
this chapter later does, the groundwork for a neurological understanding of the
imagination: specifically, how the brain activates in particular ways that becomes
informative to the interventions of art, necessitates additional consideration.
Massey’s perceptual intervention, for illustration, extends from and is heavily
indebted to Dahlia Zaidel’s treatment of “simultanagnosia” in which the apprehension of
a picture is described. Massey would note that the “constant conflict of space vs.
boundary,” as one articulation, would place a burden on the viewer as a form of sense
maker (54). For instance, she notes, that a picture “is always actually or implicitly
framed” which results in the picture needing us as viewers to perform certain actions
(55). We never see the whole picture, only that which is packaged for consumption.
Anything beyond or outside the frame belongs to the eye of the viewer, while a building
she notes by contrast does not place similar constraints or make similar demands of the
gaze.
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Massey, however, offers a resounding qualification that helps differentiate
neurological approaches to criticism from performing an overreaching act of reduction.
She notes, for instance, that the processes associated with brain functionality cannot “help
us to decide whether we like the poem, or how much” (48). As it relates to the
neurological understanding of artistic perception, as distinct from attempting to situate
creativity within the brain, Massey’s point raises several alluring prospects. Beyond but
inclusive of the notion of the simultanagnosia that articulates the functions that
differentiate a photograph from a site-specific experience, her notion sets as distinct the
un-quantifiable aspects as experience. The reified brain can speak to the various points
tripped in proximity to terms such as awe, but cannot become the totality of awe-ness, to
be awed. Perhaps more succinctly stated, Massey observes “neurosciences is best at
connecting certain features of an aesthetic process with specific events in the brain, but
artists and consumers of art care more about the integrated processes, the whole
experience, than they do about localization” (19).
The project of neuroaesthetics could then be summarized to answer three
questions: to probe the physical correlates to invention, to explore the mechanisms of
affect, and to identify the material basis of symbolic descriptors. In these ways, the
neuroaesthetic gaze becomes particularly fruitful to rhetorical inquiry. Massey would
invite a claim derived from function versus localization—what the brain does versus
where certain processes are housed. The former aligns brain science with trends of
conversation within the fields to which it is applied, and the latter seeks to sense the subunits that would conjoin to become a given descriptor or theme. The latter would also
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offer, Massey argues, much less value to the field. It would instead perhaps “weaken or
undermine neurology’s contributions to aesthetics” (16). At issue, then, would again be
the capacity for a divergent field with distinct methodology to join and contribute to an
alternative conversation surrounding the criticism of art. Along similar veins, a
neuroscientific stab at discerning how artists function at the level of brain activity would
not equate to a totalizing expression of the artistic endeavor. The sites of production are
as elusive to pinpoint as the sites of reception; yet the effort to place, to pinpoint, or to
localize within the brain marks a departure from the opening of a meta-field sketched in
this chapter.

The Synaptics of Phantasmata: In Closing
Memory has always fascinated me. Think of it. You can recall at will your first
day in high school, your first date, your first love. In doing so you are not only
recalling the event, you are also experiencing the atmosphere in which it
occurred—the sights, sounds, and smells, the social setting, the time of day, the
conversations, the emotional tone. . . .But my pleasure is short-lived. Two days
later, in the early evening, we are startled by heavy banging on our apartment
door. I remember that banging even today. My father has not yet returned from
working at the store. My mother opens the door. Two men enter. They identify
themselves as Nazi policemen and order us to pack something and leave our
apartment.
—Eric R. Kandel
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Reading memory neurorhetorically revives the phantastic tradition, and augments
it through terms such as plasticity. Memory becomes a distributed construct situated in
networks of neurons, but no more bound to the brain than the environment surrounding
the body. Rather, the mechanisms of perception that conjoin environment with cognition
enmesh to become an emergent construct, an articulation and manifestation as predicated
on memory functions as recollection or instinct. The ambience of a place, any place,
relies as extensively on the smallest cells of the body—the neurons—as the grandest
structures and acoustics of the place themselves. The city, the everyday, and the
collective of which a given person is a part cannot be reduced to that person’s lived
experience. However, that person’s lived experience exists across the technologies and
places inhabited as much as the past embodied in their neurological networks. In this
way, a turn to neurology reclaims a counter-history of memory, one which is enriched
through the lens of emergence and complexity. This final section endeavors to illustrate
this extension and connection through one instance within the neurological field.
Howard Caygill describes the legacies of two winners of the Nobel Prize who
were contemporaries in the neuro-physiological study of memory: Eric R. Kandel and
Gerald Edelman. Beyond sharing a topic of study and acclaim for their contributions,
Kandel and Edelman represent opposite ends of a central debate to neurological inquiries
of memory. Should memory, Caygill summarizes, be positioned “structurally or
functionally?” The former, an approach championed by Edelman, focuses upon the “role
of the architecture” of the brain in memory (228). The functionalist approach with which
Kandel was affiliated considers the “electrical and biochemical processes that contribute
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to the plasticity of the synapse” (228). Caygill considers these approaches
complimentary—rather than being of binary nature, these two approaches offer a
different but mutually supportive vocabulary. Working through both approaches, Caygill
suggests a possibility for a plastic memory that also follows a broader trend:
In recent decades, however, developments in the neurophysioanatomy of memory
suggest a radically new understanding not only of the formative processes of
individual memory but also of those of social and cultural memory and, most
importantly, of the inseparable relationship of them. (227)
Far from approaches of reification or reductionism, neurological studies of memory tend
to consider more directly memory as a distributed and ecological construct that emerges
synaptically. The synapse, rather than being a set structure, represents a vacancy or freespace for communication between neurons. The building blocks from which to consider a
neural-net, a set of memories, a collective memory, and a site of public commemoration
derive from the tiny gap across which neurons can communicate. This synaptic space
affords sufficient structural integrity to preserve, while also promoting a malleability
appropriate to developing new connections. To employ the words of Joseph LeDoux,
“Let’s start with a fact: People don’t come preassembled, but are glued together by life. . .
. The particular patterns of synaptic connections in an individuals brain, and the
information encoded by these connections, are the keys to who that person is” (3). In
short, a synaptical view lends itself to both blurring the lines of memory with perception,
and allows for emergent constructs beyond the subject to transpire. It is towards the
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synaptic sense of memory as both the first and final frontier of a phantastical reading of
memory I now turn.
John Kubie discusses a complex interplay of neurological factors when he
describes similarities between the physiological processes associated with imagination
and perception. To Kubie, the “essence of perception ad imagination” are cell assemblies
and mental models. With the former, “the activation of a cell assembly leads to conscious
perception.” A given image or idea (a mental model) is essentially maintained across a
web of related parts of the brain to Kubie’s synthesis, but Kubie notes “we have no idea
how this happens.” Simply put, from the standpoint of neurology, recognition and recall
bear an affinity—they are the same basic activities. The brain cannot distinguish between
the images produced through imagination and those born of sensing stimuli. A phantastic
approach to memory rhetoric finds such perspectives unsurprising—memory would not
be found at the end of perception awaiting retrieval, but an active role within constructing
a sense of the world. Kubie’s recognition of the relationship between mental model and
cell assembly promisingly conjoins mental processes often viewed as separate, but
remains steeped in a model of passivity and retention.
Although Edmund T. Rolls considers more closely the functions and properties of
brain activity that inform emotional response, he also inserts into the conversation a
broader understanding of synapsis of interest to this project. He notes that “internal
feedback between [a neural network]’s neurons that can fall into a number of states. Each
state corresponds to a decision and consists of one winning population of neurons firing
at a high rate and inhibiting the other populations.” The notion of inhibition is
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particularly promising because it suggests the possibility of competing potential
connections within a given context. The one that yells loudest by simply flooding the
synapsis becomes the more powerful connection. Rather that being a space, the synapsis
becomes a battleground. Competing connections all fire, with strength being a potential
term to discuss how the neural network functions. Rolls positions this framework as
closely related to memory functions. He notes that the “same type of noise that influences
memory is recalled influences what thought follows any one thought” (187).
Consequently, memory may contribute to “loose and particularly creative” connections
understood as creativity. Memory, approached synaptically, bears a symmetry with
imagination, perception, identity, and creativity—all correspond to the strength of
connections across synapsis. When entering this realm, Rolls reminds of a “probabilistic”
form of mental processing.
Memory as explored through neurorhetorical lens finds a material perspective
that, despite being situated in the body, is not brain bound or reductive. Understandably,
the term “neurological” may invoke highly positivistic and scientific connotations. It
certainly invokes a field that seeks anatomical understandings of cognitive processes such
as memory. And focusing on the neurological seemingly favors the individual as
divorced from contexts and dependent on a sense of reification. While neurorhetorics can
be informed by efforts to assimilate science’s understandings of mental activity into
rhetoric, it need not be confined to that particular understanding. In similar ways, it
extends beyond subjectivities in which environmental (whether cultural or material in
nature) sources of affect are neglected. Subjective approaches favor the individual,
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seeking to understand the mechanisms of internal process as distinct from environmental
processes. Although both approaches (subjective and scientistic) offer useful insights that
remain applicable, neurorhetorics pulls more generally from a number of fields to
investigate the interface the inner workings of human agents that organize and structure
the environment in defiance of the binary between intrinsic and the extrinsic.
Neurological approaches to memory rhetorics concern the embodied dynamics by which
intrinsic/extrinsic interact—allowing for the synthesis of a new perspective that expands
from the subject of neuron to the object of materializing the past in an extended form.
Born equally of intrinsic and extrinsic (subject and environment), the
neurorhetorical approach described in this chapter produces attention structures that offer
vital mechanisms for providing order to otherwise disordered and chaotic environments.
However, they are not divorced from those environments. The subject, a neurorhetorical
approach would assert, engages in transactions across the binary of the internal and the
external. Admittedly, this definition has many parts to it. To consider a brief definition by
negation, neurorhetorics exist at the points between the subjective/psychoanalytical,
cultural/collective, and material/real. More broadly, neurorhetorical approaches consider
perceptual structures that produce order and attention (including their ontologies,
functionalities, and formative processes) across realms of art, rhetorical thought, and
cultural history.
Paradoxically, the thing most individualistic (the neurological basis of physical
brain) can to this line of argument address the gaps between people and things as much as
past to present. Gotman observes a tendency to “remember objects and events only
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inasmuch as the memory conjured is useful to the body – for performing an action (such
as recognizing a significant object, acting upon an impose, making tea, or fixing the
fence)” (83). It is her use of “conjured” that I find particularly insightful in light of the
treatment of soul previously mentioned. Gotman’s neurology is a highly philosophized
one in which what the neuron does is of much greater importance that what it is. Whether
defined as synapse, cell, or network, the neuron exists to connect experience with
history—which, as previously defined, becomes a question of rhetorical memory. Yet the
neurological approach also resides and rests on questions of representation. The image of
a brain begins to also be a question of brain-image. While this may seem like a rather
circular perspective employing the terminology of image loosely (aka: the image being
something generated by brain activity and also being of the brain as active under
conditions of scanning), the reason for such an approach is rather direct: it illustrates the
degree to which a neurorhetoric can both inform and be informed by currents within poststructuralisms and –modernisms. Moreso, it points towards a future for the field of
memory studies within rhetoric—one in which the present discourses in neurology can
inform, enrich, and extend the tradition transformed and revitalized in response to
emergence.
The work remaining to be done, as a continuation of this project, is to consider the
matters of material bodily affect within a rhetorical vocabulary of memory. New means
of unpackaging the functionality of the brain, ascertaining how new forms of expression
and technology contribute to resonances, and studies of collective trauma all hinge on
seeing neurological networks as rhetorical components that renew old questions. The past
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remains with us, but the study of its continuing influence need not be constrained to one
or the other—the rhetorical or the neurological. Rather, future research can respond to the
possibility of speaking from a central position informed by both.
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